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Abstract 
Speech Act Theory is concerned with the ways in which 
language can be used. It originated with Austin, but was 
developed by Searle. The theories of Austin and Searle are 
described and several problem areas are identified. If it is to 
be a viable theory of language usage, speech act theory must be 
able to integrate with a theory of discourse structure, because 
if speech acts are identifiable as units of language, then it 
must be possible include them in a model of discourse. 
The second chapter examines discourse structure, examining 
two rival theories: the discourse analysis approach and the 
conversational analysis approach. Discourse analysis is broadly 
sympathetic to speech act theory, whereas, conversational 
analysis is not. The claims of conversational analysis are 
examined and are found to be wanting in several respects. Speech 
Act Theory is then discussed with a particular emphasis on the 
problem of relating speech acts to each other within a larger 
unit of discourse. It is noted that Austin, by including the 
expositive class of speech acts, allows for the possibility of 
relations between speech acts, whereas Searle's description of 
speech acts effectively rules out any relations between speech 
acts. 
The third chapter develops speech acts in terms of a 
schematic model consisting of cognitive states, a presumed 
effect of the speech act and an action. The cognitive states are 
represented using modal and deontic operators on the proposition 
within epistemic logic. This idea of the description of a 
speech act in terms of cognitive states is developed in Chapter 
Four. 
In Chapter Four, speech acts are related using a 
communicated cognitive state to pair two speech acts together 
into a primary and secondary speech act. It is noted that the 
idea of a primary and secondary speech act is present within the 
discourse analysis model of discourse (in the form of the 
initiation-response cycle of exchanges) and also in the 
conversational analysis approach to discourse (in the form of 
the adjacency pair). The conclusion from this is that the two 
approaches are perhaps not so incompatible as might first 
appear. 
Chapter Five deals with grammatical sentence types and 
their possible use in communicating cognitive states. It also 
examines modal auxiliary verbs and their possible relationship 
to the modal and deontic operators used in the cognitive state 
model. 
In Chapter Six, theories of indirect speech acts are 
described. An explanation of indirect speech acts is developed 
using pragmatic maxims and cognitive states to explain why 
certain indirect forms are chosen. This leads to a theory of 
linguistic politeness and a use model of speech acts. 
Contents 
1. Speech Act Theory 1 
1.1 Introduction 1 
1.2 The Seminal Work of Austin 2 
1.3 Searle's Theory of Speech Acts 3 
1.4 The Formal Theory of Speech Acts 8 
1.5 Indirect Speech Acts 19 
1.6 A Critique of Searle's Theory of Speech Acts 23 
1.7 Sadock's Linguistic Approach to Speech Acts 25 
1.8 The Inferential Approach to Speech Act Theory 27 
1.9 Some Criticisms of Speech Act Theory 31 
1.10 Computational Models of Speech Acts 35 
2. Discourse Structure 41 
2.1 Introduction 41 
2.2 Linguistic Approaches to Discourse Structure 45 
Discourse Analysis 45 
Conversational Analysis 48 
2.3 Computational Models of Discourse Structure 54 
2.4 Other Artificial Intelligence Approaches to 
Discourse Structure 56 
2.5 Issues in Discourse Analysis 60 
3. The Deconstruction of Speech Act Verbs 69 
3.1 Introduction 69 
3.2 Speech Acts as Schemas 79 
3.3 A Description of Assertive Speech Acts 87 
3.3.1 Claim 87 
3.3.2 Assure 88 
3.3.3 Argue 90 
3.3.4 Inform 91 
3.3.5 Conjecture 93 
3.3.6 Swear 94 
3.4 Commissive Speech Act Verbs 95 
3.4.1 Promise 95 
3.4.2 Consent 97 
3.4.3 Refuse 98 
3.5 Directive Speech Act Verbs 100 
3.5.1 Request 100 
3.5.2 Tell 102 
3.5.3 Require 104 
3.5.4 Permit 105 
3.6 Declarative and Expressive Speech Act Verbs 106 
3.7 Evidence to Support the Cognitive Thesis in 
Child Language 107 
3.8 What is the Cognitive State Hypothesis? 110 
3.9 Formal Speech Acts and Expressives 117 
3.10 Conclusions 119 
4. Speech Acts and Discourse Structure 120 
4.1 Introduction 120 
4.2 Cognitive States and Context 125 
4.3 Speech Act Schemas and Logical Schemas 129 
4.4 Discourse Pairs and Cognitive States 146 
4.5 The Thesis Restated 152 
5. From Speech Act to Utterance 156 
5.1 Introduction 156 
5.2 The Four Basic Sentence Types 159 
5.3 Speech Acts and Sentential Structure 162 
5.4 Modal Auxiliaries and Cognitive States 166 
Will 166 
Can 170 
May 170 
Shall 172 
Should, Ought and Must 173 
5.5 The Logical and Pragmatic Use of Modal Auxiliaries 173 
5.6 Speech Acts and Discourse Markers 177 
5.7 On a Taxonomy for Speech Acts 180 
5.8 Summary and Formal Model of Utterance 
Generation 181 
6. Indirect Speech Acts 185 
6.1 Introduction 185 
6.2 Searle's Theory of Indirect Speech Acts 187 
6.3 A New Theory of Indirect Speech Acts 193 
6.3.1 Introduction 193 
6.3.2 Indirect Speech Acts and Authority 195 
6.3.3 Pragmatic Maxims, Politeness and Indirect 
Speech Acts 196 
6.4 Politeness and Face 197 
6.5 Strategies for Indirectness Based on Cognitive 
States 202 
6.6 Indirect Speech Acts and Pragmatic Maxims 213 
6.7 A Schematic Model of the Speech Act "Request" 217 
6.8 Summary 224 
References 226 
Appendix 1 233 
Figures and Tables 
Figure 1.1 The Semantic Tableau for Assertives 13 
Figure 1.2 The Semantic Tableau for Commissives 14 
Figure 1.3 The Semantic Tableau for Directives 15 
Figure 4.1 The Basic Conversation for Action 126 
Table 4.1 The Structural Relationships of 
ASSERT/STATE(P) 137 
Table 4.2 The Structural Relationships for 
SUGGEST(P) 140 
Table 4.3 The Structural Relationships for 
FORBID(P) 140 
Table 4.4 The Structural Relationships of the 
State bel(S pP) 144 
Table 4.5 Possible Hearer Responses to 
want(S do(H P)) 144 
Acknowledgements 
I started work on my Ph. D. thesis in October 1985, little 
realising how long it would take or how much effort would have to 
be put into it. I started out with some vague notions of Natural 
Language Processing and only slowly moved into the area of speech 
act theory. 
There were two major changes to my life that took place 
during my work on the thesis. The first of these was a move away 
from Leeds Polytechnic to City University. This proved immediately 
beneficial, as I was allowed much more time to develop my thoughts 
and there were no real problems with being located so far from 
Leeds University. Indeed the train journeys were often very 
valuable as they allowed me time to think about certain ideas. 
However, I will not be sorry if I don't have to wait at Doncaster 
station again. 
The second change in my life was the birth of my son 
Christopher, this took place in December 1988, and although a 
joyous event, posed a major threat to the completion of the 
thesis. Christopher never slept through one single night during 
his first year of life and this frequently left me too exhausted 
to do anything on the thesis. I also found it almost impossible at 
first to work at home during the evenings and weekends and with a 
full time job, it was often difficult to get much done. 
With respect to various parts of the thesis, I must of course 
thank David Holdcroft for guiding me through some of the more 
mysterious apsects of speech act theory. I would also like to 
thank Sachiko Ide for stimulating within me an interest in 
politeness. 
I must thank my wife Sim for explaining to me the Chinese 
idea of face and for providing me with some of the examples. 
My thanks to various members of the Philosophy Department at 
Leeds University with whom I have had discussions at some stage on 
some aspect of my thesis. I mention: Timothy Potts, Harry Lewis 
and Peter Millican. I must admit that I spent more time talking to 
Peter Millican about the Duble Muzio Gambit or the Marshall 
Attack. 
I acknowledge with thanks the financial support of City 
University, who also provided me with a light timetable load in my 
second year there. I also grudgingly acknowledge the financial 
support of Leeds Polytechnic in the early stages of the thesis. 
I would like to thank my wife Sim for her forebearance and 
patience and for putting up with the fact that on Friday, Saturday 
and Sunday evenings (as well as the rest of the week) I would be 
upstairs using the word processor. 
Finally, I must of course thank my supervisor David Holdcroft 
to whom I owe an immense debt of gratitude. What can I say? 
Only that I consider it an honour to know and to have worked with 
a scholar and a gentleman. 
-1- 
1. Speech Act Theory 
1.1 Introduction 
The main direction of this thesis will be to explore what 
exactly a speech act is or should be. Speech Act Theory originated 
as a theory within the Philosophy of Language to explain the ways 
that we can use language, but since then speech act theory has 
been used within a wider context in linguistics and more recently 
in computational models. This wider use has thrown up several 
problems that indicate that the traditional view of speech acts 
developed by Austin and Searle is no longer sufficient to provide 
an explanation of language use. In this thesis, I will set out to 
explore speech acts within a wider framework, paying particular 
attention to discourse structure and also to speech acts at a 
cognitive level. One issue that will be explored in some detail is 
the role of indirect speech acts in a comprehensive theory. By 
taking a cognitive approach to speech act theory, I am assuming a 
priori that such a level exists, rejecting the view held by 
Dreyfus that language understanding is achieved in a non-rule-like 
manner or that "we just do it" (Dreyfus 1979). 
The remainder of Chapter One looks at traditional speech act 
theory and outlines some of the problems that have been thrown up 
by recent research particularly in Linguistics and Artificial 
Intelligence. Chapter Two is a description of research into 
Discourse Structure which includes how speech act theory might fit 
in. Chapter Three is an exploration of how speech acts may be 
represented as a "logical form" a kind of description of what the 
speech act is describing. Chapter Four describes how speech acts 
may be included in a model of discourse. Chapter Five extends this 
idea and looks at surface forms. Chapter Six attempts to provide 
an explanation of indirect speech acts using pragmatic maxims as 
Bach and Harnish claim (Bach and Harnish 1979). It also pays 
particular attention to the use of indirect speech acts in 
theories of linguistic politeness. 
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1.2 The Seminal Work of Austin 
Speech Act Theory originated with J. L. Austin, summarised in 
his William James Lectures presented at Harvard University in 1955 
(Austin 1962). Austin started by examining the view that a 
statement of fact ought to be verifiable in some way. He believed 
that many philosophical problems had arisen because of a desire to 
treat all utterances as verifiable statements. He gave the term 
"constative" to straightforward statements of fact. However he 
also described statements which 
... do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything 
at all are not 'true' and 'false' and [for which] the 
uttering of a sentence is, or is a part of the doing of 
an action which would not normally be described as 
saying something. 
(Austin op. cit. p. 3) 
He was referring here to utterances such as I name this ship..., 
and he called this class of utterance performative. Additionally 
he stated that when performative utterances of this type go wrong 
they are not so much 'false' as 'unhappy'. This doctrine of the 
things that can be and do go wrong with performatives, he 
described as infelicities. Having made this apparently clear cut 
distinction between constative and performative utterances Austin 
then went on to compare the 'implications' of performative 
utterances with 'certain discoveries made about constative 
utterances'. He analysed performative and constative utterances 
with respect to entailment, implicature and presupposition. 
Although he saw some sort of entailment involving performative 
utterances, for example, I promise entails I ought, he was not 
entirely happy with the notion that performative and constative 
utterances both have entailments. 
But I do not want to say that there is any parallel 
here; only that at least there is a very close parallel 
in the other two cases... 
(Austin op. cit. p. 54). 
Austin's sense of unease here has often been overlooked by many 
who have attempted to extend his ideas. 
Austin started by identifying a specific problem viz. that 
not all statements could be verified as true or false. He then 
analysed in some detail the nature of performative statements, but 
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then attempted to relate these ideas in a more general way to all 
types of statements and, at the end of his book, had left many 
loose strands and a lot of unanswered questions. He concluded that 
all utterances that he had examined had a happiness or unhappiness 
dimension, an illocutionary force, a truth/falsehood dimension and 
a locutionary meaning; and he argued that what was required was a 
study of the range of illocutionary forces of an utterance. 
1.3 Searle's Theory of Speech Acts 
A key response to these questions and problems was made by 
Searle, the pupil of Austin, who was primarily responsible for 
developing speech act theory into the form in which it is now 
known. His most important works in this area are Searle 
(1969,1979) and Searle and Van der Veken (1985). Searle's work 
differs from Austin's in several respects: firstly Austin 
distinguished between locutionary, illocutionary and 
perlocutionary acts, whereas Searle was somewhat sceptical about 
this distinction, preferring instead a rigorous approach to the 
description of illocutionary acts. This point is discussed in 
Holdcroft (1978). A second distinction concerns the different 
emphasis placed by Austin and Searle on the force and meaning of a 
speech act. The force of a speech act is a form of gradation of a 
particular type of speech act. Thus if we accept directive as a 
term to describe those speech acts that are attempts by the 
speaker to get the hearer to carry out an action, then a 
suggestion would carry a veak force whereas a command would carry 
a stronger force. Searle used the idea of illocutionary force as 
the central plank of his theory, particularly in his formal theory 
of illocutionary logic (Searle and Van der Veken 1985). 
Austin, on the other hand was more concerned with individual 
speech acts and less with illocutionary force. Another notion that 
has been promoted by Searle's theory is the idea of direction of 
fit. Searle maintains that there are "four and only four" 
directions of fit in language. These are: 
i) Word-to-World, where the utterance fits an independently 
existing state of affairs in the world. A statement of 
fact exhibits this direction of fit. 
ii) World-to-Word, where the world is altered to fit the 
propositional content of the illocution. An example of 
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such an act would be a directive speech act, such as an 
order. 
iii) The double direction of fit is when the world is altered 
to fit the propositional content of the utterance by 
being represented as so altered. For example: I name 
this ship the SS Titanic". 
iv) The null direction of fit. Where there is no question of 
achieving success of fit between word and world. 
According to Searle expressive acts (i. e. those where 
the speaker is expressing his feelings) provide examples 
of the null direction of fit. 
If we accept the view that language lies purely in a two- 
dimensional plain between the world and words uttered, then there 
are, Searle argues, no other possibilities, however this denies 
the possibility of any referential relationships between speech 
items. When I summarise my criticisms of Searle this point will be 
explored further. What is most likely is that the notion of 
direction of fit is something totally alien to Austin's view of 
speech acts. Indeed as I shall point out later, it is likely that 
Austin would have taken issue with the "flattening" of language 
into a two-dimensional plain which is necessary for Searle's 
theory. 
Searle attempted to describe the differences between the 
different types of illocutionary acts Searle (1979). He was able 
to distinguish twelve important differences: 
1. Differences in the point of the type of act. The illocutionary 
point is one of the most important components of Searle's theory. 
The illocutionary point is the purpose of an act of a particular 
type, for example, the point of an assertive act is to tell people 
how things are. Searle considers the illocutionary point to be a 
component of the illocutionary force. 
2. Differences in the direction of fit between words and the 
world. The direction of fit is central to Searle's theory, if it 
falls then his whole taxonomy falls apart. The four possibilities 
have been described above. However the whole notion of direction 
of fit rests on the a priori assumption of two-dimensional view 
of language as a relationship between words and the world. The 
whole idea of direction of fit falls apart if it can be shown that 
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locutions sometimes serve some purpose other than to relate to the 
world. 
3. Differences in the expressed psychological state. An 
illocutionary act may express belief (as in an assertion), 
intention (as in a promise) or even desire or want. This is an 
interesting but minor point of the Searle theory. If we assume 
that there are a small number of possible psychological states 
that relate to illocutionary acts, then it ought to be possible to 
represent the acts in terms of these psychological states. This 
idea is pursued in Chapter Three, when I examine underlying 
representations of illocutionary acts. 
4. Differences in the force or strength with which the 
illocutionary point is presented. It is clear that insisting is 
far stronger than suggesting. Hence we can assign a degree of 
strength to the illocutionary point. It appears to be intuitive 
that if we are going to categorise, say, all assertive acts 
together, that some of them have a stronger point than others, 
from the hesitant suggestion to the forceful assertion. However, 
one issue relating to the degree of force of the illocutionary 
point is the question of whether the degree enables us to put 
individual types of assertive onto some linear (or indeed non- 
linear) scale, or whether different types of utterance that purvey 
the same illocutionary act have a different degree of strength of 
the illocutionary point. Searle appears to ignore this 
distinction, but it is important if we are going to be able to 
describe exactly what a speech act is. It also raises the question 
of whether, for example, considerations of politeness should come 
into speech act theory. 
5. Differences in the sta,: us or position of the speaker and hearer 
as they bear on the illocutionary force of the utterance. Although 
defining this difference, Searle makes very little use of it. It 
is fairly clear that the relative status of the speakers has a 
bearing on the types of utterance used in a conversation, but 
Searle's theory has almost nothing to say about this. There 
appears to be an effect upon the strength of the illocutionary 
point. For example a person of higher status may make a suggestion 
to someone of lower status which is effectively a directive. The 
issue of relative status of speaker and hearer is explored by 
Berry (1982). 
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However, status also bears a relationship to topic, under 
certain circumstances, an inferior may issue orders to a superior, 
for example: Kindly remove your hand from my knee. Perhaps this is 
of more relevance when considering discourse structure, because it 
is effectively contextual in nature. However, the ability of 
individuals to affect an utterance form according to their 
relative statuses casts some doubt on the validity of the claim by 
Searle of the one-to-one relationship between utterance form and 
illocutionary point. 
6. Differences in the way the utterance relates to the interests 
of the speaker and the hearer. By this Searle is referring to the 
distinction between pairs of words such as boast and lament. To 
boast that P is to assert P while expressing pride that P is the 
case, on the other hand lamenting that P is to assert that P while 
expressing regret that P is the case. It is of course quite 
possible for two individuals to contradict each other, one 
boasting that P and the other lamenting that P. A lamentation that 
P may well take the form of: I very much regret that..., boasting 
on the other hand is more conventional. For example: I hold the 
International Master's Title, said by one chess player to another, 
may be seen as boasting, but in different societies even a 
relatively harmless statement such as: Well, we try to keep our 
garden looking nice, might be seen as offensive - in Japan for 
instance (see Leech 1983). Notions of pride and remorse are very 
difficult to quantify and it is questionable whether verbs such as 
boast and lament should be included in a taxonomy of speech acts. 
7. Differences in relations to the rest of the discourse. Searle 
notes certain performative expressions such as: I reply, I deduce, 
which relate the utterance to the rest of the discourse. This 
point is important and was referred to by Austin. Austin regarded 
it as "a source of puzzlement" that certain speech acts appear to 
belong to more than one category, particularly when referring to 
the class of speech act he called expositive (for a further 
discussion of this see Smith and Holdcroft (1990)). However it 
forms no part of Searle's final theory (Searle and Van 
der Veken 1985). Furthermore, in a recent article on Conversation 
(Searle 1986), he plays down its importance. Searle has tended to 
hide behind the use of Ockham's Razor, named after William of 
Ockham, the medieval philosopher who first expressed the argument 
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"Do not multiply entities beyond what is strictly necessary to 
explain the phenomena". However in this case the argument is 
misguided as the strictly two-dimensional relationship between 
words and the world which is central to Searle's thesis falls 
down badly in certain areas, as I will attempt to show throughout 
this thesis. The idea that a speech act can "relate" to another 
part of the discourse does not fit in with the essentially 
sentence-based notions of speech acts formalised in Searle and van 
der Veken (1985). If we allow the idea that a speech act may be 
dependent upon what has gone before it in the discourse, then the 
notion that the illocutionary force is the main component 
of meaning loses its validity. 
8. Differences in propositional content that are determined by 
illocutionary force indicating devices. Searle recognised that 
certain surface form constructs affect the illocutionary force of 
the utterance. For example the use of adverbs may strengthen or 
weaken the force of the utterance. For example: 
(1) You really must go. 
(2) You must go. 
The use of the adverb really adds force to the utterance. But 
since Searle's final theory is verb oriented, it is very difficult 
to see how exactly it is possible to reconcile speech act verbs to 
the subtle nuances of illocutionary force indicating devices. 
9. Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts 
and those that can be, but need not be performed as speech acts. 
This, on the other hand does not seem so important for speech act 
theory as a linguistic theory. For example it would be difficult 
and highly impractical to assert non verbally that Einstein's 
theory of relativity is perhaps incorrect, on the other hand it is 
possible to signal disapproval merely by the raising of an 
eyebrow. 
10. Differences between those acts that require an extra- 
linguistic institution for their performance and those that do 
not. This point is note-worthy if only to draw attention to the 
fact that the majority of speech acts that fall into this category 
do not comfortably fit into Searle's formal theory. The category 
of speech acts that require an extra-linguistic institution are 
called performatives by Austin and declaratives by Searle. 
11. Differences between those acts where the corresponding 
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illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where it does 
not. 
12. Differences in the style of performance of the illocutionary 
act. To illustrate this point Searle makes the distinction between 
the performance of an announcement and confiding. This again is 
essentially a non-linguistic point. Searle is drawing attention to 
the fact that the mode of delivery of the speech act to some 
extent determines the category into which it falls. Confiding 
generally implies notification to a select group of individuals of 
something that is not generally known, whereas the purpose of 
announcing is to make public some fact previously known only to 
the speaker or at most to a few individuals. The implication of 
confiding is that it is done in hushed tones, whereas announcing 
may be carried out to maximise the size of the audience. 
Searle's taxonomy of speech acts consists of five broad 
categories (Searle 1979). 
1. Assertives. The assertive class commits the speaker to 
something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed 
proposition. Examples include assert, predict and insist. 
2. Directives. These are attempts by the speaker to get the 
hearer to do something. Examples include direct, order and 
entreat. 
3. Commissives. These are acts that commit the speaker to 
some future course of action. Examples include commit, 
promise and threaten. 
4. Expressives. These express the psychological state 
specified in the sincerity condition; acts of this kind 
express the speaker's own feelings. Examples include 
apologize, thank and praise. 
5. Declaratives. These are acts which bring about a 
corresponding change in the world, e. g. I declare X to be Y, 
X shall henceforth be known as Y, assuming the speaker has 
the authority to make the declaration. 
1.4 The Formal Theory of Speech Acts 
The formal theory of speech acts is described in Searle and 
Van der Veken (1985). The notion of illocutionary force is central 
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to this theory. 
Part of the meaning of an elementary sentence is that 
its literal utterance in a given context constitutes 
the performance of an illocutionary act of a particular 
illocutionary force. 
(Searle and Van der Veken op. cit. p. 7). 
Furthermore they define seven constituent components of 
illocutionary force: 
1. Illocutionary Point, the point or purpose of 
a particular type of act. Thus the purpose of an 
assertive is to make a statement about the world. It is 
the illocutionary point that essentially 
distinguishes each broad category of speech act defined 
above. 
2. The degree of strength of the illocutionary point. As 
described above, the illocutionary point may be 
stronger for certain types of speech acts than for 
others. For example I insist is stronger than I 
suggest. 
3. The Mode of achievement. The mode of achievement is that 
which distinguishes say a request from a command. A 
command is issued from a position of authority and it is 
this invocation of the position of authority, that is 
the mode of achievement of the command. Similarly, 
testifying differs from asserting in that testifying 
takes place under oath. In the case of testifying, being 
under oath is the mode of achievement. To summarise, the 
mode of achievement is an amorphous collection of extra- 
linguistic additions to a speech act that transform a 
basic form into a more complex speech act. 
4. Propositional Content Conditions. The propositional 
content conditions are constraints put on the speech act 
type by the propositional content itself. For example, 
it makes no sense to predict something that has already 
come to pass, similarly it would be non-sensical to 
promise to carry out an action that was to have taken 
place anyway. Also it is not possible to apologize "for 
the law of modus ponens" (Searle and van der Veken op. 
cit. p. 16). 
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5. Preparatory Conditions. Preparatory conditions relate to 
certain presuppositions "peculiar to illocutionary 
force", for example promising presupposes that the 
speaker is able to fulfil that promise. 
6. Sincerity Conditions. The sincerity conditions ensure 
that the speech act performed is in accordance with the 
speaker's beliefs, intentions and feelings e. g. that the 
speaker believes that the assertion he has just made is 
true, or that he intends to carry out his promise etc. 
7. The degree of strength of the sincerity conditions. 
Certain acts have stronger sincerity conditions attached 
to them, for example begging or imploring has a stronger 
sincerity condition than requesting. 
The next part of the formal theory maintains that there are 
five illocutionary points. 
1. The assertive point. A statement has the assertive point 
if the speaker presents a proposition as representing 
the actual state of affairs of the world. 
2. The commissive point. A statement has the commissive 
point if the speaker commits himself to carrying out the 
action specified by the propositional content at some 
future stage. 
3. The directive point. A statement has a directive point 
if the speaker is attempting to get the hearer to carry 
out the action specified by the propositional content of 
the utterance. 
4. The declarative point. A statement has the declarative 
point if the world is changed in a way specified by the 
propositional content of the utterance. 
5. The expressive point. A statement has the expressive 
point if it expresses the psychological feelings and 
states of the speaker. 
Given these five primitive illocutionary points, we can use 
them as a base for their corresponding group of speech acts to 
define primitive speech acts for each group, and to build more 
complex speech acts by adding extra components of illocutionary 
force to the base. This is the idea behind the formal theory. Thus 
we have a primitive illocutionary force for each category of 
speech act: 
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1. The primitive assertive illocutionary force has the 
assertive illocutionary point with no mode of 
achievement and no propositional content conditions. 
2. The primitive directive illocutionary force has the 
directive illocutionary point with the propositional 
content that represents a future course of action of the 
hearer. 
3. The primitive commissive illocutionary force has the 
commissive illocutionary point with the propositional 
content condition that the propositional content 
represents some future course of action of the speaker. 
4. The primitive declarative illocutionary force has the 
declarative illocutionary point with the mode of 
achievement that the speaker invokes his power to 
perform the declaration, but with no propositional 
content conditions. 
5. The primitive expressive illocutionary force has the 
expressive point with no other special conditions. 
Having defined the primitive illocutionary acts, we can use 
these to build more complex acts by operations on the 
illocutionary forces. Searle and Van der Veken identify five such 
operations: 
1. The addition of propositional content conditions. Some 
of the illocutionary forces have more propositional 
content conditions than others. The example given by 
Searle and Van der Veken here is that of report which 
has more propositional content conditions than assert 
because its propositional content conditions only relate 
to past or present. Thus report effectively entails 
assert. 
2. The addition of preparatory conditions. Some 
illocutionary forces have more preparatory conditions 
than other forces with the same point. Thus remind has 
more preparatory conditions than assert because it is 
necessary for a reminder that the propositional content 
has been made known to the hearer before, thus remind 
entails assert. 
3. The addition of sincerity conditions. It is possible to 
add sincerity conditions to illocutionary forces to 
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create new illocutionary forces. For example, to lament 
that P is to assert that P while expressing regret that 
P. Thus lamenting that P entails asserting that P. 
4. The restriction of the mode of achievement of the 
illocutionary point. The mode of achievement of the 
illocutionary point restricts the set of conditions 
under which the illocutionary point can be achieved. 
Thus insist differs from assert in its mode of 
achievement namely persistence. 
5. The operations of increasing or decreasing the degrees 
of strength of the illocutionary point and of the 
sincerity conditions. Some illocutionary forces differ 
from others in the degree of strength with which their 
illocutionary point is achieved and in the degree of 
strength with which their psychological state is 
expressed. Thus assert is a stronger form of 
suggest. 
Having defined the primitive illocutionary acts for each 
category and the operations that may be performed upon those acts 
in order to produce more complex acts, Searle and Van der Veken 
then go on to produce semantic tableaux for assertives, 
commissives and directives (figures 1.1,1.2 and 1.3). These 
tableaux show the entailment relationships between the various 
speech act verbs analysed. 
There appear to be several shortcomings of the formal theory 
which will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Three, but 
which will be introduced now. Firstly, it is significant that 
there are only three semantic tableaux (for assertives, directives 
and commissives). There are no tableaux for the other two 
categories and it is worthwhile exploring why this might be so. 
Searle and Van der Veken identify 21 declarative speech act verbs. 
Our list of declaratives contains: declare, resign, 
adjourn, appoint, nominate, approve, confirm, disapprove, 
endorse, renounce, disclaim, denounce, repudiate, bless, 
curse, excommunicate, consecrate, christen, abbreviate, 
name and call. 
(Searle and Van der Veken op. cit. p. 205). 
The problem with declaratives is that there is no significant 
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Figure 1.1 
The Semantic Tableau For Assertives 
(Searle and van der Veken op. cit. p. 219) 
confess 
6 
admit ... 
argue testify 
r 
e 
assure swear 
suggest 
lament 
... complain 
e= Addition of Propositional Content 
E= Addition of Preparatory Conditions 
Addition of Mode of Achievement 
-i- = Increase in the Degree of Strength of the Illocutionary Point 
ý' = Addition of Sincerity Conditions 
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Figure 1.2 
The Semantic Tableau for Commissives 
(Searle and Van der Veken op. cit. p. 219) 
swear 
consent assure vow promise 
E 
accept pledge threaten 
\Z+ 
commit 
= Increase in the degree of Strength of the Illocutionary Point 
Jý'= Addition of Mode of Achievement 
E= Addition of Preparatory Conditions 
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Figure 1.3 
The Semantic Tableau for Directives 
(Searle and Van der Veken op. cit. p. 220) 
command 
order require 
beg ask urge demand 
request insist tell 
direct 
advise warn 
suggest 
8= Addition of Propositional Content 
= Addition of Preparatory Conditions 
Jý = Addition of Mode of Achievement 
-}- = Increase of the Degree of Strength 
Conditions 
of the Illocutionary Point 
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entailment relationships between them. Most of the speech act 
verbs in this category are built on the entailment relationship of 
declare plus some added extra to the illocutionary force. Because 
of the very flat tableau that results, the entailment relationship 
almost loses its meaning, and indeed suggests that the speech acts 
in this category are of a different nature to those of other 
categories. All of them are per se declarations of one sort or 
another dependent on an extra-linguistic institution and bear very 
little relationship to each other except that many are carried out 
within the confines of institutionalised religion. There is a 
strong case for treating declaratives as a separate group from 
the other speech acts. They do not for example have any part to 
play in a theory of indirect speech acts (to be discussed below). 
For example, when something is consecrated, it is done so 
according to some agreed linguistic formula. It would not be 
acceptable given the ceremonial procedures of consecration to use 
a surface form other than the one specified, whereas it is 
possible to make say an assertion in a round-about manner. There 
is perhaps a case for renaming declaratives as Formal Speech Acts, 
or even preserving Austin's original name of "performatives". 
Expressives are similarly devoid of any meaningful entailment 
relationships and many of the speech acts contained within 
Searle's category might be better called ritual exchanges (see for 
example Goffman 1972). 
When examining the tableaux that actually exist there are 
further problems. The assertives tableau is somewhat flat because 
most of the speech act verbs in this category are built directly 
from assert. However some of these "entailment relationships" 
appear to be totally misconceived. For example, assure is one such 
speech act verb that entails assert, but from assure we have 
argue; it is questionable whether argue is a speech act verb at 
all. Although it is entirely possible to have a one sentence 
argument, it is more usual for an argument to be a structured 
exchange between the participants in the discourse. For example 
Schiffrin (1985) defines an argument as a structure consisting of 
a position, with paired exchanges of disputes of and support for 
the position. Consider the following recorded telephone message: 
(3) A: I rang you earlier but you were out. 
(4) B: Oh, I must have been at David's Mum's. 
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(5) A: Oh. 
(6) B: Mind you, we've been in a good hour and a half to two. 
(7) A: Oh, I went shopping then. 
In (3), A makes an assertion (an argument? ) which is initially 
accepted by B, but then after some thought (6), B disputes A's 
position and A instead of backing up her claim crumbles in (7). If 
we accept the view that an argument is a discourse structure, and 
also accept Schiffrin's view of that structure, then the brief 
dialogue above makes sense. However if we take Searle's model, 
then (3) is an argument and (6) is merely another assertion. There 
is no explanation in Searle's model as to why B should produce 
such an utterance at that point. Had B not disputed A's utterance, 
then (3) would have stood as an assertion or an implied question. 
There is nothing in the illocutionary force of the utterance to 
indicate that it should be an argument. It only becomes an 
argument after being disputed by B. Hence there appears to be 
something seriously wrong with the essentially verb oriented 
approach of Searle. 
There are also further objections: consider the speech act 
verb permit. Permit is described by Searle and Van der Veken as 
follows: 
To grant permission to someone to do something is to 
perform the act of illocutionary denegation of 
forbidding him to do it. 
(Searle and Van der Veken op. cit. p. 202). 
Permit is placed within the directive class of speech act verbs 
and thus must be built upon the primitive speech act verb for this 
class, namely direct, yet a glance at the semantic tableau for 
directives reveals that permit is absent. It is a worthwhile 
exercise to attempt to locate permit in the tableau of directives. 
The primitive speech act for this group, direct is an attempt to 
get the hearer to do something while remaining neutral about the 
outcome. Directives have the propositional content constraint that 
the propositional content represents a future course of action by 
the hearer, and also have the preparatory conditions that the 
hearer must be capable of carrying out the action specified in the 
propositional content. Thus direct does not entail permit, a point 
which is made clearer by examining the weaker form of direct, 
suggest. If I suggest that P, I am merely stating an opinion as to 
-18- 
how the hearer may proceed, I am making no claims about whether P 
is permissible or not. Consider the following: 
(8) Lecturer: You might like to use the photocopier to copy 
this article. 
(8) is a suggestion as to how the student obtains a copy of an 
article. Unknown to the lecturer there is a notice that has been 
placed upon the photocopier by the head of department stating "No 
photocopies until further notice - over budget". Then the 
suggestion was not infelicitous it merely proved to be worthless. 
Thus permission to carry out P is not entailed by a suggestion to 
do P, and because direct is merely a stronger form of suggest 
(according to the model) then permit is not entailed by direct 
either. 
There are three pathways up from direct, namely 
request, insist and tell, however request does not entail permit, 
consider for example the following: 
(9) Lecturer: Could you photocopy this article? 
(10) Student: I'm sorry, I have a lecture right now, but I 
could come back later. 
In the example, the photocopier is not available for use because 
it is still over budget, the student knows this, but the lecturer 
obviously doesn't. In certain societies, the response is given so 
that the lecturer is seen not to lose face. Effectively the 
request is turned down but was not infelicitous. 
Insist is merely a stronger form of suggest and therefore 
does not entail permit, so that leaves us with tell. According to 
Searle and Van der Veken (op. cit p. 201), the difference between 
tell and order, which is further up the semantic tableau, is that 
an order is issued from a position of authority. Being in a 
position of authority entails being able to grant permission and 
therefore, order entails permit. If I were to issue an order 
without being able to grant permission then my order is 
infelicitous. This one example illustrates that the whole approach 
appealing to entailments between speech act verbs is highly 
suspect. Indeed, deontic operators such as permit, forbid and so 
on cause problems for the speech act categorisation process. 
Consider: 
(11): You must remove your bag from the fire exit. 
In (11), 1 am not making an order, I am merely pointing out an 
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obligation, if the bag is not removed, then it is not my fault, I 
have done my duty by telling you of your obligations. It is not an 
order, it is also not telling according to the Searle and Van der 
Veken definition of this speech act verb: 
To tell a hearer to do something is to direct him in a 
manner which does not give him the option of refusal. 
(Searle and Van der Veken op. cit. p. 200). 
In (11), I am giving the hearer the option of refusal, after all 
it is not my fault if he chooses to ignore me. There appear to be 
two different forms of speech act that have been compressed into 
one. Firstly, I might tell someone to do something when I want 
them to do it and effectively don't give them the option of 
refusal; and, secondly, when I point out an obligation where I 
feel that in the public interest, say I should make this 
obligation known, and yet I have no personal interest in the 
outcome of my speech act. The first is tell in the sense intended 
by Searle, but the second is a deontic operator which has been 
ignored by the model. In Chapter Three, I shall argue that an 
expression such as (11) is really an assertive. In pointing out 
the obligation the speaker is effectively saying: "By my belief 
you are obligated to remove your bag from the fire exit. " 
1.5 Indirect Speech Acts 
Searle also includes an attempted explanation of indirect 
speech acts (Searle 1979). An indirect speech act is an utterance 
that contains the illocutionary force indicators for one kind of 
illocutionary act but which is uttered to perform another type of 
illocutionary act. The problem with indirect speech acts is that 
they don't fit comfortably into the Searle and Van der Veken model 
outlined above because the model provides no adequate theory as to 
why indirect speech acts are used and what their place should be 
in the theory. Indirect speech acts are important for the whole 
existence of speech act theory and we need an adequate theory of 
them if it is to be a viable theory of how language is used. 
Chapter Six will be devoted to the subject of indirect speech 
acts, but I shall examine some of the problems and arguments 
surrounding them in this introductory section. 
Speech Act Theory has frequently been attacked because of its 
-20- 
alleged inability to account for indirect speech acts, see for 
example Levinson (1983) and I shall examine these arguments in 
Chapter Two. 
In his section on indirect speech acts, Searle includes an 
analysis of the modal can. Of the utterance Can you reach the 
salt?; he interprets this as a sentence in which the speaker may 
utter and mean what he says and also mean another illocution with 
a different propositional content, so that he makes a request by 
asking a question. The idea that the utterance is both a question 
and a request seems somewhat dubious, but this issue and the whole 
problem of indirect speech acts will be discussed in more depth in 
Chapter Six, (see also Chapter Five for an analysis of modal 
auxiliary verbs). The section on indirect speech acts (Searle 
1979, p. 46) includes an analysis of the following case (examined 
in more detail in Chapter Six): 
(12) X: lets go to the movies tonight. 
(13) Y: I have to study for an exam. 
Searle breaks down the comprehension of Y's indirect speech act 
into ten steps: firstly X makes a proposal to Y which elicits the 
above response, and secondly we assume that Y is co-operating in 
the conversation. Searle's third step maintains that the response 
must be one of acceptance, rejection etc., and that this is in 
accordance with speech act theory. This claim is dubious as there 
is no mention of the permissible relationship of speech acts to 
one another within the framework of Searle's theory. I shall not 
discuss the remaining steps in Searle's analysis as his 
interpretation of an indirect speech act rests on the third step. 
The theory of indirect speech acts is essentially a "bolt 
on" theory and needs much work done on it to build it into a 
respectable theory of language usage. Searle's theory of indirect 
speech acts rests on the so-called conventionality thesis. The 
conventionality thesis is based on the assumption that certain 
illocutionary acts count as the performance of other acts by 
convention. This attempts to explain why certain illocutionary 
acts that are presented indirectly are immediately perceived as 
such, and can be transliterated into the underlying illocution 
without any difficulty. There are several weak points with the 
conventionality thesis which are discussed in detail by Bach and 
Harnish (1979). They point out that it is not exactly clear what 
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is meant by conventions. If conventions mean customs of usage, 
then they suggest rules such as: 
It is customary to request by using certain declarative 
and interrogative forms. 
Postsentential and preverbial "please" indicates that 
the speaker is intending to request. 
(Bach and Harnish op. cit. p. 189). 
However, they point out that such conventions do not give an 
account of certain irregularities regarding the postsentential use 
of "please". For example: 
(14): I want you to stop making that noise, please? 
(15)*: Are you able to do A, please? 
(14) is acceptable, but (15) is not. The main objection to the 
conventionality thesis is that there is no stated connection 
between usage and the psychological states of the speakers that 
might allow us to provide an explanation for the distribution of 
postsentential "please". 
Before summarising Searle's contribution to speech act theory 
and its shortcomings it would be useful to look at two alternate 
approaches to indirect speech acts. 
Sadock (1974) puts forward the ambiguity thesis to explain 
indirect speech acts. The ambiguity thesis is the view that 
utterances may have additional meanings and thus the standardized 
use of such utterances is not indirect at all, but literal and 
direct. In this way the standardized use of the utterance 
(assuming that it is seen to be indirect) does not have 
to be computed from the direct form. Sadock sets out to 
demonstrate that the ambiguity thesis is incorporated within a 
theory about a range of linguistic phenomena. His arguments 
concern the fact that an inferential theory, like 
Searle's would be more complex, and he also presents certain 
tests, that distinguish those cases that can be treated as 
ambiguous, which are discussed in section 1.7 (Sadock op. cit. pp. 
82-83,88-91) and also Bach and Harnish (op. cit. pp. 176-183). 
A third theory is presented by Bach and Harnish (op. cit. p. 
192). They call it the standardization thesis: 
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the mutual beliefs that constitute illocutionary 
conventions enable the hearer to infer the speaker's 
indirect intent immediately, without going through the 
usual working-out process. 
(Bach and Harnish op. cit. p. 192). 
Because of the importance of the standardization thesis in 
relation to the work presented later on in this thesis, and also 
because of the difficulty in explaining it in isolation, I will 
describe it in section 1.8 when I examine Bach and Harnish's 
inferential theory of speech acts. 
It is largely because of its inadequate treatment of indirect 
speech acts that speech act theory has been under attack from 
rival approaches, in particular by socio-linguists. Their rival 
theory will be discussed in Chapter Two. Many criticisms of 
indirect speech acts stem from the fact that an indirect speech 
act may be interpreted indirectly or simply in its direct form. In 
Schegloff (1988) however, he makes the point that a 
misunderstanding arises where an interpretation of an utterance 
is neither the direct nor the indirect form of the speech act. 
He describes a discourse phenomenon called fourth position 
repair which can be outlined as below: 
(16) A: Statement. 
(17) B: Response to statement. 
(18) A: Query of response. 
(19) B: Repair (Oh, I thought you meant X). 
Suppose that the initial statement (16) is an indirect speech act, 
say the direct interpretation is a question and the indirect 
interpretation is to take it as a request. Then, if a 
misunderstanding arises, by speech act theory, in his response, B 
might make the mistake of interpreting the indirect speech act 
directly and thus answering the question instead of treating it as 
a request. However Schegloff quotes an example where the first 
statement (a request) is treated, not as a question but as what is 
known as a pre-announcement (a pre-sequence, these will be 
discussed in Chapter Two): 
(20) Mother: Do you know who is going to that meeting? 
(21) Russ: Who? 
(22) Mother: I don't know. 
(23) Russ: Oh, probably Mrs. McOwen. 
Schegloff states that according to speech act theory (20) is 
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either a request or a question, but in the actual dialogue it is 
misinterpreted as a pre-announcement, and because the 
misinterpretation does not match with the two predicted forms from 
speech act theory then speech act theory is incorrect. On the 
contrary Schegloff's observations appear to support the 
standardization thesis because what is going wrong is that Russ 
assumes that there is a mutual belief that both his mother and 
himself know that Mrs. McOwen is going to the meeting, so that he 
was expecting his mother to provide him with some new information. 
Moreover, the notion of a pre-announcement as some sort of 
discourse category in its own right seems questionable. Consider 
the following: 
(20) A: Do you know who's going to that meeting? 
(21) B: Who? 
(21a) B: No, who? 
(21b)* B: Yes, who? 
If (20) was a question then it would be perfectly natural to say 
(21a), on the other hand if it was a pre-announcement then (21b) 
should be acceptable because B is not being presented with any new 
information. If we can make some form of appeal to the 
psychological states of speaker and hearer, along with some notion 
of what they both know and believe when making certain speech 
acts, then this criticism loses much of its force. The approach 
taken by the socio-linguists, known as conversational analysis is 
considered in greater detail in Chapter Two. The problem of 
indirect speech acts is taken up in Chapter Six. 
1.6 A Critique of Searle's Theory of Speech Acts 
To summarise there are several weak points and problems with 
Searle's theory: 
1. The sentential basis of Searle's theory seems to be 
incorrect; in particular, it does not explain adequately 
Austin's "source of puzzlement" relating to expositives. 
Also it does not allow for the possibility of a structural 
relationship between speech acts and units of discourse 
structure. 
2. The second problem, which is related to the first, is 
that Searle has imposed a uniform structure on his 
analysis of speech acts that is somewhat artificial, for 
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example, in the formal analysis of speech acts (Searle 
and Van der Veken op. cit) an argument is presented as an 
assertive, and yet it would appear that an argument is 
more a unit of discourse whereas an assertion could be 
considered to be a sentence based speech act. For a 
further discussion of this see (Holdcroft and Smith 
1990). 
3. The reliance on entailment in the formal theory does not 
hold for all speech acts, for example the directive 
permit does not appear in the semantic tableau of 
directives and indeed it cannot be made to fit into the 
semantic tableau. Additionally, it is not possible to 
describe interesting entailments between declaratives, 
hence it can hardly be described as a comprehensive and 
complete theory. Austin's misgivings about the appeal to 
entailment in this context are perhaps well founded. 
4. The theory of indirect speech acts does not sit well with 
the formal theory of speech acts, and needs much 
more work done on it. 
5. Searle mentions politeness as a reason for the use of 
indirect speech acts, this is an aspect of speech act 
theory that remains almost unexplored. 
6. There is a problem of "levels of abstraction" with 
Searle's theory. This is perhaps a cognitive or even 
computational problem rather than a philosophical one, 
but if the philosophical theory is not plausible 
cognitively then it is also a philosophical problem. The 
"levels of abstraction" problem is that if we accept 
Searle's theory, then there must be a level at which an 
utterance is decoded into a speech act. For example, in 
interpreting an indirect speech act, the encoded marker 
of politeness in the utterance must be stripped away to 
reveal the underlying speech act. Similarly when 
generating an utterance, we must start with an abstract 
speech act description, and add the appropriate marker of 
the level of politeness to arrive at the final utterance 
used to perform the act. (Currently, speech act theory 
says very little or nothing about why a particular 
utterance is chosen). 
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7. The final problem, in part related to the previous one, 
is: how do considerations to do with politeness among 
other things relate to speech act theory, or should they 
be a part of speech act theory at all? The problems 
listed above will be examined in greater detail 
throughout the thesis. 
1.7 Sadock's Linguistic Approach to Speech Acts 
A somewhat different approach to speech act theory has been 
put forward by Sadock (1974) based on linguistic structure. Sadock 
attempts a linguistic based approach to speech act theory built on 
the ambiguity thesis. The ambiguity thesis is the view that 
sentences that are standardly used indirectly have additional 
meanings. Thus, the standardized use of a sentence is not indirect 
at all, but literal and direct. Sadock attempts to support this 
thesis by systematically analysing a range of linguistic 
phenomena. He examines six distinct grammatical forms which he 
claims exhibit "force-ambiguity", required to support the 
ambiguity thesis: 1. Whimperatives -a whimperative sentence has 
the form 
modal {subjunctive} you VP? 
{ negative } 
For example: 
(24) Can you leave now? 
(25) Can't you take him with you? 
Sadock argues that the semantic structure underlying the 
whimperative form is also thought to underlie imperatives. To 
support this view it is necessary to look for evidence that these 
sentence forms behave as imperatives in their indirect usage, and 
also that they do not act as interrogatives (again in their 
indirect usage). Sadock puts forward three types of evidence to 
support the ambiguity thesis here. Firstly, he examines the 
distribution of words such as "please" in imperatives and 
whimperatives. 
(26) Please shut the door. 
(27) Would you please shut the door. 
There appears to be a correspondence in the use of please with 
action verbs in imperatives and whimperatives. This correspondence 
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also occurs when "please" is added post-sententially. 
(28) Shut the door, please. 
(29) Would you shut the door, please. 
Second, Sadock considers "fractured" forms of whimperatives: 
(please) VP modal (subjunctive) you (please) 
{negative ) 
and attempts to show that they are requests but not questions. He 
states that they do not behave like questions in at least four 
respects (Sadock op. cit. 112). 
(30a) When will you wash the car, or don't you know? 
(30b)* Wash the car, will you, or don't you know? 
(31a) When will you wash the car, by any chance? 
(31b)* Wash the car, by any chance, will you? 
(32a) Tell me, when will you wash the car? 
(32b)* Tell me, wash the car will you? 
(33) When will you wash the car, and when will you do the 
dishes? 
The evidence presented here is that certain types of expression 
which may be conjoined to interrogatives cannot be so conjoined 
with fractured whimperatives. Bach and Harnish (1979) however see 
an objection here. Certain non-questions may be conjoined to 
questions if the non-question in some way relates to the question 
(Bach and Harnish op. cit. 180). 
(34) When will you wash the car and The careful how you 
answer. ) 
{I want to know 
quickly. ) 
Thirdly, certain expressions co-occur with imperatives but not 
interrogatives: 
(35a) Wash the car, someone. 
(35b)* When will you wash the car, someone? 
Against the whimperative argument, there is evidence to suggest 
that whimperatives can function like interrogatives. (Green 1975) 
points out that responstýs to whimperatives match responses to 
interrogatives and not imperatives. This is because whimperatives 
require a verbal response whether or not they are complied with 
whereas imperatives only require a verbal response if they are not 
complied with. The evidence regarding the fractured whimperative 
also seems somewhat dubious and may be explained away with an 
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adequate explanation of the use of connectives. For example: 
(36) When will you wash the car and mow the lawn? 
(37) When will you wash the car and I'll do the dishes? 
In (36), the when effectively carries forward across the 
connective whereas in (37) it doesn't. The evidence presented here 
by Sadock may have more to do with rules for use of connectives 
rather than some hidden linguistic structure. 
2. Impositives - Impositives take the form of: Why don't we VP? 
or: How about VP-ing? Sadock's theory here is that impositives are 
suggestions and not whimperatives or questions. His evidence to 
support this view is based on the fact that impositives may be 
answered positively by "OK" but must be refused with a reason for 
refusing (in order to avoid any animosity). Unfortunately this 
distinction is not very clear cut. 
The other categories are queclaratives such as: Does anyone 
VP anymore, pseudo-imperatives, such as: Move and I'll shoot. 
Requestions form another category, such as: Columbus discovered 
America in? and Tag-questions: John likes spinach doesn't he?. 
Although there appear to be problems with this approach, 
Sadock has presented some data that needs to be explained. 
1.8 The Inferential Approach To Speech Act Theory 
The inferential approach to speech act theory has been put 
forward by Bach and Harnish (1979) and this is worth examining in 
more detail. Bach and Harnish set out a speech act schema which 
attempts to explain the inferences involved in deciphering four 
basic types of speech act: 
i) literal and direct speech acts 
ii) literal and indirect speech acts 
iii) non-literal and direct speech acts 
iv) non-literal and indirect speech acts 
The inferences involve three factors: content, context and 
communicative intentions. 
The speech act schema is based upon three presumptions: 
1) The Linguistic Presumption (LP). This is the mutual belief 
that speaker and hearer share a common language, and that 
when Speaker (S) utters an expression (e) Hearer(H) can 
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identify what S is saying, given that H knows the meaning of 
e in the common language (L) and that H knows any appropriate 
background information. Without this mutual belief that they 
share the language they are using, people would not and 
probably could not communicate in the language. 
2) The Communicative Presumption (CP). This is the assumption 
that whenever speaker S utters some e in L he is doing so 
with some recognizable intention. People do not have beliefs 
about illocutionary acts, but they do believe that speakers 
speak with overt intentions and it is this fact that 
helps them to identify the illocutionary act from some 
utterance. 
3) The Presumption of Literalness (PL). This is the mutual 
belief that if in uttering eS could be speaking literally 
then S is speaking literally. 
Using these assumptions, Bach and Harnish developed a speech act 
schema (Bach and Harnish op. cit. p. 21) which attempts to describe 
how the hearer may infer an illocutionary act from an utterance. 
The hearer H, first of all, realises that S has made some 
utterance e. By the linguistic presumption, H may infer that S 
meant something by e and that this is something that e means in L, 
their shared language. However, because of the large amount of 
ambiguity in language, H needs more than just the linguistic 
presumption to determine what S meant by e. In other words, given 
that e is ambiguous and that S meant only one of those meanings to 
be operative, then H has to determine which of those meanings was 
intended by S. Bach and Harnish suggest that the hearer is able to 
determine which of the interpretations is meant by using certain 
mutual contextual beliefs (MCBs). Hence the first steps of H's 
inference take the form of: 
S is uttering e. 
a) e means ... and in L. 
b) S means ... by e, or S means 
by e. 
c) The supposition that S means by e is contextually less 
appropriate. 
S means ... by e. 
From the fact that H infers that S means ... by e, H can 
determine 
that S is saying that U(P), where U is some utterance and P is its 
propositional content. 
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Given that H has inferred that S is saying that U(P), H now 
has to determine whether S is speaking literally and directly, 
i. e. S means P with some illocutionary force F. To summarise: 
Si: S is uttering e. 
S2: S means ... by e. 
S3: S is saying that U(P) 
S4: S, if speaking literally, is F-ing that P. 
S5: S could be F-ing that P. 
S6: S is F-ing that P. 
Bach and Harnish then extend the schema to include non-literal 
direct acts, literal indirect acts and non-literal indirect acts. 
The steps for indirect literal acts are: firstly, there is a 
realisation by H that S could not be merely F-ing that P. There is 
some Find that P connected in a way identifiable under the 
circumstances to F-ing that P, such that in F-ing that P, S could 
also be Find-ing that P. This gives some idea of the schema 
proposed by Bach and Harnish for identifying both direct and 
indirect speech acts. This is described in more detail in Chapter 
Three. 
The speech act schema outlined above is dependent upon the 
psychological plausibility of first examining an utterance to see 
if it is direct and if it is not, only then going on to interpret 
it as an indirect utterance. Bach and Harnish also propose an 
alternate speech act taxonomy in which they distinguish 
communicative and conventional speech acts. Conventional speech 
acts are broadly speaking the same class of acts as Searle's 
declaratives. Communicative speech acts are subdivided into four 
categories: constatives, directives, commissives and 
acknowledgements. 
The main thrust of their argument rests however, on the 
speech act schema, even though the fine details of how for example 
H interprets an utterance as indirect have only been sketchily 
worked out. They suggest that even if the speech act schema is not 
a exact model of how speech acts are interpreted then it may at 
least be a "rational reconstruction" of inferences that the hearer 
makes. However they admit that the speech act schema is only the 
bare bones of the strategy: 
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That we cannot readily identify all their ingredients 
attests to their complexity and subtlety, not to their 
non-existence or blatant simplicity. 
(Bach and Harnish 1979, p. 93) 
Furthermore they state: 
We suggest that every interpersonal situation ... 
involve(s) mutually recognised rules that apply to 
persons and types of situations. 
Bach and Harnish also make some attempt to rationalise indirect 
speech acts in a way that is absent in Searle's work. They are 
particularly concerned with acts that do not seem to fit into the 
speech act schema. These involve the use of standard forms such as 
Can you pass the salt? For this type of speech act, they suggest 
that the usual schema of inference is short-circuited, i. e. the 
hearer can jump directly down to that part of the schema that 
deals with indirect speech acts. This, they admit poses a problem 
for their schema, because, if the schema is short-circuited, then, 
instead of having to rule out the literal intent as primary and 
infer S's indirect intent, H can identify the indirect intent 
without having to search for it. This, in turn leads to 
implication that standard indirect forms such as: Can you pass the 
salt, must be regarded as systematically ambiguous (see the 
ambiguity thesis in 1.7). Bach and Harnish attempt to solve this 
problem by the standardization thesis. 
They look first of all, to the conventionality thesis, which 
they claim points to how the speech act schema may be short- 
circuited without multiplying meaning. They state that the mutual 
beliefs that constitute illocutionary conventions enable the 
hearer to infer the speaker's indirect intent immediately, without 
having to go through the usual steps. They then point out that it 
is possible to formulate a notion of illocutionary standardization 
that does not require illocutionary conventions. It is only 
through constant use that such illocutions become standardized. 
They state that standardization is achieved by a mutual 
belief that in some context, it would violate the conversational 
principle to make the utterance with its literally determined 
force. In other words, there is a mutual belief between S and H 
that in this particular context, S's illocutionary intent in 
uttering U is indirect. 
Another aspect of speech act theory addressed by Bach and 
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Harnish raises the question of how speech act descriptions are 
generated; and they propose a speech production model (Bach and 
Harnish p. 238, op. cit. ) which consists of nine basic steps: 
1. Speaker S has a variety of beliefs and desires concerning 
the nature and direction of the discourse, H's beliefs 
etc. 
2. S forms a series of pragmatic intents. 
3. S attempts to predict the consequences of fulfilling these 
various intents. 
4. The utility of each intent is assessed. 
5. A particular pragmatic intent PI is formed. 
6. A variety of linguistic expressions of PI are formed. 
7. S attempts to predict the likelihood of fulfilling S's 
pragmatic intent with each expression. 
8. The most likely expression ei is selected. 
9. Expression ei is uttered. 
The Bach and Harnish approach to speech act theory has an 
appeal from the cognitive point of view because of its attempt to 
describe the methods of inference used in generating and 
interpreting direct and indirect speech acts, however as the 
authors freely admit there is much still to be done to add flesh 
to the bare outline presented. 
1.9 Some Criticisms of Speech Act Theory 
Speech Act Theory is not without its critics however and many 
of the criticisms levelled at speech act theory have arisen 
because of the problems caused by integrating indirect speech acts 
into the theory. However speech act theory has also been attacked 
from two different angles: firstly because it is based on the 
assumption that there are certain features of utterances which are 
identifiable in a systematic way that make it possible to map 
utterances onto speech act types. For example the indicative mood 
indicates an assertive speech act, whereas the imperative mood 
points to a directive. Obviously, indirect speech acts pose 
problems for this assumption, particularly when the surface form 
points to an assertive and the indirect interpretation indicates a 
directive (this would happen in the case of a hint: I'm very short 
of money this month). 
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If it proves impossible to relate linguistic form to function 
in a systematic way, then it becomes necessary to resort to pure 
pragmatics, i. e. lifting speech act theory entirely away from 
linguistic form and this does not seem to be very desirable. One 
way out of this problem might be to describe in a systematic way 
the reasons why indirection is used and what form it takes. After 
all, it ought to be possible to describe the different ways of 
being indirect, because if there are an infinite number of 
possible ways, then it becomes impossible to recognise when 
someone is speaking indirectly. 
Levinson (1983) for example, suggests that perhaps we ought 
to reject the fundamental assumption that sentences have literal 
forces but should concentrate instead on the idea of mapping 
speech act forces onto sentences in context. This is another way 
of specifying the problem of "levels of abstraction" mentioned 
earlier. If there is no level at which the speech act can be 
specified then there is no point in trying to map out a detailed 
taxonomy of speech act types. This would lead us to either reject 
the notion of speech acts altogether or to modify our views of 
what a speech act actually is. 
Levinson suggests that the notion of a literal force could be 
replaced with the idea that a speech act could be viewed as an 
operation on a context and that a context must be understood in 
terms of sets of propositions describing beliefs, knowledge and so 
on of speaker and hearer. Thus he states: 
i) An assertion that p is a function from a context 
where the speaker S is not committed to p ... 
into a context in which S is committed to the 
justified true belief that p. 
ii) A promise that p is a function from a context 
where S is not committed to bringing about the 
state of affairs described in p, into one in which 
S is so committed. 
iii) An order that p is a function from a context in 
which H is not required by S to bring about the 
state of affairs described by p, into one in which 
H is so required. 
(Levinson 1983, p277) 
Levinson's proposals have been extended by Gazdar (1981). If 
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we reject the notion of force then there is a wide gap between 
surface forms and the underlying representations. Although 
Levinson has described a set of underlying representations (above) 
there is no rationale as to what goes in that set or how those 
representations are derived from the utterances that embody them. 
The representation of an assertive as a function from context 
to context gives us no idea how we are going to recognise the 
assertive. This theory leaves a very large gap between the ways 
that we can use language and how we actually use language. There 
is however, a certain appeal to representing a speech act in terms 
of propositions describing beliefs, knowledge etc. If these sets 
of propositions can be used, perhaps in conjunction with pragmatic 
rules to map the speech act as an abstract concept onto an actual 
surface form with certain linguistic features that reflect those 
beliefs etc. constrained by the pragmatic rules, then we have the 
beginnings of a powerful theory that will be able to hold on to 
the idea that speech act theory should be concerned with the 
mapping of function onto form in a systematic way and 
incorporating indirect speech acts as part of that theory. 
Certain surface features do seem to systematically signal 
certain illocutionary forces, for example: please, often 
indicates a request. Perhaps it is the case that certain 
linguistic structures are not so much an indication of a given 
illocutionary force as an indication of the underlying 
propositions and other components that make up the speech act. 
For example, perhaps please is used in many requests because it is 
an indicator of a level of politeness, which is obligatory when 
making a request, and thus must be marked linguistically in some 
way. On the other hand, when making a request in a very indirect 
way, such as a hint, the marker of politeness is omitted because 
its presence might force the hearer into interpreting the hint as 
a request, whereas by using a very indirect strategy, the aim is 
to introduce some level of ambiguity into the utterance, so that 
it could be accepted as an assertive instead, thus giving the 
hearer the option of implicitly declining the request (I explore 
this possibility in Chapter Six). 
A second attack on speech act theory comes through the study 
of discourse structure. If we accept the notion that a speech act 
equates roughly to a sentence (and it is not clear that this is or 
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should be the case), then if we are to accept the idea that 
discourse has some form of structure, then we must be prepared to 
integrate speech act theory into a theory of discourse structure. 
There are those who advocate that discourse has no identifiable 
structure, in which case the problem does not arise, but equally, 
there are some theories of discourse that are incompatible with 
speech act theory. This issue will be explored further in Chapter 
Two. 
Levinson also suggests that speech act theory may come to be 
superseded by a "more complex, multi-faceted pragmatic approach", 
and that is in a sense what I am setting out to do, by recognising 
the great complexity of the factors that determine a given speech 
act. 
One of the problems of speech act theory is that although it 
originated as an attempt to answer the problem of why it is 
difficult to assign truth values to certain types of sentences, it 
has been adopted by a much wider set of disciplines including 
linguistics, cognitive science, artificial intelligence and the 
psychology of language. Each of these disciplines sets their own 
questions about speech act theory and the more these questions are 
asked, the less clear it becomes as to what exactly speech act 
theory is or should be. At the philosophical level there are still 
problems concerning taxonomies of speech acts, notions of whether 
there are speech acts which are inexpressible (Holdcroft 1978) and 
the problem of how indirect speech acts can be incorporated into a 
more general theory of speech acts. However cognitive science has 
thrown up several new problems that require to be answered. 
Firstly, there is the problem of how we derive the correct speech 
act from the utterance and secondly there is the question of how 
we formulate utterances appropriate for the act we wish to 
perform. Both of these questions presuppose the existence of 
speech act representations at some cognitive level. The 
traditional philosophical approach of Searle (for example) is too 
vague, it explains these problems in general terms of "background 
knowledge" and "some form of inference". It totally avoids the 
problem of whether there is some cognitive level at which speech 
acts are represented, and to argue that "we just do it" as some 
philosophers have is to avoid the issue completely in order to 
prop up some leaky philosophical theory that can't stand up to a 
-35- 
rigorous analysis. Linguistics has the problem of the relationship 
between the meaning of words and speech act theory and indeed 
Sadock (1974) has argued that speech act verbs are at the highest 
linguistic level in terms of grammatical structure. Added to all 
of this we have to examine empirical data to see whether our 
speech act models are psychologically plausible. This suggests 
that speech act theory may have to be very complex. 
1.10 Computational Models of Speech Acts 
Speech act theory has been used in Artificial Intelligence 
Natural Language Processing programs with varying degrees of 
success, but AI has managed to throw up new problems and provide 
new insights into speech act theory. 
One influential program was that of Allen (1983), see also 
Allen (1987) for a more detailed description of the program. Allen 
collected a corpus of exchanges between members of the public and 
information clerks on Toronto station and one phenomenon that he 
was interested in was that often the clerk provided more 
information than was asked for. 
(38) Patron: When does the Montreal train leave? 
(39) Clerk: 3.15 gate 10. 
(Allen 1983, p107). 
To explain this Allen made three assumptions: 
i) People are rational agents who are capable of forming 
and executing plans to achieve their goals. 
ii) They are often capable of inferring the plans of other 
agents from observing the agent to perform some action. 
iii) They are capable of detecting obstacles in another 
agent's plan. 
On this basis, the clerk was able to reply with the additional 
information because he inferred the plan of the patron and 
perceived that it might be useful to add the gate number to his 
answer. 
In order to be able to play the role of the clerk, a computer 
system must be able to represent plans and actions. The action 
type represented by Allen (1983, p. 117) takes the form of schema 
which consists of a name, a set. of parameters and (possibly null) 
sets of formulas in the following classes: 
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i) Preconditions - conditions that should be true if the 
action's execution is to succeed. 
ii) Effects - conditions that become true after the 
successful execution of the action. 
iii) Body -a specification of the action at a more detailed 
level. 
In this way, a speech act type may be represented as an action 
type. The action of informing is: 
INFORM(Speaker, Hearer, P) 
precondition: Know(Hearer, P) 
effect: Know(Hearer, P) 
body: Mutually believe(Hearer, Speaker(Want, 
Speaker(Know, Hearer, P))) 
A plan can be represented as a partial ordering of actions mapping 
an initial state onto a goal state. If we see a goal state as a 
target that is being aimed at, then, the program can construct a 
plan of action to achieve this target by working out which plans 
it must execute in order to arrive at the goal state. Additionally 
the system needs to be able to both reason about the ways of 
achieving goals and to be able to recognise plans (of the patron). 
There are two plans in the system: the BOARD plan (planning to 
catch a train) and the MEET plan (planning to meet someone off a 
train). So, presented with an utterance such as 
(40) The train to Windsor? 
the system first of all parses the utterance into a semantic 
representation and then attempts to assign possible speech act 
types to it using criteria such as sentence mood. Given that the 
utterance is a request it now attempts to fit it into a plan. It 
does this by using plan construction rules to expand the top level 
goals into sub-goals. These expansions are called "expectations". 
At the same time plan inference rules are used to attempt to work 
out what the speaker was trying to achieve in making the 
utterance, these expansions are called "alternatives". Then a 
forward and backing chaining method is used to make the 
expectations meet the alternatives and when this happens a 
plausible plan has been identified. 
Having identified the plan, the system now detects any 
obstacles to its execution. The reply takes into consideration any 
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perceived obstacles. 
Speech act recognition in Allen's system takes the form of 
marrying together expectations and alternatives to form a coherent 
plan. There is a certain appeal to this approach because it goes 
some way to integrate speech acts within a Gricean pragmatic 
framework. The notion of plan recognition when applied to speech 
acts appears to go some length towards illuminating the maxim "be 
informative". Also it is not impossible to see that the plan based 
approach can be used to explain some of the uses of indirect 
speech acts. Consider 
(41) Do you know where the nearest telephone box is? 
(42a)* Yes. 
(42b) Yes, its just round the corner on your left. 
If we take a plan based approach it is not difficult to see how 
(41) is perceived as a request for information rather than a 
question. In interpreting (41) we make an attempt to understand 
what the speaker had in mind when asking the question (probably 
that he wanted to use the telephone). Then it becomes clear why 
(41) is interpreted indirectly. 
Allen's approach is not without its problems however. The 
heuristics used to determine the appropriate plan are domain 
specific and it is by no means clear whether this approach could 
be extended to an unlimited domain. Litman (1985) has developed a 
system for introducing, developing and modifying plans which goes 
some way towards integrating the plan-based approach with a theory 
of discourse structure. Discourse structure and speech acts will 
be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
An attempt at speech act generation has been made by Appelt 
(1985). He called his system KAMP - Knowledge and Modalities 
Planner. KAMP's domain is the assembly and repair of complex 
electro-mechanical devices. The user of the system is a novice 
seeking assistance. The speech acts modelled in the system are 
requesting and informing. 
KAMP is a hierarchical planning system that uses a non-linear 
representation of plans, called a procedural network. Whereas 
Allen concentrated on inferring plans from utterances, Appelt's 
work is concerned with the question of how holding a particular 
set of beliefs and intentions results in an agent making a 
particular utterance. Linguistic actions form a hierarchy of four 
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levels: 
i) Illocutionary acts such as INFORM and REQUEST. 
ii) Surface speech acts such as ASSERT, COMMAND and ASK. 
iii) Concept activation - DESCRIBE and POINT. 
iv) Utterance acts. 
The linguistic levels are expanded downwards within the planner 
starting with the illocutionary acts and ending up with the 
utterance acts, but above the illocutionary acts comes the top 
level goal. For example the top level goal might be to remove the 
pump from the platform, knowing that currently the pump is 
attached to the platform. So the top level goal would be 
-attached(pump, platform). This is expanded to a series of 
preconditions such as the fact that the computer (Rob) should be 
in the same place as the apprentice (John). Then the sub-goal 
Do(John, remove(Pu, PL)) is expanded into a request that John 
remove the pump from the platform. However John does not know what 
tool is required to carry out this action (this conclusion is 
arrived at by expanding the sub-goal remove(Pu, PL) and discovering 
that a certain tool is required, Rob then examines what he knows 
about John and discovers that John does not know anything about 
this tool, so not only do we need a request to remove the pump 
from the platform but we also need to inform John about which tool 
to use (and possibly where it is, by an ostensive act). The 
further subgoals are generated down to the lowest level using the 
cycle of plan-generation and critics (Sacerdoti 1977) and after 
the cycle of expansion and criticism has been completed, KAMP 
finds each functional description associated with the surface 
speech acts and unifies it with a teleological grammar, which is a 
sort of schematic grammatical representation of surface speech 
acts. Filling in the grammatical schema produces the final 
utterance. 
Allen's and Appelt's work are representative of the approach 
to speech act theory in AI. Although probably throwing up more 
questions than they answer, these approaches give us further 
insight into speech act theory. Allen's work is important because 
it, to some extent marries together speech act theory to a Gricean 
pragmatic framework and Appelt's work is of value because it 
illustrates how utterances can reasonably be interpreted as 
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multiple speech acts. However, if they achieve nothing else, 
computational models give us some insight into the complexity of 
speech act recognition. 
This in turn, perhaps serves as a warning that to assume, as 
has tended to happen in classical speech act theory that there is 
a systematic, reliable way of utilising grammatical indicators as 
a guide for speech act type is mistaken. 
Allen's work also acts as a pointer to another important 
dimension to speech act theory: the idea that in the process of 
producing an appropriate utterance from a speech act might perhaps 
be guided by pragmatics, such as the ones proposed by Grice 
(1975). Grice suggested that "talk-exchanges" are governed by an 
over-riding principle, called the co-operative principle, which 
may be subdivided into various conversational presumptions (called 
maxims, by Grice). In any conversational/social situation, these 
maxims must be mutually recognised if they are to apply and are 
thus elevated to the status of rules. The co-operative principle 
consists of four sets of maxims: quantity, quality, relation and 
manner. The quantity maxim exhorts us to give the right amount of 
information, the quality maxim exhorts us to be truthful and not 
to say that for which there is insufficient evidence. The maxim of 
relation simply states that we should be relevant and the maxim of 
manner exhorts us to be perspicuous. 
At first sight, it is not at all obvious what these maxims 
have to do with speech act theory, but lets consider for a moment 
the problem of indirect speech acts. By using an indirect speech 
act, we are immediately violating the maxim of manner that states 
that we should avoid obscurity of expression. If we are to 
incorporate indirect speech acts into a theory of speech acts, 
then there must be something in that theory that indicates why 
indirect speech acts are used. To reply that it is conventional to 
use an indirect speech act in a certain situation is not enough, 
the simple fact is that wherever we can use an indirect speech 
act, a direct one also exists, and our theory must give some 
account of why the indirect speech act is chosen in preference. 
Additionally, there needs to be some account of discourse 
structure in relation to speech act theory. It is not enough 
simply to state that there are a certain set of speech act types 
and leave it at that. There are clearly certain rules that govern 
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how speech acts fit into discourse and there are many unanswered 
questions with respect to speech acts and discourse structure; for 
example, if a question is considered a speech act type, then why 
is not an answer also considered to be a speech act type? If the 
answer is that it is because a question clearly maps onto a 
particular grammatical form, then that is not an adequate 
explanation, because this response falls down when we come to 
consider questions that are asked indirectly. Another problem that 
must be faced up to is that of analysing speech acts in relation 
to one another in discourse. To argue that these relations do not 
exist, perhaps by invoking Ockham's razor, is to ignore a lot of 
problems that become evident when examining speech act theory in 
the wider context of discourse. 
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2. Discourse Structure 
2.1 Introduction 
Discourse structure is concerned with the explanation of how 
sequential organisation in discourse is explained and understood. 
Discourse in this context refers to any body of text that involves 
interaction between two or more speakers. This includes casual 
conversation such as one might encounter at some social event, 
telephone conversations, interaction in a classroom, interviewing 
candidates for jobs etc. All of these examples involve some form 
of interaction between speakers of a somewhat different nature. 
For example certain things can be assumed in a social conversation 
that cannot in a telephone conversation because of the proximity 
of the participants in the social conversation, the rules for 
interaction in a formal interview are different to those of a 
consultation with a doctor and so on. 
So the central issue in the analysis of discourse is whether 
there is a formal structure to discourse and if so what it is. 
Another question that is perhaps no less important is whether the 
formal structure of discourse in say a classroom situation can be 
analysed in the same way as say social conversation. So a separate 
issue is: assuming that there is a formal structure to discourse, 
is it universal to all forms of discourse or are there a distinct 
set of discourse types that each have their own variation in terms 
of structural layout? 
Clearly an introduction to speech act theory followed by an 
introduction to discourse structure needs some explanation. The 
reason for this is to enable us to can ask the question whether it 
is possible, or indeed desirable, to integrate speech act theory 
with discourse structure. The precedence for this question goes 
back some way, Austin recognised the importance of this 
relationship when carrying out an analysis of the category that he 
called expositives: 
Expositives are used in acts of exposition involving the 
expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and 
the clarifying of usages and of references. We have said 
repeatedly that we may dispute as to whether these are 
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not verdictive, exercitive, behabitive, or commissive 
acts as well... An enormous number [of expositives] ... 
seem to refer to conversational exchange. 
(Austin 1962, p. 161). 
Searle also made reference to the discourse structure element of 
speech acts when cataloguing variations in illocutionary acts: 
Some performative expressions serve to relate the 
utterance to the rest of the discourse. 
(Searle 1979 p. 6). 
However the discourse structure element of illocutionary acts is 
missing in his final theory. Indeed in a later work (Searle 1986) 
his answer to the question: "Could we have a set of rules for 
conversation in the same way that we have a set of constitutive 
rules for speech acts? " is a definite "no". 
Another way that theories of discourse structure have a 
bearing on speech act theory is that theories of discourse could 
even threaten speech act theory if the two prove to be totally 
incompatible, for this would force us to assess which of the two 
we have got wrong and if we find that our theory of discourse 
structure is more coherent then we would be forced to re-examine 
speech act theory. Levinson for example suggests that this is 
indeed the case, in particular, he calls for a re-examination of 
indirect speech acts, in the light of findings from the 
conversational analysis approach of Schegloff and Sacks (Levinson 
1983, p. 356). 
In this section I describe first of all two competing 
approaches to discourse structure. The first is the discourse 
analysis approach of which Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) is a good 
example. The second approach is conversational analysis which has 
been developed by Schegloff and Sacks amongst others, see for 
example (Schegloff and Sacks 1973). 
These approaches are important because although discourse 
analysis is to some extent compatible with speech act theory, 
conversational analysis is not. At lower levels of description the 
structural categories included in the discourse analysis 
approaches have some similarities with speech act descriptions, 
however there is not a perfect marriage between the two. In the 
Sinclair and Coulthard model for example (Sinclair and Coulthard 
op. cit. ), there are low level categories that describe discourse 
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markers rather than speech acts (see section 2.2 for a description 
of Sinclair and Coulthard's work). 
Conversational analysis on the other hand appears to be 
largely incompatible with conventional speech act theory for 
reasons that will be described in section 2.2. 
In exploring the relationship between speech act theory and 
discourse structure we need to ask three fundamental questions: 
1. Is there a definite structure to discourse, or is it merely an 
illusion? Searle (1986) for example, claims that the relationships 
described in the conversational analysis approach are not 
indicative of discourse structure, but are mere "regularities". 
Even if this is true, there are problems with the current theories 
of speech acts, because relational aspects appear to have some 
bearing on speech acts (this issue was discussed in Chapter One). 
It seems somewhat implausible that there is no structure 
whatsoever to discourse. There are several pointers (see Chapter 
One) that indicate that there are problems with conventional 
speech act theory. These problems may well be solved by exploring 
the relationship between discourse structure and speech acts. 
2. The second question is that assuming that there is a structure 
to discourse and that it is fundamentally compatible with speech 
act theory, in what way does it affect speech act theory? The 
answer to this question must be that speech act theory has to 
incorporate some sort of relational aspect because as it stands, 
it does allow for a relational dimension. Furthermore, if speech 
act theory is to fit in with existing theories of discourse 
structure, then there must be a plausible explanation of how it 
relates not only to other speech acts, but also how it relates to 
other discourse phenomena that are explained by theories of 
discourse. This would include an explanation of how speech acts 
relate to discourse markers, how speech acts can be paired and how 
the first speech act in a pair constrains the second. It is also 
desirable to explain why one surface form is preferred over 
another under certain circumstances. This notion of preference 
organisation is fairly central to conversational analysis, but is 
absent from conventional speech act theory. 
If we accept that speech act theory is an integral part of an 
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explanation of discourse structure we must also accept that 
certain aspects of discourse organization operate independently of 
speech act theory. This is catered for in the Sinclair and 
Coulthard model by the strictly hierarchical organization of 
discourse. At a certain level above speech acts come 
conversational exchanges and the rules that govern adjacency of 
conversational exchanges are almost certainly independent of 
speech act theory. This is because at some level discourse 
structure must be concerned with how topics are organised and 
developed rather than how individual ideas and beliefs are 
expressed. The Sinclair and Coulthard model relates to classroom 
dialogue, and at higher levels in the structure, for example, 
exchanges or transactions, (see section 2.2) considerations such 
as pedagogic strategies come into play. 
Thus we can see that it is totally acceptable to have an 
explanation of discourse at at least two levels; one independent 
of speech act theory and the other integrally bound up with it. 
However if speech act theory is to stand as a plausible theory of 
how we use language, then it must in some way be bound up with a 
theory of discourse structure at some level within the hierarchy. 
3. The third question is assuming that there is a structure to 
discourse, and that it proves to be fundamentally incompatible 
with speech act theory, then what is the future for speech act 
theory? Levinson (1983) and Schegloff (1988) for example have 
claimed that the conversational analysis approach puts the whole 
theory in doubt, and these claims need close scrutiny. However if 
such an explanation of discourse is to replace speech act theory, 
then it must be capable of solving the same sort of problems that 
speech act theory currently does. 
Section 2.3 describes some computational models of discourse 
structure. Although at best incomplete, these models often give 
an interesting insight into some of the problems posed by 
discourse analysis. For example, Allen's plan based model (Allen 
1983), suggests a possible computational explanation of one of the 
Gricean maxims. Litman (1985) also gives some insight into 
insertion sequences described in conversational analysis. 
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2.2 Linguistic Approaches to Discourse Structure 
Discourse Analysis 
Levinson mistakenly states that the work in discourse 
analysis is based on speech acts (or related notions) (Levinson 
op. cit. p 286). However if we look more closely at the work of 
Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) for example, the distinction between 
discourse analysis and conversational analysis becomes less clear. 
Sinclair and Coulthard attempted to analyse the structure of 
classroom dialogue for which they propose a hierarchical structure 
with five different descriptive levels for the analysis of 
discourse. At the top level of their analysis comes the lesson 
which consists of an unordered series of transactions. Each 
transaction consists of a set of ordered exchanges of the form 
PM (M2... Mn) (T) 
in which P is a preliminary exchange Ma medial exchange 
and Ta terminal one. 
(Sinclair and Coulthard op. cit., p. 25) 
The parentheses indicate that a unit is optional, so the smallest 
transaction must consist of at least a preliminary and medial 
exchange. The preliminary and terminal exchanges are essentially 
boundary markers between transactions. The medial exchanges are 
the meat of the interaction between teacher and pupil, and are 
also known as teaching exchanges. 
The exchanges are themselves broken down further into moves, 
of which a typical classroom exchange consists of an initiation 
move followed by an optional response and optional feedback move. 
Typically an initiation move contains some new material presented 
by the teacher to which the teacher may elicit a response from the 
pupils and finally provide feedback to the pupils response. 
The moves themselves consist of one or more acts which form 
the primitive level of Sinclair and Coulthard's discourse 
analysis. Acts may be roughly grouped together into three 
categories: markers of discourse boundaries for example OK, right 
and well or even short periods of silence. The second group is 
concerned with controlling the discourse, for example one act is 
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called nomination which serves to enable the teacher to nominate a 
pupil as a participant in the discourse. The third group has 
informational content for example there are acts called 
informatives and directives. 
It is clear therefore that Sinclair and Coulthard's work is 
not entirely based on speech act theory. Indeed they themselves 
warn against equating speech act theory too closely with their own 
work 
We are interested [on the other hand] in the function of 
an utterance or part of an utterance in the discourse 
and thus the sort of questions we ask about an utterance 
are whether it is intended to evoke a response, whether 
it is a response its, ýlf, whether it is intended to mark 
a boundary in the discourse, and so on. " 
(Sinclair and Coulthard op. cit. p14). 
This issue is also discussed in (Holdcroft and Smith 1990). 
A question that naturally arises from a study of discourse 
structure such as the model proposed by Sinclair and Coulthard in 
conjunction with speech act theory is: to what extent may the acts 
identified in Sinclair and Coulthard's model be identified with 
speech acts? Firstly, the point has already been made that there 
are three distinct groups of acts in the discourse model and only 
one of them is remotely like a speech act. Of these, there might 
be a temptation to equate acts such as informative or directive 
with their counterparts in speech act theory, but there is a many- 
to-many relationship between speech acts and discourse acts. For 
example, the speech act question figures in the discourse acts: 
elicitation, check and clue amongst others. Additionally, the 
discourse act clue may be realised by the speech acts: question, 
state(ment) and command. One reason for this might be that the 
discourse acts relate to other acts within the discourse and take 
account of the position within the discourse; for example the 
discourse act check is so named because it only occurs after the 
teacher has set a task for the pupils to do and is concerned with 
their progress. Whereas, the discourse act metastatement occurs as 
an introduction of what is to follow. In other words, the 
discourse acts are all heavily dependent upon the context in which 
they are situated, whereas speech acts have been defined in a way 
that is totally independent of any context, hence there would be 
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some difficulty in attempting a marriage of the two. 
Sinclair and Coulthard's analysis is only concerned with the 
structure of classroom discourse which is rigidly structured. It 
is a form of discourse where one (group) of the participants has 
little control over the direction of the discourse, and also where 
the teacher can effectively take over control at any point. Thus 
it is clear that it would not be easy to map the Sinclair and 
Coulthard model onto open discourse situations, for example, a 
telephone conversation between two people of equal status. 
However attempts have been made to tailor their model to any 
discourse situation. Burton (1981) for example made just such an 
attempt. Her modifications were at several different levels of the 
Sinclair and Coulthard hierarchy. First of all at the lowest level 
i. e., the act, she made some small additions to the subclass of 
acts that she called markers. She added what she called 
"expressive particles" for example hey, which would be somewhat 
out of place in a classroom. This categorisation appears to 
disguise what is in fact a very complex interaction between 
discourse markers and the rest of the utterance - see for example 
Schiffrin (1987) for a comprehensive treatment of discourse 
markers. Other modifications include "Requests for speaker's 
rights" which are pre-topic items such as: Can I ask you a 
question? This however is a more interesting modification from the 
point of view of speech act theory, as it appears to be an attempt 
to categorise a type of indirect speech act. She also includes 
conversational pairs such as accuse/excuse and inform/comment. 
At the level of moves she adds the following to the list of 
existing moves: 
i) supporting moves, which serve to support the preceding 
move. 
ii) challenging moves, which hold up the topic presented in 
the previous move. 
iii) re-opening moves, which re-open a move that has been 
challenged in some way or other. 
iv) bound-opening moves, which allow the addition of 
informative and comment acts to enlarge the discourse 
framework. 
Burton also recognises two types of exchanges: explicit 
boundary exchanges and conversational exchanges. Boundary 
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exchanges mark the boundary of each transaction, whereas 
conversational exchanges are the "normal" exchanges that make up a 
transaction. There is a certain appeal to the modifications 
proposed by Burton as they can, for example, be used to describe 
the structure of an argument proposed by Schiffrin (1985). An 
argument could be described in terms of a move countered by a 
challenging move, followed up by a supportive move, and so on. 
At the level of exchanges, Burton identifies two types of 
exchange: explicit boundary exchanges and conversational exchanges 
(Burton op. cit. ). The boundary exchanges are optional exchanges 
that take place at the openings of transactions, while 
conversational exchanges begin with an opening (or re-opening or 
challenging move) and are followed by one or several supportive 
moves. The transaction level is essentially the same as that 
described in Sinclair and Coulthard's original work. 
Conversational Analysis 
Conversational analysis on the other hand was originally 
formulated by ethnomethodologists of which some of the most 
important work has been by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974), 
Schegloff and Sacks (1973), Schegloff (1972) and Pomerantz (1978). 
The basis of the conversational analysis approach is perhaps 
the adjacency pair, a seemingly obvious relationship between pairs 
of utterances. Examples of adjacency pairs include question-answer 
and offer-acceptance. 
Schegloff and Sacks (1973) give a more precise definition: 
adjacency pairs are sequences of two utterances that 
are: 
i) adjacent 
ii) produced by different speakers 
iii) ordered as a first part and a second part 
iv) typed, so that a particular first part 
requires a particular second (or range of 
second parts) e. g. offers require acceptances 
or rejections, greetings require greetings, 
and so on. 
Additionally, when the first part of an adjacency pair has been 
uttered, the speaker must stop speaking and the next speaker must 
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at some point produce the second part of the adjacency pair. 
The first requirement is that the two utterances are 
adjacent. However, between the two components of the adjacency 
pair, there frequently occur what Schegloff (1972) describes as 
insertion sequences: 
(1) A: I'd like a Farnborough number please. 
(2) B: In Hampshire? 
(3) A: No, Kent. 
(4) B: OK. what name? 
(1) and (4) form an adjacency pair, but another adjacency pair (2) 
and (3) is inserted in between. Insertion sequences are not 
restricted to just another pair in between. Levinson (1983) for 
example describes a sequence where four adjacency pairs are 
inserted between one. Schegloff (op. cit. p. 306) suggests that the 
criterion of adjacency should be replaced with the idea of 
conditional relevance. Conditional relevance is a criterion that 
given a first part of a pair, a second part is immediately 
relevant and predictable from expectations. Levinson suggests that 
if the second part fails to appear, then it is noticeably absent. 
He also states that what conditional relevance sets up is not a 
formation rule that specifies that say a question must receive an 
answer if it is to count as well-formed discourse, but it is a set 
of expectations that have to be attended to. 
The second criterion is that the two parts of an adjacency 
pair are issued by different speakers. This criterion appears to 
pose few problems unless we consider rhetorical questions. In the 
Sinclair and Coulthard model, described above, there is an act 
called a meta-statement. A meta-statement occurs at the beginning 
of a class-room type dialogue structure and is a statement about 
what is to follow. 
For example, a seminar about speech act theory could start 
with the (rhetorical) question: I want to ask a question, Did 
Searle get it wrong? This "question" is not so much a question 
as a statement that the topic of the seminar will be "I believe 
Searle got his speech act theory wrong, and I intend to explain 
why". In a sense, it is not a question, it encompasses the whole 
of what is to follow. It has no answer as a second part of an 
adjacency pair, but then conversation analysis is only about 
conversation and not seminars, where the turn taking is rigidly 
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defined. However the classroom situation described by Sinclair and 
Coulthard is not that far removed from conversation. 
The third criterion is that an adjacency pair is ordered as a 
first part and a second part, the idea that the adjacency pair 
must be ordered is not particularly significant to our argument, 
except to observe that the ordering imposes a structural 
relationship between the first part and the second. Any such 
relationship between the two parts is absent in conventional 
speech act theory. 
The final criterion is that the two parts are typed so that a 
particular first part requires a particular second part. As 
Levinson points out 
Unless for any given first part there is a small or at 
least limited set of seconds, the concept will cease, it 
seems, to describe the tight organization in 
conversation that is its principal attraction. 
(Levinson op. cit. p. 306). 
Again, according to Levinson, the concept of the adjacency pair 
rests on the notion of preference organization. Not all potential 
second parts to the first part of an adjacency pair are of equal 
standing, he states that there is a ranking operating over the 
range of alternatives such that at least one is preferred and at 
least one is dispreferred. This notion is a linguistic rather than 
psychological one. The idea is that preferred seconds are 
unmarked, i. e., they are structurally much simpler. Whereas a 
dispreferred alternative is marked by perhaps a significant delay 
in delivery, marked by a particle such as well or given with an 
account of why a dispreferred alternative is given. Additionally, 
the dispreferred alternative may be given in an indirect or 
mitigated form. 
This account of the matching of first and second parts 
contains some explanations of language usage that is absent in 
speech act theory, for example it gives some account of the use of 
discourse markers and clearly needs further investigation. 
On top of what is essentially local conversational 
organisation, there are higher level structures that map onto 
three or four turns in a conversation. The most important of these 
are repair and pre-sequences. 
Repair (Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks 1977) is a mechanism 
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that deals with the correction of misunderstandings, mishearings 
or even non-hearings. Repair may be self-initiated (repair by the 
speaker of the repairable item), or other initiated (repair by 
someone other than the speaker of the repairable item). An example 
of self-repair might be: 
(5) A: How did the monks get there? I mean how could they 
have earned a living? 
The above utterance from a classroom dialogue has a second part 
which is a self-initiated repair to make the first part clearer. 
Pre-sequence is used to refer to both certain kinds of turns 
and a certain kind of sequence containing that type of turn. For 
example a summons is a pre-sequence that prefigures a turn 
containing the reason for the summons. e. g. 
(6) A: Hey! 
(7) B: Uh? 
(8) A: Keep off the grass. 
Other types of pre-sequences include pre-invitations, where 
the first pair starts with a greeting, to be followed by an 
invitation. A pre-request is a question that sets the ground for 
a request, e. g. 
(9) A: Can I buy a ticket for the concert here? 
(10) B: Yes, indeed. 
(11) A: Two seats please. 
Another type of pre-sequence described by Terasaki (1976) is the 
pre-announcement. A pre-announcement is exactly as its name 
suggests, a pair that precedes some announcement. For example: 
(12) A: Guess what. 
(13) B: What? 
(14) A: Its egg mornay for lunch again. 
In addition to the intermediate structures described above, 
there are also some higher level structures called overall 
organisations that organise the totality of the exchanges within a 
specific conversation. 
Schegloff (1972) identifies a sequence in telephone 
conversations that occur at the beginning of the conversation 
called an opening section in which identification, greetings and 
recognition occur. Following the opening section (still in 
telephone conversations) comes the first topic slot in which the 
caller announces his reason for the call. The first topic slot is 
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a privileged slot which is free from topical constraints arising 
from prior turns. After the first topic come a series of topics 
which are related to previous topics. 
Mechanisms for closing down a topic are local procedures that 
can operate throughout a call. Finally there is the closing 
section, which serves to shut down the conversation. Closing 
sections must be balanced so that the conversation is closed down 
without one of participants still having something important to 
say, and also must be done without undue haste. A closing sequence 
typically contains the following: 
i) a closing down of some topic which may include the 
making of arrangements, giving regards to other family 
members etc. 
ii) pre-closing items such as: right, OK, well ... 
iii) a typing of a call (if appropriate) such as a favour 
granted, checking up on a person's health etc. 
iv) a final exchange of elements: bye, cheerio etc. 
There have been recent attempts to apply the ideas of 
Schegloff et. al. to larger discourse units. One example of this 
is the work of Houtkoop and Mazeland (1985) who attempt to apply 
the ideas of conversational analysis to larger discourse units 
(DUs). 
They distinguish in their model closed DUs where there is a 
primary speaker who is holding the floor and open DUs where there 
is a negotiation on the type of conversational unit underway. The 
description of the closed DUs places the following restrictions 
upon the traditional conversational analysis model (Houtkoop and 
Mazeland op. cit. p. 601): 
i) The primary speaker is expected to continue a DU until a 
turn -a constructional unit which marks DU completion 
has been produced. 
ii) The DU is sequentially implicative for the kind of 
contributive DU a recipient can make. The DR (The DU- 
recipient) should be placed according to the turn-taking 
model, that is around the end of the turn-constructional 
units. 
iii) If there is speaker transition at a point which is 
marked as DU-incomplete, there is a preference for the 
primary speaker(PS) to become the next speaker. 
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After a recognizable end of the DU, the turn taking model becomes 
operative again, until the next DU is started. 
Another higher level model based on conversational analysis 
was described by Polanyi (1988) in which discourse structure can 
be represented as the recursive sequencing and embedding of 
discourse units of various types. Polanyi also talks about 
discourse adjacency units which are used in talk to accomplish 
specific interactional tasks. 
Although the two approaches to discourse structure appear to 
be at odds with each other, there are areas where they share 
common ground. For example, at higher levels in the discourse 
model, both approaches advocate a hierarchical structure. The 
Sinclair and Coulthard model is strictly hierarchical and both 
Houtkoop and Mazeland and Polanyi advocate an approach that is 
hierarchical. This suggests that any real differences that exist 
in the models must occur in either the way the hierarchies have 
been defined, or at the level of detail at the lower levels in the 
model. 
Even down at the lowest levels of the hierarchies there 
appears to be common ground that is not at first apparent. Both 
approaches recognise the importance of boundary markers and 
although such markers are absent from conventional speech act 
theory, they are present in the discourse analysis approach. Thus 
it is not impossible to suggest that if speech act theory were to 
take account of such markers, then it would come to resemble the 
conversational analysis approach more closely. 
Additionally, the two approaches stress the importance of 
sequential organisation, however the conversational analysis 
approach is formal, but the discourse analysis approach is more 
functional and utterance based. The discourse analysis approach 
can seem too rigid to be able to encompass the incredible 
flexibility of language. On the other hand the conversational 
analysis approach does not appear to be sufficiently well defined 
to cover the flexibility of language. These criticisms suggest 
that something between the two approaches might be more 
satisfactory. 
There is another area of common ground between the two 
approaches that is most striking and yet appears to have gone 
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totally undocumented. At the heart of the Sinclair and Coulthard 
model is the move sequence: 
Initiation (Response) (Feedback) 
Burton suggested that in order to tailor their approach to open 
discourse, the feedback element should be discarded (see above), 
leaving us with a basic cycle of initiation and response. 
Conversationally, this makes sense, A speaks and then B responds 
to what A has said, possibly taking the initiative himself. The 
conversational analysis approach has at its heart the adjacency 
pair: a pair consisting of a first part and a second part. This 
pair is ordered and typed (see the description above). If we take 
initiation as the first part and response as the second part, then 
there is a remarkable similarity between these two descriptions. 
Perhaps the two approaches are not so much at odds as might first 
appear. 
2.3 Computational Models of Discourse Structure 
One of the most ambitious attempts to build a computational 
model of discourse structure was that of Reichman (1985). Reichman 
sees discourse (specifically, conversational discourse) structured 
as a series of functionally related conversational moves 
interspersed among utterances that serve as a continuation of what 
has gone before. She identifies six types of conversational move: 
(Reichman op. cit. p. 21) 
i) presenting a claim 
ii) explaining a claim 
iii) challenging a claim 
iv) giving support to a claim 
v) shifting a topic 
vi) resuming a preceding subject of discourse 
This analysis fits into the previous models of discourse analysis 
because conversational moves are merely formal descriptions of 
boundaries between higher level discourse units. 
Reichman imposes a further structure onto discourse in the 
form of a context space (Reichman op. cit. p. 24). The context 
space is partially defined by the conversational structures it 
contains. Reichman then states that a discourse structure can be 
defined in terms of the context spaces it contains. 
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Reichman then goes on to describe a program that recognizes 
the formal structures described above that she claims constitute a 
discourse. Reichman's largely hierarchical approach is in many 
ways similar to the Sinclair and Coulthard approach, though not as 
detailed, in that there do not appear to be anything equivalent to 
Sinclair and Coulthard's acts in her work. 
A different approach was taken by Allen (1983) in his plan- 
based approach to natural language understanding, described in 
Chapter One. Allen's work was extended by Litman (1985) from a 
sentential plan recognition system to a plan-based theory of 
discourse. A major assumption of her work was that: 
The structure of dialogues and the use of surface 
linguistic phenomena are highly rule-governed. 
(Litman op. cit. p. 15). 
The system carries out plan analysis using knowledge about 
the structure of typical plans (known as domain plans), it also 
attempts to cope with "things people do with plans", known as 
meta-plans using a knowledge of the previous dialogue and a data 
structure for maintaining the relationships between the plans 
(known as a plan stack). Plans have been described in Chapter One, 
but the idea of meta-plans is new and needs some explanation. 
A meta-plan is a plan-about-plans that deals with a sort of 
executive handling of plans. For example there are meta-plans that 
deal with introducing plans, executing plans, specifying part of 
plans abandoning plans etc. A meta-plan is specified as having a 
header, which is a description of the meta-plan, a decomposition 
which is the speech act that is used to introduce the meta-plan 
into the dialogue, effects which specify what action is to be 
taken next and constraints which specify the minimum requirements 
for the meta-plan to be performed. 
The meta-plan INTRODUCE-PLAN can be specified as: 
HEADER: INTRODUCE-PLAN(speaker, hearer, action, plan) 
DECOMPOSITION: REQUEST(speaker, hearer, action) 
EFFECTS: WANT(hearer, plan) 
NEXT(action, plan) 
CONSTRAINTS: STEP(action, plan) 
AGENT (action, hearer) 
(Litman op. cit. p. 29) 
REQUEST is the speech act that is used to issue the meta- 
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plan, WANT is based on the assumption that the hearer is a co- 
operative agent and will therefore adopt the plan as a joint 
action to be performed. NEXT specifies that the action marked in 
the WANT operator will be the next action to be performed. STEP 
and AGENT are constraints that specify that the hearer must be 
able to perform the plan in question. 
The plan stack is used to monitor the execution of a task 
including its various clarifications and corrections. During the 
course of a dialogue, a stack of executing and suspended plans is 
built up and maintained by the plan recognizer. Within the stack 
each meta-plan refers to the plan below it, and the currently 
executing plan is maintained at the top of the stack. The plan 
stack is effectively a description of all plans and meta-plans 
that are currently active in a dialogue with the meta-plans 
related to the domain plans that they are modifying. 
Although Litman's approach is very interesting there are some 
very difficult problems that it does not appear to have tackled. 
In an unrestricted domain, how does the plan recognizer work given 
an almost limitless variety of plans and domains? Secondly, it is 
not clear how the plan stack carries out its housekeeping to clear 
out abandoned plans which happen with great regularity in open 
discourse. For example, whenever a new topic is introduced by 
means of some strategy such as: Oh, by the way... or That reminds 
me... In this situation, unless the first speaker is very 
determined not have the current plan dropped it is likely to 
become interrupted at this point and may never be re-introduced, 
unless one of the speakers makes a determined effort to do so. The 
problem then for the stack housekeeping is when to remove the 
suspended plan from the stack. 
2.4 Other Artificial Intelligence Approaches to Discourse 
Much of the early work in understanding discourse centred 
around the use of frames (Minsky 1975). A frame is a data 
structure that allows a class of objects to be described. It 
consists of a collection of slots that describe aspects of the 
objects. These slots may have a set of conditions attached to them 
that must be met by anything that fills the slot. Additionally, 
they may have associated with them procedural information. This 
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procedural information may specify what has to be done if the slot 
becomes filled (this is known as an IF-ADDED procedure) or how to 
obtain the value to fill the slot (an IF-NEEDED procedure). 
Related frames may be grouped together to form a frame system. 
Because frames contain information about many aspects of an 
object, this information can be used as though it has been 
explicitly observed. For example a frame about a room will have a 
slot describing a door, and whether or not the door of a 
particular room has been explicitly mentioned in say a dialogue, 
the frame system is able to make inferences based on the 
assumption that that particular room has a door. 
Scripts (Schank and Abelson 1977) are an adaptation of 
frames. Schank built a natural language understanding system based 
on three ideas. Firstly, semantic primitives which were supposed 
to be capable of describing all actions described in language. 
There are eleven basic semantic primitives (see Rich (1991) for an 
introduction to the subject), for example, PTRANS is the physical 
transfer of an object, MBUILD means building new information out 
of old. Thus by using these semantic primitives, Schank claims 
that all actions could be represented using language independent 
semantic units. 
The second idea was called conceptual dependency which was a 
theory of how the meaning of language can be represented in such a 
way that inferences can be drawn from sentences in a way that is 
independent of the original sentences. Conceptual dependency 
representations are not built out of the primitives corresponding 
to words in the sentence, but combinations of sentence units. 
Conceptual dependencies can be built up using semantic primitives 
plus four primitive conceptual categories representing actions, 
objects, modifiers of actions and modifiers of objects. Conceptual 
dependency resulted in a small set of possible interactions 
between what Schank called actions (verbs), objects (nouns), 
modifiers of actions (adverbs) and picture aiders (adjectives). 
One example was the relationship between an actor and the event 
that he or she causes. 
Semantic primitives were put into a data structure called a 
script which described a stereotyped situation such as taking a 
meal in a restaurant or taking a ride on a bus. The set of 
semantic primitives put together gave an overall description of 
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the events that typically take place when executing a script. Thus 
eating in a restaurant contained scenes: entering, finding a 
table, ordering, eating the meal, paying and leaving. 
The script also had props which were the objects that 
appeared in the script, for example tables, chairs and menus in a 
restaurant script. There were also roles which were taken by the 
participants of the script, for example, customers, waiters and 
cooks in the restaurant script. The script had entry conditions, 
such as the fact that the customer was hungry in the restaurant 
script, and results such as the fact that the restaurant owner had 
more money after the meal. The advantage of such a description was 
that it enabled the computer program to infer events from a story. 
For example, if we are told that someone went into a restaurant 
and had a meal, then we can infer that they sat down at a table 
even though it is not explicitly mentioned. At the time this 
represented a step forward in Artificial Intelligence research. 
Semantic primitives and conceptual dependency are described in 
greater detail in Schank (1975) and scripts are described in 
Schank and Abelson (1977). 
A system implemented using scripts could build up a 
representation of a story about an everyday situation, it could 
then answer questions about information that might not have been 
explicitly mentioned in the story. For example a story such as: 
John went to dinner. He ordered steak teriyaki. After he had 
his meal, he went home. 
A script system could answer a question such as: 
(15) Did John pay for his meal? 
It could also deal with stories where the script may be 
incomplete, for example: 
John went to dinner. He waited for ages to be served. He got 
mad and left. 
A script system could then correctly answer a question such as 
(16) Did John eat his meal? 
One of the more successful programs that used scripts was 
called SAM (Script Applier Mechanism) (Cullingford 1978) which 
attempted to make sense of newspaper stories. Unfortunately, it 
suffered from the same drawback as any script based system in that 
it only worked for stories that fitted the script stereotype. 
A telling objection to the whole idea of scripts is given 
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by Dreyfus (1979 p. 43). 
Real stories pose a further problem for Schank's 
approach. In a script ... what counts as the relevant 
facts depends on the story itself. For example a script 
that describes a bus trip contains the fact that the 
passenger thanks the driver. But... [that] would not be 
important in a story in which the passenger simply took 
the bus as part of a longer journey, while it might be 
crucially important if the story concerned a 
misanthrope who had not thanked anyone before. 
A more plan and goal based system was written by Wilensky 
(1978) which attempted to understand stories by reasoning about 
the plans and goals of the agents involved in the story. His 
program PAM (Plan Applier Mechanism) described an algorithm for 
detecting and processing various types of goal-based stories, 
using knowledge about what goals existed, how goals were fulfilled 
and how they interacted. It used bottom-up reasoning to form 
script like explanations. However there was nothing in this work 
regarding intentional aspects of stories or issues relating to 
surface linguistic phenomena. Also the work concentrated on the 
goals of the characters in the story rather than the goals of the 
writer of the story (Litman 1985). 
There has been some work on plan recognition systems that 
inferred intentions from a description of the actions of the 
participants of a sequence of physical actions (Schmidt et. al. 
1978). 
Sidner has carried out research with understanding dialogues 
both intentionally and by using surface linguistic phenomena 
Sidner (1985). Grosz has carried out work on planning to integrate 
multiple perspectives Grosz (1979). Extensions to planning have 
been carried out by Cohen and Levesque (1985) and Kautz (1985) who 
are interested in developing a formal theory of planning for 
systems that view language as planned behaviour. Cohen and 
Levesque use a possible worlds semantics to develop a theory of 
communication, whereas Kautz is concerned with non-monotonic 
aspects of reasoning with plans. 
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2.5 Issues in Discourse Analysis 
Returning to the three questions raised in section 2.1: the 
first of these was the question whether there is such a thing as a 
structure to discourse. Very little has been said about this 
simply because the chapter is about theories of discourse that 
presuppose that there is some sort of structure. However this 
question should be examined briefly. 
Searle brought Ockham's razor to his defence in order to 
justify the non-relational nature of speech act theory. Indeed he 
has recently argued that there is no real structure to discourse 
Searle (1986). A convincing refutation of Searle's arguments have 
been given in Holdcroft (1991). 
Searle gives four main reasons why he feels that there will 
be no adequate theory of the structure of discourse. Firstly, 
there are few interesting sequential relationships between speech 
acts (Holdcroft op. cit. ). Secondly, he feels that conversations 
lack a purpose or point and hence cannot be explained in terms of 
pragmatic maxims of the type proposed by Grice. Thirdly (Searle 
states) that what appear to be rules, are mere regularities in 
language caused by a behaviour that is difficult to diverge from. 
This is his main criticism of the Schegloff et. al. approach. 
Finally, Searle feels that it is what he calls "the background" to 
a conversation that determines what is relevant and what is not, 
it is the cognitive views of the participants in the discourse 
that determine the relevance, hence it is not possible to have a 
general theory of relevance. 
Holdcroft discusses these points at some length. In answer to 
point one, Holdcroft states that Searle's view holds only if we 
accept Searle's view of speech acts to be correct and in any 
event, speech acts only have a minor role to play in any theory of 
discourse structure. It is quite possible for speech acts to have 
a substantial role to play in a theory of discourse structure, 
even if it is only at a low level (see section 2.2). Holdcroft 
then goes on to reject Searle's second point and argues that 
Searle's view of the background is not sufficient to reject out of 
hand the idea that conversation has a structure, indeed to accept 
Searle's view would be to totally undermine cognitive science. 
Searle's stance on discourse is understandable given his 
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description of speech acts. However, this is in spite of the fact 
that Austin originally pointed to the possible relationship 
between speech acts and discourse structure when looking at the 
expositive class of speech acts. It is also in spite of the fact 
that Searle himself originally stated that how one speech act 
stands in relation to another has a bearing on the description of 
the speech act (see Chapter One). His final description of the 
components of illocutionary force do not allow for the possibility 
of any relations between speech acts, and hence he is forced into 
rejecting the stance that discourse has a structure. This is a 
position that I find untenable. 
The second question made the a priori assumption that 
discourse structure was compatible with speech act theory, but 
asked how this compatibility affected speech act theory. The 
Sinclair and Coulthard model appears on the face of it to be 
compatible with speech act theory. However a great deal of work 
has to be done to fully integrate speech act theory into a 
discourse model along the lines proposed by Sinclair and 
Coulthard. Some of the Sinclair and Coulthard acts appear to 
describe speech acts, but these are merely functional categories 
and do little to constrain the possible speech acts in any given 
position in a piece of discourse. When attempting to describe the 
relationship between two adjacent speech acts we need to examine 
relevance - what it is that makes adjacent utterances relate to 
each other. 
Sperber and Wilson (1982) put forward a pragmatic theory 
based on the theory of maximal relevance. They suggest that: 
Degrees of relevance depend on a ratio of input to 
output, where output is the number of contextual 
implications, and input is the amount of processing 
needed to derive these contextual implications. 
(Sperber and Wilson op. cit. p. 74) 
Sperber and Wilson describe processing time as some function of 
time and energy expended. Their theory is expanded in greater 
detail in (Sperber and Wilson 1986). However there are grave 
problems with this approach, for example see Gazdar and Good 
(1982). Gazdar and Good's demolition of Sperber and Wilson's 
theory is based on an attack on Sperber and Wilson's notion of 
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non-trivial inference and also degrees of relevance. 
A more interesting account of conversational relevance is 
given by Holdcroft (1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d). Firstly as a 
pragmatic maxim, relevance has been regarded as having a pre- 
eminent position (Holdcroft 1986a). Holdcroft asks the question 
what relevance relates to, sentences, speech acts, speaker's goals 
etc. Conversational analysis suggests a structure to discourse in 
the same way that there is a grammatical structure, except that 
the units are functionally related. Holdcroft sees problems with 
this (Holdcroft 1986a, p. 2). Firstly, because of the functional 
relationships, there are several different syntactic realisations 
to the units, and the relevance relationship is difficult to 
define. Additionally, it must be possible to separately identify 
the question and answer in a question-answer pair from their place 
in any given structure. 
He suggests that the problem of relevance can be sub-divided 
into logical relevance, topical relevance and relevance to a 
higher order goal, though it must be said that Sperber and Wilson 
made a not very successful attempt to describe logical relevance. 
Several issues have emerged from the investigation into 
speech acts and discourse structure. Firstly when examining the 
two main rival theories of discourse structure, we notice that at 
a higher level both theories talk about a hierarchical structure 
superimposed onto a more primitive set of units. So it is at the 
lower level where the main difference of opinion is most apparent. 
Both approaches to discourse structure mention the use of 
discourse markers in their respective theories: discourse analysis 
has as some of its lowest level units discourse markers. 
Conversational analysis uses discourse markers to mark dis- 
preferred seconds in adjacency pairs, so there are grounds for 
investigating the role of discourse markers in discourse 
structure. The conclusion that one must draw from this is that 
there are very real points of contact between the two theories 
that are worthy of further investigation. 
Finally, it must be realised that relevance is a very 
slippery notion. Consider the following conversational pairs: 
(17) A: We stopped over in Singapore for a couple of days 
and saw some of the sights, such as Orchard Road 
and the Merlion. 
(18) B: Singapore's streets are clean enough to eat off. 
-63- 
B may not have visited Singapore and hence had no experience of 
it but has heard about the cleanliness of the streets and thus 
made an effort not to appear ignorant about the place. 
(19) A: We went to York recently and visited the Jorvik 
centre. It was very impressive. 
(20) B: York reminds me of Chester with all its quaint old 
narrow streets. 
In this couplet, B makes a statement that is relevant in that 
it refers to York but B is perhaps making an attempt to shift the 
conversation to more familiar territory. Possibly B did not know 
what the Jorvik centre was. The conclusion that may be drawn from 
this is that relationships between sentences may only involve 
relevance in a very weak sense, and relevance on its own is 
unlikely to be the key to sequential organisation. 
It is hardly meaningful or desirable to attempt to describe 
the relationships given above purely in terms of speech acts. 
However speech act theory should be able to say something about 
more closely associated acts such as question/answer pairs and 
this is where the rival theory comes into its own. 
There appears to be some common ground between the discourse 
analysis approach and conversational analysis because of a 
striking similarity between the core components of both 
approaches. The modified version of Sinclair and Coulthard's model 
(Burton 1981) has the initiation-response cycle as the central 
part of the structure. This idea of initiation-response is not 
wholly dissimilar from the idea of an adjacency pair, where the 
first part initiates something (a question initiates an answer), 
and then the second part provides a response to the first. The 
main difference of course is that the adjacency pair is described 
in a formal way. 
The third question assumes a priori that speech act theory is 
fundamentally incompatible with an explanation of discourse 
structure and asks the question: what are the implications for 
speech act theory if this proves to be the case? The implications 
are bleak if this turns out to be true. The principal contender to 
thus unseat speech act theory is conversational analysis. 
Examining the different approaches of discourse analysis and 
conversational analysis we see that the main differences appear 
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to occur at a lower level as both discourse analysis and 
conversational analysis models view discourse as a hierarchy of 
structures. But a closer examination of the two approaches suggest 
that these differences may not be as great as it might at first 
appear. 
Levinson (op. cit. ;p 356) suggests that the conversational 
analysis approach solves the problem of indirect speech acts. The 
problem, posed in classical speech act theory is simply that of 
why an utterance does not have literal force but some other force 
that is explained by a theory of indirect speech acts. For example 
the utterance: 
(21) Must I ask you to take out the garbage? 
would be interpreted as a request rather than a question which is 
its literal force. Concentrating on requests, Levinson explains 
away the problem of indirect speech acts using pre-requests. A 
pre-request is a sequence that has a four-position structure: 
(22) A: Do you have seats for the Saturday matinee? (PRE- 
REQUEST) 
(23) B: There are plenty in the circle and balcony. (GO- 
AHEAD). 
(24) A: I'd like two in the balcony, please. (REQUEST). 
(25) B: OK. (RESPONSE). 
In a pre-request, position 1 turns (22), check that conditions for 
successful position 3 turns (24), obtain. This appears to be 
because the preference ranking of a request prefers acceptance 
and dis-prefers refusal, therefore the pre-request effectively 
sets up an acceptance by checking the pre-conditions for that 
acceptance. In cases of doubt pre-requests are preferred over 
requests. What is checked in the pre-request is the most common 
grounds for refusal (Labov and Fanshel 1977). This may be whether 
goods are in stock in service encounters (as above) (Sinclair 
1976) or inability to fulfil the, request. Levinson suggests that 
there may be a preference to avoid requests altogether, hence a 
pre-request may be taken as a hint that someone wants something. 
Thus the most preferred form would be a pre-request immediately 
followed by the response, e. g. 
(26) Do you have 'The Independent'? 
(27) Here you are (Provides). 
In this way position 1 pre-requests can be phrased in order to get 
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directly to position 4. Brown and Levinson (1979) note another 
form of pre-request that enables a position 4 response to be 
arrived at directly: 
(28) I don't suppose you have this in black? 
(29) No I'm afraid not. 
This is an example of what Brown and Levinson call interactional 
pessimism. Levinson goes on to suggest (Levinson op. cit. p. 363) 
that this strategy of 'loading' a pre-request so that the response 
can be reached directly explains the problem of indirect speech 
acts because, he suggests, that for each type of indirect request 
there is an appropriate underlying strategy for going from a pre- 
request directly to the response without going through the 
intermediate stages. He suggests that: 
Careful comparison of this conversationally based 
account with the standard accounts of speech acts will 
show that it renders many of the most problematic 
aspects of indirect speech act issues quite illusory. 
(Levinson op. cit. p. 364) 
One of the most interesting and challenging aspects of 
conversational analysis is the attempt to explain indirect speech 
acts and this needs further investigation. Levinson (op. cit. ) 
described in some detail how a four-turn sequence such as a pre- 
request before a request, can be compacted into the first and 
fourth turns (see above) with the first turn effectively inviting 
a fourth turn response. Levinson then suggests that all indirect 
speech acts might be explained in this way. Additionally indirect 
speech acts were hinted at when talking about dis-preferred 
seconds to the first part of an adjacency pair. 
Taking the compacted four-turn sequence first, if there is an 
indirect speech act that cannot be explained away in this way then 
the explanation given by Levinson is at best incomplete. Consider 
the class of indirect speech acts known as hints, for example: 
(30): Its snowing heavily this evening. 
(31): I'll give you a lift. 
(32): Thanks. 
The first utterance, issued in a snow-storm by Aa non-car owner 
to B is treated as a request for a lift. If we are to accept this 
interpretation of the sequence then there must be some explanation 
based around the use of a pre-request or at least some sort of 
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preparatory structure. The problem with a hint as a pre-request is 
that if the hint is either ignored or not perceived as such then 
the request is unlikely to follow. Consider the response to (30): 
(33): Yes, indeed. 
The respondent either ignores the implied request or fails to see 
that it is a request rather than a statement of the obvious. 
Social convention would almost certainly forbid the speaker from 
then going on to make he request directly. If there are no 
circumstances under which the request can be made directly, then a 
hint cannot be called a pre-request. Another type of indirect 
speech act that throws doubt on the conversational analysis 
approach is the following: 
(34): (Mother to Son): Must I ask you to take out the 
garbage? 
Then consider an equivalent indirect speech act: 
(35): (One stranger to another in a train): Must I ask you to 
close the window? 
According to the conversational analysis approach there is a 
single explanation why this type of indirect speech might be used 
based on a pre-request - request sequence. The mother to son 
utterance although not exactly polite would be acceptable, whereas 
the second utterance is not only impolite, but does not make sense 
pragmatically because the indirect speech act pre-supposes a prior 
agreement that the hearer would carry out the action. This 
analysis suggests that politeness as well as the relative statuses 
of the participants in the discourse plays an important part in 
unravelling why indirect speech acts are used. Additionally prior, 
mutual knowledge and any form of contract between the participants 
appears to play an important part in a theory of indirect speech 
acts. 
Another point about pre-sequences is that they do not appear 
to be uniform phenomena, for example it is not clear that a pre- 
announcement serves the same sort of function as a pre-request. It 
does not for example appear to have the same potential for 
collapse into two utterances, except that B might pre-empt A's 
pre-announcement: 
(36) A: Guess what? 
(37) B: Its egg mornay for lunch again. 
It does not serve as a vehicle for explaining an indirect speech 
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act. Its use does not even appear to bear any relationship to the 
corresponding form pre-request. This only serves to re-inforce the 
view that the conversational analysis is not so much a theory as a 
set of observations. Although discourse analysis and speech act 
theory are compatible, conversational analysis and speech act 
theory are not. However, this arises because of the treatment of 
indirect speech acts in conversational analysis, but this argument 
fails because it is simply insufficient to explain all types of 
indirect speech acts. Furthermore, the categories used in 
conversational analysis (pre-sequences) are in themselves 
inconsistent and appear to be more observations of mere 
regularities in discourse, rather than a fundamental component. We 
may thus conclude that in conversational analysis, we don't have a 
theory of discourse that is incompatible with speech act theory. 
Several other aspects come into the theories of discourse 
without being explicitly mentioned. Perhaps the most interesting 
of these is politeness. Is it the case that conversational 
analysis explains the phenomenon of politeness, or is it perhaps 
that there are politeness maxims that are driving the conversation 
and producing the results that are being observed in 
conversational analysis? The status of the speakers seems 
important, but gets no mention in the conversational analysis 
approach. Finally, the problem of context also rears its ugly head 
when looking at some of the examples. 
Levinson suggests that a pre-request may be taken as a hint 
that someone wants something, however its use is to some extent 
governed by context, consider the example: 
(38) A: Do you have 'The Independent'? 
(39) B: Here you are. (provides) 
Lets suppose that instead the conversation takes place in a large 
DIY superstore, then we are likely to get the following sequence: 
(40) A: Do you have any replacement rotary blade cutters? 
(41) B: They're in the gardening section next to the 
pesticides. 
B is only likely to fulfil the request if a further request is 
made. e. g. 
(42) A: Could you show me where exactly? 
This is an example of the co-operative principle of Grice. Could 
it be the case that a plan-based model (similar to the one 
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described in section 2.3) could provide us with a suitable 
explanation of what is going on here? The pre-request sequence 
does not seem to adequately explain all possibilities. It does not 
explain hints, because if a hint is ignored, it is usually the 
case that steps 3 and 4 of the pre-request sequence are not 
carried out. Furthermore it does explain why the sequence 
sometimes stops at step two as in the example given above. It also 
provides no explanation as to why certain types of indirect 
requests are used, such as the formula: 
(43) Must I ask you to X? 
described above. However pre-sequences are interesting, and they 
do pose some questions that are not adequately covered by 
traditional speech act theory. 
AI models may also have something to contribute as Allen's 
plan recognition system (mentioned in Chapter One) describes one 
of the Gricean pragmatic maxims in action (be informative). Could 
a plan model do more than just this? 
It is apparent from this study that in order to have an 
adequate theory of speech acts, that discourse structure is 
important and must be studied in conjunction with it. However in 
recognising the importance of discourse structure in speech act 
theory and vice versa, we must also recognise the limitations of 
speech act theory with respect to discourse structure. At higher 
levels of the descriptive hierarchy, speech act theory apparently 
has little or nothing to do with discourse structure. It is also 
evident from this study that discourse analysis is compatible with 
speech act theory, although there are several unanswered questions 
in both theories. Finally, conversational analysis, although it 
has provided us with many insights into discourse structure is 
theoretically weak and although it has been alleged to have 
undermined speech act theory has failed to do so. 
Several questions and lines of investigation have been opened 
and only some of these will be explored in the next few 
chapters. Chapter Three describes an attempt to re-examine speech 
act verbs in order to find a more plausible set of primitives for 
them and also to build a logical form of the speech acts. 
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3. The Deconstruction of Speech Act Verbs 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter One I described some of the more traditional 
theories of speech acts and in Chapter Two looked at discourse 
analysis and its possible relationship to speech act theory. 
Having examined existing theories it is now time to attempt to 
build a new theory that will hopefully answer many of the problems 
posed. I intend to take speech acts as the starting point for my 
new theory, in particular to examine speech act verbs as they at 
least provide a means of categorising different speech act types. 
An interesting account of speech act verbs is given by Wierzbicka 
(1987), and I will to a large extent draw on this work for my 
description of speech act verbs, simply because, even though I 
don't agree with all of the descriptions they do at least have 
many similarities to the approach I intend to take in my own 
description of speech act verbs. 
In section 1.6 I listed seven problems with Searle's theory 
of speech acts. It is now time to examine these in more detail. 
The first point was that the basis for Searle's account of 
speech acts is largely sentential in nature and does not allow for 
the possibility of a structural relationship between speech acts 
and units of discourse. In order to make clear why Searle's theory 
does not allow for any relational aspects we need to examine 
carefully what his theory states. Firstly, he talks about 
direction of fit (section 1.3) stating that there are four and 
only four possible directions of fit: word-to-world where the 
utterance fits an independently existing state of affairs in the 
world; world-to-word, where the world is altered to fit the 
propositional content of the illocution; the double direction of 
fit and the null direction of fit. If we are to allow a speech act 
to relate to something that has occurred previously, perhaps we 
should add a direction of fit such as word-to-context where the 
propositional content relates to a previous speech act within the 
context. But this is a rather vague and somewhat problematic 
definition because it only considers a speech act to be a type of 
function operating between the propositional content and what that 
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propositional content represents in the world. However, there is a 
sense in which the context (both linguistic and non-linguistic) 
plays an important role in speech act recognition. An account of 
this is given by Gazdar(1981) in which he states: 
I'm not claiming that a theory of speech acts 
constitutes a theory of utterance sequencing but only 
that an account of the recognition and interpretation of 
speech acts is a necessary component of such a theory. 
(Gazdar op. cit. p. 65) 
The problem with the word and world idea is that it gives no 
account of how a speech act interacts with other speech acts 
within the discourse. This is especially problematical when we 
must accept that one surface form can be interpreted as several 
different speech acts. Gazdar uses as an example: 
(1) You will go home tomorrow. 
which may be interpreted as a question, a prediction, an order but 
not for example as a promise. 
We also need to examine the seven components of illocutionary 
force to see why on Searle's account, they are incompatible with 
the notion that one speech act can relate to another (section 
1.4). Firstly there is the illocutionary point of the utterance, 
which is the purpose or point of a particular act. I see no 
problems with the illocutionary point, except that it says nothing 
about the relational problem, but there is no reason in principle 
why it shouldn't. For example, if the illocutionary point of a 
question is to get the hearer to provide an answer, then in a 
sense the illocutionary point of the question is hinting at a 
relationship between one speech act and another. Because I see no 
problem with the illocutionary point, I also have no arguments 
with the degree of strength of the illocutionary point, except to 
remark that it should not necessarily be regarded as a linear 
scale. I have pointed out previously that certain speech acts such 
as permit do not readily fit into the tableaux given by Searle and 
Van der Veken (1985) and therefore the degree of strength could 
perhaps be better viewed as some sort of computation upon an n- 
tuple of factors that determine the strength of the speech act. 
The third component of illocutionary force is the mode of 
achievement. The mode of achievement is an amorphous grouping of 
extra-linguistic means of underscoring the illocutionary force of 
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an utterance. For example, Searle cites command as a speech act 
that carries a mode of achievement as part of its illocutionary 
force. A command is carried out from a position of authority and 
it is this position of authority that is the mode of achievement. 
Similarly testify has as mode of achievement the fact that it is 
asserting the truth of something while under oath. Authority 
appears to be important _or an explanation of speech acts, but 
doing something such as testifying seems to be somewhat different. 
When someone testifies, they have previously sworn on something 
that they hold to be sacred that they will tell the truth. While 
testifying, we may do many things, such as make requests or ask 
questions as well as asserting that something is the case with the 
special mode of achievement of being under oath. I am going to be 
concerned with the relationship between speech acts and discourse 
and its structure, as well as their relationship to surface forms, 
hence I will consider testify as forming a special category of 
speech act that I intend to call a formal speech act. We cannot 
for example use special indirect forms that count as testifying, 
in the way that we can with speech acts such as request. 
Furthermore, testifying does not significantly alter the surface 
form; consider a situation where two individuals have both 
testified that what they are about to say is the truth, then they 
carry on a conversation in a normal manner. A transcript of their 
conversation would be indistinguishable from one where neither 
party was under oath. The point of this is that the fact that 
someone is testifying to something being the case does not 
materially alter the actual way (in terms of surface forms) in 
which they say something. Because of this, I argue that speech 
acts such as testify should be treated as special cases, as formal 
speech acts. 
However before going on to explain what formal speech acts 
are, it is worth investigating the notion of authority and its 
effect upon speech acts 
Berry (1982) identified (at least) two relationships between 
speaker and hearer with respect to authority: firstly when either 
speaker or hearer is in a position of authority over the other, 
and secondly where either speaker or hearer is in the position of 
being the primary knower. It must be realised straight away that 
the position of authority can change depending upon the subject. 
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For example, even if A has institutional authority over B, B could 
still give an order such as: Kindly remove your hand from my knee! 
B still has certain rights and can order A not to violate those 
rights. The same applies to the position of primary knower. The 
primary knower is assumed to be an authority on the subject matter 
of the conversation. Everyone can at sometime be a primary knower. 
For example, anyone who is relating their personal experiences is 
assumed to be the primary knower with respect to that subject. 
Thus the position of authority and primary knower are to some 
extent determined by the subject matter of the conversation. 
Going back to formal speech acts: by making this distinction 
I am attempting to distinguish those speech acts that shape 
surface forms and determine those that are integrally bound up 
with discourse from those that are not. To explain exactly what I 
mean by this; consider Searle's class of speech act verbs called 
declaratives: very often these involve ritualised ceremonies using 
pre-determined text, for example: baptise or excommunicate. No-one 
would seriously argue that these speech act verbs are going to 
denote separate grammatical structures. On the other hand the 
speech act verbs: question and assert appear to map onto different 
sentence types. Furthermore, a speech act verb such as testify 
also has no distinct surface form. The point is that certain 
speech act verbs have nothing to do with distinct sentential types 
whereas others do. 
The second point is that certain speech act verbs appear to 
have no relational element to them, again consider: baptise or 
excommunicate. There is no possible discourse relationship between 
these and any other act in the way there is for offer and 
acceptance, say. However, there are a set of speech act verbs that 
I would like to include in the category of formal speech acts 
which can appear within normal discourse and do appear to relate 
to other acts. An example might be resign. Just what are or are 
not formal speech acts will become clearer as I move on to define 
those speech acts that I consider to be outside the class of 
formal acts. 
Going back to the idea of testifying: clearly it is different 
from asserting, but the added component that makes testify 
different from assert does not change the surface form or the 
rules that govern discourse structure. When I testify that 
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something is true, I am still obeying Grice's pragmatic maxims 
(assuming that it is they that guide conversation). I still answer 
questions and still have a similar range of responses to requests. 
I can also in certain ways assert indirectly but I cannot in any 
way be said to be testifying by speaking indirectly, it is known 
beforehand that I am testifying, whether or not I speak 
indirectly. This means that by testifying, I am not altering the 
relationship between speech act and grammatical structure or 
choice of surface form. For these reasons, I argue that speech 
acts such as testify should be treated as separate cases. There 
are still other speech acts such as baptise that use a pre- 
ordained set of words and that only if very specific people utter 
those words do we successfully achieve baptism. The declarative 
speech acts similar to baptise have no role to play in an 
understanding of the relationship between speech acts and 
discourse structure and I do not intend to cover them further. 
Although I agree to some extent with the idea of a mode of 
achievement, the type of speech act that use it are of no 
significance when considering the relational aspect of speech 
acts. 
The fourth component of illocutionary force is the 
propositional content condition(s). Propositional content 
conditions do nothing in their own right to help us solve the 
problem of context, however they are significant and should thus 
be considered further. Propositional content conditions include 
constraints such as the fact that I cannot predict something that 
has already taken place, or report on something that has yet to 
take place. In other words, they are constraints put upon the 
speech act type by the propositional content itself. 
The fifth component of illocutionary force are preparatory 
conditions, and include such things as the fact that promising 
presupposes that the speaker can fulfil the promise. I propose to 
greatly extend the category of preparatory conditions as they can 
provide us with just the relational link that we require. To 
illustrate just how this can be achieved, consider a request. We 
could regard that as communicating a want, in that speaker 
communicates to hearer that he wants the hearer to (do) P. If we 
then consider this communicated want as part of the overall 
context, then fulfilling the request can be seen as responding to 
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that want. In this way a relational link is set up between the 
original request, and the response to that request and the two 
acts are related via the context. The notion of "preparatory 
conditions" and the possible relationship between two speech acts 
via a common context is something that will be developed in this 
and coming chapters. 
The sixth component of illocutionary force consists of 
sincerity conditions. Sincerity conditions should be examined at 
two different levels. Firstly, it is worth pointing out that 
Austin's original idea came from an examination of performatives. 
He spoke in terms of misinvocations, (Austin 1962, p. 17) where the 
procedure may not exist, misapplications, where it exists but 
cannot be applied in the manner purported, and misexecutions, 
where it is applied incorrectly. However Searle chose to apply the 
idea of sincerity conditions more to conventional speech acts, and 
this seems to lead to a gap in speech act theory. If speech act 
theory is supposed to be a total explanation of how we can use 
language, then if sincerity conditions apply to all speech acts 
they must surely apply to lies. Although sincerity conditions are 
important for performative acts, I feel that they are misapplied 
to other speech acts. In fact an explanation for Searle's idea of 
sincerity conditions for acts such as assert can be furnished by 
application of Gricean maxims (see Leech 1983 and also Chapter 
Six). 
The explanation of speech acts that I will propose will be 
capable of including the possibility of someone telling a lie 
without it violating a requirement of one of the constituents of 
the description of speech acts. Telling a lie involves someone 
knowing or believing that P is true and stating that -P with the 
intention that the hearer believe that -P. 
The final component of illocutionary force is the degree of 
strength of the sincerity condition. However, even if we accept 
that a sincerity condition be a constituent component of 
illocutionary force, then it does not follow that the "degree of 
strength" can be measured on a linear scale. The examples used by 
Searle illustrate this point: request and beg are often paired 
together with beg having a stronger sincerity condition than 
request. Similarly assert and testify are paired with testify 
having a stronger sincerity condition than assert. However the 
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facts that make beg "stronger" than request are different from 
those that make testify stronger than assert. 
In attempting to examine the question of relations between 
speech acts, I have examined the seven constituent components of 
illocutionary force and have come to the following conclusions: 
i) The illocutionary point of a speech act could be construed 
in a relational way, in the sense that a request for 
example can be seen as an attempt by the speaker to elicit 
a response from the hearer. 
ii) Preparatory conditions may be used to provide a link from 
one speech act to another via a context. 
In this chapter and the following ones, I intend to build upon 
these ideas to present a new theory of speech acts that embraces 
the relational problem while at the same time describing how 
speech acts relate to discourse structure. 
The second criticism of Searle's approach given in section 
1.6 concerns the rigidity of its approach. I have already touched 
on one of the problems, namely that some of the components of 
illocutionary force are either too amorphous or too simplistic, in 
particular the mode of achievement and the propositional content 
conditions. Additionally, the degree of strength of the 
illocutionary point cannot surely be measured on a simple linear 
scale. I have already given some reasons why this is so above. A 
further problem is that the speech acts presented are essentially 
sentential in basis, since their content is a proposition 
expressed by a sentence, and this restriction to one level rules 
out a possible explanation of lower levels units of discourse, 
such as discourse markers, or higher level units such as 
conversational exchanges. I originally cited argue as an example 
of a speech act that is more compatible with a higher level unit 
of discourse than are: speech acts according to Searle's 
description. I will describe argue in more detail below. 
My third criticism was that too much emphasis was placed on 
entailment relations between speech acts. This took an extreme 
form in the semantic tableaux presented in Searle and Van der 
Veken(1985). Austin himself had warned against placing too much 
reliance upon the entailment relations of speech acts, and I feel 
this has proved to be sound advice. The problem with entailment 
and the notion of primitive speech acts is that it falls down for 
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certain speech acts, such as permit in the case of the directive 
class, and is almost absent in two classes of speech acts, namely 
expressives and declaratives. This suggests that either 
expressives and declaratives should be treated in a different way 
to other types of speech acts, or that entailment should be played 
down. 
My fourth criticism of Searle's description is that the 
theory of indirect speech acts is not properly explained, indeed 
the important question of why in certain circumstances, indirect 
speech acts are preferred over direct speech acts is not even 
addressed. Currently, conversational analysis appears to provide 
us with a better account of why indirect speech acts exist (albeit 
as something else in that theory) and any theory of indirect 
speech acts that is to be taken seriously, must be able to 
challenge that account in a far more convincing way than Searle 
has been able to so far. In the theory I am about to present, I 
hope to be able to provide an account of why indirect speech acts 
are used which incorporates notions of politeness and uses 
pragmatic maxims. 
My fifth criticism of Searle's approach is that although he 
mentions politeness in passing, no attempt is made to integrate it 
into his theory. My theory will include politeness in an attempt 
to explain indirect speech acts. 
The sixth criticism of the existing theory concerns what I 
called "levels of abstraction". If speech act theory is correct, 
then it must provide us with an account of the ways in which we 
can use language. This however leads us into an immediate problem. 
If it is merely a description of ways in which we can use language 
then it is surely an atomistic account of language. If speech act 
theory can only tell us that we may use sentences in this way or 
that way, without any account as to how we put several speech acts 
together, or how, in a particular context within a particular 
language community, we deliver the speech act using an appropriate 
surface form, then it is saying nothing much about the performance 
of language which is what pragmatic accounts of language set out 
to explain. 
What speech act theory is attempting to achieve is to 
describe the relations between a proposition and an utterance, and 
further with what intentions that utterance was made. This implies 
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that it must be able to say something about how the utterance is 
derived from the proposition and the intentions. Hence it must be 
able to say something about how we get from a proposition 
expressed as a thought to an utterance. 
However in doing this, it is providing us with an 
intermediate level description, that is somewhere between the 
original thought and the final utterance. Obviously, a speech act 
cannot be a thought and it isn't an utterance, therefore, it must 
be some form of description of what we want to say that lies 
between the two. The traditional view is that the proposition is 
grouped with the other components of illocutionary force and an 
utterance is produced from this. But traditional speech act theory 
says nothing about how this happens and what is involved. Bach and 
Harnish (1979) however say something about the reverse process, 
i. e. how a speech act is extracted from an utterance. In my theory 
I intend to assume a priori that there is some intermediate 
descriptive level and that this can be used to frame the 
utterance. In other words, before producing the final utterance, 
we put together some form of description that expresses precisely 
what we want to say. Although I freely acknowledge that there is 
no psychological justification for this. Before proceeding to 
take a look at some specific speech act verbs, it is worth re- 
examining the seven components of illocutionary force to see 
exactly what will be left. 
1. Illocutionary Point. This is the point or purpose of the act. 
My description will include a "presumed effect" which is a 
description of what the speaker is setting out to achieve by 
uttering the act in question. I have no real objections to the 
notion of an illocutionary point. 
2. The degree of strength of the illocutionary point. I reject the 
view that this should lie as a point on a linear scale, it might 
be more appropriate to think of it as an adjacent area in an n- 
space hypercube. In other words it is very much a multi- 
dimensional measure. Hence it would not usually be appropriate to 
think of one act as being "stronger" than another. But two acts 
could be thought of as having broadly the same sort of purpose. 
The only linear relationships would be rather trivial, such as a 
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comparison between: 
(2) I am angry. 
and 
(3) 1 am very, very angry. 
3. The Mode of achievement. This is a component that I propose to 
do away with completely. Any acts that include a so called mode of 
achievement can either be explained in an alternative way or can 
be classified as "formal" speech acts, i. e., those that are 
associated with some sort of formal ritual, such as swearing an 
oath, or parties renouncing "Satan and all his works" - the rite 
leading up to baptism. 
4. Propositional Content Conditions. Most of these will "come out 
in the wash". In my description of predict for example, I will 
include components that will include by necessity, the fact that I 
can only predict a future event, hence the propositional content 
condition will be built into the description. I will also be able 
to explain the fact that I cannot apologize for the law of Modus 
Ponens, because my description of apologize will include a 
description of exactly what I can apologize for. 
5. Preparatory Conditions. The notion of a preparatory condition 
will be greatly enhanced and will not be restricted to 
presuppositions but will also include "cognitive states". 
6. Sincerity Conditions. I propose to drop these completely, and 
hence by implication the seventh component, the degree of strength 
of the sincerity conditions. I have no objections to the idea that 
sincerity conditions should remain for "formal" speech acts, but 
they have no place in communicative speech acts. We can use 
pragmatic maxims to explain sincerity conditions. For example when 
asserting, we should have evidence for what we assert. And we only 
have to appeal to the maxims of quality and quantity to derive 
sincerity conditions. If we already have a maxim that exhorts us 
to say only what we believe to be true and what we have adequate 
evidence for, then there appears to be no need to have sincerity 
conditions. 
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3.2 Speech Acts As Schemas 
My definition of a speech act will encompass what the speaker 
needs to have thought about before deciding to make an utterance 
communicating that speech act, (very roughly, the preconditions 
necessary to make an act). It will also define the action, i. e. 
what is to be communicated by the speech act. Further it will 
describe those things that the speaker needs to know in order to 
make sense of the responses that he is likely to receive after 
making an utterance communicating the speech act. Finally, it will 
have attached to it a set of strategies that the speaker needs in 
order to convert the speech act into the most appropriate surface 
form in order to utter a representation of the speech act. 
I will illustrate what is required in each of these component 
parts using a very rough description of some common speech acts. 
For example, in order to make an assertion, presumably I have some 
evidence that leads me to believe that P may be true, or to make 
the hearer believe that P is true. I may also want to believe that 
it is something that is of interest to the hearer. The action will 
consist of communicating the belief that P is true. In asserting 
something, I hope that the effect will be that the hearer will 
accept P as true, but I have to be prepared for the possibility 
that the hearer may not believe P and this type of knowledge will 
enable me to decode the responses given by the hearer to my 
assertion. Finally, I have to decide on the most appropriate 
surface form for my assertion. I do this using various pragmatic 
maxims that direct me to interact with the hearer in a certain 
way. My choice will also be based on considerations such as 
politeness. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will develop the idea of 
a speech act description as a schema consisting of descriptions of 
what the speaker needs to know, believe etc. in order to make a 
particular type of speech act. I will develop schemas for several 
speech act types. I will also describe what it is that the speech 
act is supposed to achieve, i. e. what it is communicating to the 
hearer. Additionally, the schema will contain some descriptions of 
what the speaker needs to know in order to successfully interpret 
the possible responses to the speech act. I will develop the idea 
of strategies to produce the correct surface form in Chapter Six. 
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Schemas have already been used to represent speech acts, and 
in Artificial Intelligence models, and generally consist of a set 
of preconditions that are necessary for the speech act to be 
uttered. They will also include an effect, which is the effect 
that the speech act is presumed to have on the hearer. Finally, 
they may include a body, which may specify how the speech act is 
to be realised as an utterance, or may perhaps describe some 
mutual knowledge of speaker and hearer. I will first examine 
assert, and then go on to give some descriptions of other speech 
act verbs. 
Assert is discussed by both Searle and Van der Veken and Bach 
and Harnish. Searle and Van der Veken use it as their primitive 
assertive act. It has been used in several Artificial Intelligence 
models using speech acts including Allen's model (Allen 1983). 
Allen describes assert in terms of the schema: 
INFORM (S, H, P) 
precondition: know(S, P) 
effect: know(H, P) 
body: MB(H, S, (want S (know H P))) 
Assert is the act of speaker informing hearer of P with the 
precondition that speaker knows that P is true and the effect that 
hearer knows that P is true. The body of the speech act is the 
mutual belief that hearer and speaker both know that speaker wants 
hearer to know that P. The body of this act is a sort of 
representation of the communicative presumption (see the end of 
this chapter) that the speaker and hearer both understand what the 
speech act is used for. 
Holdcroft and Smith (1990) propose a slight modification to 
this schema to include a discourse context: 
INFORM(S, H, discourse-context, P) 
precondition: bel(S, P) 
not-committed(S, discourse-context, P) 
effects: committed(S, discourse-context, P) 
bel (H, P) 
In this description of assert, the rather strong know is changed 
to believe and the schema includes the fact that within a 
particular discourse context the speaker changes from being not 
committed to P to being committed to P. 
-81- 
Bach and Harnish (op. cit) describe assert as: 
in uttering e, S asserts that P iff S expresses: 
i) the belief that P and 
ii) the intention that H believe that P. " 
Another author who has described assert is Wierzbicka (op. 
cit. p. 321). Wierzbicka "semantically" analysed a large number of 
speech act verbs and although I do not agree totally with her 
analysis the description that she uses to encapsulate the meaning 
of each of the verbs is sufficiently interesting to merit further 
study, it is also not all that far removed from the description 
that I shall eventually employ. However before looking at 
Wierzbicka's description, the schemas given above need to be 
explained in more detail. 
First of all, the description of assert given by Allen 
(above) has INFORM(S, H, P) as a sort of header followed by 
preconditions, effects and a body. The problem with using inform 
is that inform is itself a speech act verb and has to be ruled out 
for a primitive. The interpretation of inform that I intend to use 
is that it is a representation of an utterance act, hence a more 
neutral verb such as ratter or speak would perhaps be more 
appropriate. For my description I will use speak in order to 
illustrate that it merely relates to the act of uttering and does 
not in itself carry any components of illocutionary force. Before 
going on any further it is worthwhile attempting to relate the 
other parts of the Allen schema to the components of illocutionary 
force. Firstly the preconditions: preconditions appear to be 
preparatory conditions, however it is questionable that in order 
to assert that P, I need to know or believe that P is true. 
Perhaps instead of bel(S P) it would be more in the spirit of an 
assertion to represent the speaker's belief about P as: want(S 
bel(H bel(S P))). In other words, in making an assertion, I want 
the hearer to believe that I believe P. The effect of assert is 
that the hearer knows that P is true, this is again questionable 
as the hearer cannot be forced into believing that P is true 
simply because it has been asserted that it is (Allen was fully 
aware of this when formulating his schema, but defended it because 
it was adequate for the purposes that it was used for, Allen 
(1987)). The effects appear to relate to the illocutionary point, 
i. e. for assert, the illocutionary point is that the hearer should 
come to know that P is true. 
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This discussion has led us to a description of a speech act 
in terms of three component parts: 
i) The communicative part - which specifies what information 
is to be provided in the utterance. For assert it is 
a statement that the speaker is going to make an 
utterance directed at the hearer with propositional 
content P. 
ii) The preconditions - which specify what the speaker should 
know, want or believe in order to successfully utter the 
speech act. 
iii) The effect - which is the desired result of the speech 
act. 
The communicative part provides information that will be used to 
select the correct surface form (however it should be stressed 
that it is not the only thing that determines what the surface 
form will be). The preconditions are a set of states that I shall 
refer to as "cognitive states", which should be present in the 
speaker's mind before making the utterance that constitutes the 
speech act (I am not claiming here that this is a conscious 
process similar to: I believe ... and therefore, 
I will 
assert P). The preconditions can also affect the eventual surface 
form of the utterance, but this is something that will be explored 
more fully when I come on to consider the problem of indirect 
speech acts. The effect is what the speaker desires to happen as a 
result of uttering the speech act. 
At this point it is perhaps useful to look at Wierzbicka's 
definition of assert in the light of the above description. 
The meaning of assert given by Wierzbicka (op. cit. p. 321) is 
1) I say: X 
2) I imagine some people would say this is not true. 
3) I can say that this is true. 
4) I assume that people will have to think that it is true. 
5) 1 say this because I want to say what I know is true. 
1) is equivalent to the outline form of the utterance action: 
SPEAK(S H P) 
It is possible to translate 2) as 
bel(S [Ex: bel(x -P)]) 
in other words I am stating this as the belief held by the speaker 
that there are some people who might believe that P is not true. 
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The third condition: 
I can say that this is true. 
This could be represented simply as 
bel(S P) or bel(S poss (P) ) 
(Given the discussion above, this might be more accurate as: 
want(S bel(H bel(S P))) which could be represented as: 
+bel(S P) ). 
I take issue with the fourth of Wierzbicka's conditions and prefer 
instead to represent it as: 
I assume that people may believe that it is true. 
which is represented as: 
bel(S poss(bel(H P))) 
In other words speaker believes that it is possible that the 
hearer will believe P. If we leave Wierzbicka's original condition 
"I assume that people will have to believe that it is true" then 
it contradicts the previous condition that I imagine some people 
will say that it is not true. The final condition is: 
I say this because I want to say what I know is true. 
want(S INFORM(H [Ex: bel(S x)])) 
This serves as the reason why the speaker wants to assert that P 
is true. It is of course a great simplification of why the speaker 
may wish to assert P, which may be for many reasons, such as to 
simply "start off" a conversation, but whatever that reason is, 
ultimately, the speaker wants to inform the hearer of something 
that he believes in. Of course, there is a danger that this simply 
becomes a circular definition, that the speaker asserts that P 
because he wants to assert that P. However it makes more sense if 
we compare it with the other (Searlean) categories of speech act. 
For example, when about to make a directive speech act, the 
speaker wants to know something or get the hearer to do something. 
Hence this condition might then be: 
want (S INFORM(H S P)) 
or 
want (S do (H P)) . 
In the case of commissives it might be: 
want(S INFORM(S H will(do(S P))). 
In other words, the speaker wants to inform the hearer that he 
will do P. 
Wierzbicka has chosen to represent assert with some quite 
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complex statements that need further explanation given the 
relatively simple description by Allen above. Previously, our 
preconditions consisted solely of the fact that if I wanted to 
assert that P was true then I merely had to believe or know that P 
was true. But now we have some forms that appear to be saying 
something about the likely response of the hearer to the 
assertion. 
Wierzbicka's first statement was entirely consistent with the 
outline utterance form used by Allen, however her second statement 
is something totally new. Statement 2) says that if I assert 
something then I have to expect that some people will not agree 
with me. This is not a necessary precondition for asserting that P 
in the sense that knowing or believing that P (or more accurately, 
wanting the hearer to believe that P) is but its purpose fits in 
with the idea outlined above of preparing the speaker for 
responses that don't fit in with expectations. In other words if I 
know that some people will disagree with me when I assert that P 
then it will help me to readily make sense of the responses. Hence 
2) does not constrain possible responses to the utterance so much 
as explain them. Because of this I feel that 2) is an important 
constituent part of a description of assert. 3) is in keeping with 
the precondition given by Allen in his schema and so should not 
need much further explanation. 4) is a modified version of the 
effect of the speech act. I prefer the interpretation that 
bel(S poss (bel (H P))) to 
bel(H P) 
because it is absurd to suggest that simply because speaker 
asserts that P that the hearer has to believe that P. 5) is an 
explanation of why the speaker made the utterance, though it is 
not clear to me that this is necessary as a component of assert 
but I will include it anyway. 
Putting all of this together we can now arrive at a schema 
consisting of an action, effect and set of cognitive states: 
Action: SPEAK(S H P) 
Cognitive States: 1) bel(S [Ex: bel(x -P)]) 
2) +bel(S P) 
3) bel(S poss (bel (H P)) ) 
4) want(S INFORM(H [Ex: bel(S x)])) 
Presumed Effect: bel(H P) 
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Note that I have called the effect the "presumed effect". The 
presumed effect is what the speaker hopes to achieve by the speech 
act. The preferred response by the hearer would be for him to 
acknowledge that he believes that P is true. However, this is not 
the only response possible. The hearer may not believe that P or 
may know P already. If we can formalise the possible responses to 
a speech act, then we will have gone a long way to stealing the 
theoretical ground from the conversational analysis approach to 
discourse, which talks in terms of preferred and dispreferred 
responses. 
The description of the speech act in terms of cognitive 
states throws some light on two major problems: firstly the 
relationship of speech acts to discourse structure, and secondly, 
the representational issues of speech act theory. The cognitive 
states represented in order to make an assertion enable the 
speaker to accurately predict the likely responses to the speech 
act. In the case of assert, those responses are acceptance of P, 
challenging of P, and a possible statement that P was already 
known. 
In the remainder of this chapter I shall describe four or 
five speech act verbs from each of the Searlean categories in 
terms similar to the above analysis of assert. There are many 
unanswered questions, some of which I hope to explore in the next 
three chapters. 
In Chapter Four I will expand on the idea that the 
preconditions (or cognitive states) can in some way direct or 
explain the relationships between speech acts in discourse. If we 
take assert as an example; the preconditions in addition to being 
necessary preconditions are also states that explain how the 
hearer may react to the utterance. For example in assert, the 
hearer may not believe that P and the speaker is prepared for 
this. Assert is not a very good example in this respect because it 
is not very strongly cohesive in relational terms to other speech 
acts. In other words the utterance of an assertion does very 
little to constrain what must come after. Other issues that I will 
raise in Chapter Four are the possible existence of "universal 
states", i. e. states that relate to any speech act that also allow 
the speaker to predict possible responses by the hearer. A simple 
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example of this may be that the hearer may not like the way in 
which the speaker issues the utterance, e. g. the hearer may object 
to the speaker shouting. 
In Chapter Five I will explore the effect that the speech act 
description has upon the surface form of the utterance. The method 
by which the utterance is derived from the speech act description 
will not be complete, because several other factors are involved 
in generation of the surface form including literary style which I 
consider to be beyond the scope of the thesis. However, as stated 
previously, I hope to show that not only does the action specified 
in the schema affect the surface form, but so do some of the 
cognitive states or preconditions, and this will be explored 
further in Chapter Six. 
Chapter Six will include an explanation of indirect speech 
acts in terms of the descriptions given above. It will also show 
that the speech act descriptions are not rigidly cast in stone, 
and that there may be some variation. Additionally it will attempt 
to explain how pragmatic maxims affect the generation of surface 
forms, and will attempt to evolve a sort of "pragmatic logic" 
based on epistemic, modal and deontic operators. It will also 
consider politeness and its effects on the generation of surface 
forms. Much of the explanation of indirect speech acts will be 
based on politeness maxims. 
Finally a note on the operators used in the next section to 
describe the speech acts and the syntax used. I have used 
epistemic operators such as bel, want and know. Belief logic has 
been formalised by Konolige (1985). Existential and universal 
quantifiers have been used in certain places along with 
traditional propositional operators. I have also used the modal 
operators poss and necc. For a simple introduction to modal logic 
see McCawley (1981) and Hughes and Cresswell (1968). 
I have also used deontic operators in the cognitive state 
descriptions, 0 for obligation, p for permission and f to denote 
something that is forbidden (see Hilpinen (1971) for a description 
of deontic logic). I will examine the use of modal and deontic 
logic further in Chapter Four. 
I have used a notation in which an operator (in lower case) 
is followed by its parameters enclosed in parentheses, e. g., 
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bel(S P) means that the speaker believes that P. 
necc(P) means that it is necessarily the case that P. 
These operators may be nested: 
necc(bel (S P) ) 
A left parenthesis always follows the operator name and it is 
closed off at the end of its last parameter. 
Action or speech act names are used in upper case, e. g. 
SPEAK(S H P) 
which means that the speaker produces a surface form expressing 
P. Quantifiers have been enclosed in brackets in order to describe 
their scope, e. g., 
[Ex: bel(x P)] 
I will examine the use of the various logical operators and 
discuss the schematic use of the formulae in Chapter Four. 
3.3 A description of Assertive Speech Acts 
3.3.1 Claim 
Searle and Van der Veken (op. cit. p. 183) state that claim 
may be treated in exactly the same way as assert, however there 
are significant differences between them that need to be explored. 
Claim puts forward some view, like assert, but it is a more 
forceful act because the speaker in making a claim is expecting 
opposition and (presumably) has evidence to back up the claim. The 
conditions given by Wierzbicka (op. cit. p. 324) are: 
1) I say: X 
2) I imagine that some people will say this is not true. 
3) I think that I have good reason to say this. 
4) I think that I can cause people to have to say that this 
is right. 
5) I say this because I want to cause other people to think 
that it is right. 
1) as before, can be represented as SPEAK(S H P). 
2) is also as before: 
bel(S [Ex: bel(x -P)]) 
The third condition concerns the evidence for making the claim. If 
in making a claim, the speaker has evidence to support it, we 
could say that the speaker knows of some Q from which it could be 
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inferred that P. A slightly weaker case of this would be that the 
speaker believes that P can be inferred from Q. This suggests the 
following logical form: 
bel(S [EQ: know(S Q) & bel(S (Q ->P))]) 
4) is a statement of what speaker believes will happen as a result 
of making a claim. In making a claim I want the hearer to believe 
that P will be true, however from condition 2) I know that some 
people will not believe that P. Hence 4) can be looked upon as a 
statement of the perlocutionary effect bel(H P). 5) is a statement 
of the desire to make the hearer believe that P is true and can be 
represented as: 
want (S bel(H P)) 
So to summarise claim in schema form: 
Action: SPEAK(S H P) 
Cognitive States: 1) bel(S [Ex: bel(x -P)]) 
2) bel(S [EQ: know(S Q) & 
bel(S (Q -> P))]) 
3) want (S bel (H P) ) 
Presumed Effect: bel(H P) 
One of the main differences with assert is the existence of the 
evidence to support the claim. Because of condition 1) it will 
come as no surprise to speaker that the claim may be disputed. 
Condition 2) means that the hearer may dispute Q or even the 
inference that the speaker used to derive P from Q. 
3.3.2 Assure 
Searle and Van der Veken (op. cit. p. 184) describe assure as: 
asserting with the perlocutionary intention of 
convincing the hearer of the truth of the propositional 
content in the world of the utterance. 
Wierzbicka states that assure is also concerned with the removal 
of "worry" from the mind of the hearer. Assuring is specifically 
concerned with people (as contrasted with confirm, where one can 
confirm reports etc. ), additionally assure means assuring someone 
of the truth or accuracy of something. 
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The conditions given by Wierzbicka for assure are: 
1) I assume that you are thinking of something that you would 
want to be true. 
2) I assume that you are not sure if it is true. 
3) I think I can cause you to be sure that it is true. 
4) I say: X 
5) I say this because I want to cause you to be sure that the 
thing that you would want to be true is true. 
4) as before is simply SPEAK(S H P) 
There are two important elements to condition 1): firstly the 
assumption made by the speaker that the hearer is thinking about 
P. This comes from the context, the speaker infers by some process 
that the hearer is thinking about P and would like it to be true. 
Hence it can be represented as 
bel(S want(H bel(H P))) 
2) is connected with 1) and simply indicates that the speaker 
believes that the hearer may doubt whether P is true. Hence we can 
represent it as: 
bel(S bel(H poss(-P))) 
3) is the desired effect of the speech act verb, i. e. by assuring 
you of something I am attempting to cause you to believe that it 
is true, hence this condition refers to the presumed effect. 
5) follows on from 3) in that the speaker wants to cause the 
hearer to believe P. I have chosen to simplify this to the fact 
that the speaker wants the hearer to believe that P. In a sense it 
is a justification for the speech act. It can be represented as: 
want (S bel(H P)) 
So the whole schema for assure is: 
Action: SPEAK(S H P) 
Cognitive States: 1) bel(S want(H bel(H P))) 
2) bel(S bel(H poss(-P))) 
3) want (S bel (H P) ) 
Presumed Effect: bel(H P) 
As the presumed effect is that the hearer believes that P, 
the other possibilities are that the hearer believed that P anyway 
(the speaker's belief in 1) is incorrect), that the hearer had no 
interest in believing whether P is true or not (the speaker's 
belief in 1) is wrong but for a different reason). The hearer may 
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have previously believed -P, and now either still believes -P, or 
has suddenly had a change of heart and now becomes convinced of P. 
3.3.3 Argue 
Searle and Van der Veken (op. cit. p. 184) define argue as 
differing from assure only in that the speaker gives supporting 
evidence for P. 
Wierzbicka states that arguing implies a collective speech 
activity extended in time (Wierzbicka op. cit. p. 125). 
She gives the following conditions for argue: 
1) I know that what you think about W is different from what 
I think about it. 
2) I assume that if I am right you can't be right. 
3) I think I can say some things which you will have to say 
are right. 
4) I assume that you will understand that if you say that 
these things are right then you will have to say that I 
was right and that you were wrong. 
5) I say (... ). 
6) I say these things because I want to cause you to have to 
say that I was right and you were wrong. 
Assuming that neither Wierzbicka nor Searle are restricting 
their definition of argue to one-line logical arguments, then 
according to the analysis given in this thesis argue is not a 
speech act. The central argument in this thesis is that a speech 
act is performed in the context of a defined set of cognitive 
states and argue does not follow this pattern. Searle and Van der 
Veken state that argue requires supporting evidence and this 
implies some sort of inter-speech act relation. However, it is 
this very relation between speech acts that Searle denies exists 
(Searle 1979) using Ockham's Razor as an argument against those 
who would claim that there is a relational dimension to 
illocutionary force (Smith and Holdcroft 1990). The cognitive 
approach to speech act theory does not require such a relational 
dimension because each speech act is self contained within its 
cognitive states. But It is those very cognitive states that 
ensure that an argument takes place because of the incompatibility 
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of views between the two participants in the discourse. Hence the 
cognitive approach to speech act theory is simpler than the 
approach taken by Searle and Van der Veken, moreover, their 
approach is forced to admit of the existence of some sort of 
relational element between speech acts anyway. 
Argue as an illocutionary force is equally nonsensical 
because the speaker is not always in a position to know that an 
argument is about to take place. Consider the following sequence: 
A: Asserts P 
B: Disagrees about P 
A: (Somewhat taken aback): Provides supporting evidence for 
P. 
The central thesis that will be developed is that the problem 
of relations between speech acts need not exist, because it is the 
cognitive states that effectively define the relationships between 
the components of the discourse, and not the speech acts on their 
own. This argument will be developed throughout this thesis. If we 
consider Wierzbicka's first condition for argue we can see that 
this cognitive state does not need to be present when presenting 
the argument (the initial statement). Speaker may assert P knowing 
that some people may disagree with it. On finding out that the 
hearer does disagree with it, his cognitive state will then 
include a representation of Wierzbicka's condition 1. The point 
quite simply is that arguments do not arise out of thin air. They 
generally have as a starting point an assertion made by one of the 
participants in the discourse, but at the time of making that 
assertion, the speaker may not have known that the hearer was 
going to disagree and therefore the illocutionary force of arguing 
can only be assigned post hoc. Because of this it requires of 
necessity a relation between the speaker's initial assertion and 
the hearer's disagreement with it, hence the notion of an 
illocutionary force for argue does not make sense. 
3.3.4 Inform 
Searle and Van der Veken (op. Cit. p. 185) state that: 
To inform is to assert to a hearer with the additional 
preparatory condition that the hearer does not already 
know what he is being informed of. 
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This rather simplistic explanation of the difference between 
inform and assert does not seem to encapsulate the essential 
difference between the two speech act verbs. It is quite possible 
that when the speaker asserts that P the hearer knows that P 
already. So that is not the crucial difference between the two. 
Inform first of all, appears to leave no room for doubts, in that 
after being informed that P the hearer has to believe that P is 
true. The difference it would appear from this is that inform 
carries with it some notion of authority on the subject of P. Not 
necessarily established or official authority, but an unspoken 
agreement between speaker and hearer that the speaker is an 
authority on the subject matter of P. 
Wierzbicka then gives the following conditions for inform: 
1) I assume that you want to know things about X. 
2) I know something about X that I think you should know. 
3) I assume I should cause you to know it. 
4) I say (... ) . 
5) I say this because I want to cause you to know it. 
6) I assume that you will understand that this is not 
something that could be untrue. 
7) I assume that I will cause you to know it by saying this. 
1) is rather vague and I prefer something simpler, hence I have 
interpreted it as: 
I assume that you want to know P 
This is represented as: 
bel(S want(H know(P))) 
The second condition could simply be interpreted as the fact that 
speaker knows P, which would be 
know(S P) 
Additionally we could add something to represent the fact that the 
speaker believes that the hearer should know P. So an alternative 
version of 2) is 
know(S P) & bel(S want(know(H P))) 
3) is a statement that justifies the use of inform as a speech act 
and can be omitted from the final schema. I have re-interpreted 4) 
as 
SPEAK(S H P) 
5) can be interpreted as the fact that the speaker wants the 
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hearer to know P and hence can be represented as 
want (S know(H P)) 
6) could be achieved by a mutual understanding that the speaker is 
an authority on the subject of P. As some sort of cognitive state 
this should not pose too many problems but it would be of 
significant difficulty in a computational model. 
MB(auth(S P)) 
7) is a description of the presumed effect of issuing the speech 
act. Thus the description of INFORM becomes: 
Action: SPEAK(S H P) 
Cognitive States: 1) bel(S want(H know(P))) 
2) know(S P) 
3) want (S know (H P)) 
4) MB(auth(S P) ) 
Presumed Effect: know(H P) 
Because we have a speech act called inform it is now clear 
why speak is used. Possible problems may occur if the hearer does 
not want to know about P, or if the speaker is not perceived by 
the hearer to be an authority on P. 
3.3.5 Conjecture 
Searle and Van der Veken (op. cit. p. 266) state that 
conjecture is to 
weakly assert that P while presupposing that one has at 
least some evidence for P. 
Conjecture implies that the Speaker has at least thought about P 
but does not know the answer, effectively, it is based on some 
evidence but not enough to form a complete picture. My first 
condition is that the speaker wants to know P or what P is and 
hence can be represented as: 
want(S know(P)) 
The second is that the speaker does not know P: 
-know(S P) 
The third is the fact that the speaker in making a conjecture is 
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effectively saying P is possible and hence it could be represented 
as: 
SPEAK(S H poss(P)) 
Note that poss(P) does not mean that the speaker is tied to making 
an utterance of the format (... ) is possible. It merely indicates 
that the final utterance will contain some element of uncertainty 
or at best tentative certainty. 
The fourth is a statement that the speaker believes that P is 
possible: 
bel (S poss (P) ) 
The last condition is that the speaker wants the hearer to believe 
in the possibility that P and can be represented as: 
want (S bel(H poss (P)) ) 
The effect of the conjecture is to place it into context (as a 
possible focus for discussion). This gives us the following 
schema: 
Action: SPEAK(S H poss(P)) 
Cognitive States: 1) want(S know(P)) 
2) -know(S P) 
3) bel(S poss (P) ) 
4) want (S bel(H poss (P)) ) 
Presumed Effect: incontext(P) 
Possible effects and problems with conjecture are firstly that the 
hearer may have sufficient evidence to make a pronouncement on P. 
The hearer may feel that the speaker does not have sufficient 
evidence to make the conjecture, may ask what evidence the speaker 
has or even add possible evidence. The hearer may feel that the 
conjecture is of no significance (in effect challenging cognitive 
state 4). 
3.3.6 Swear 
To swear that P is an attempt to make the hearer have to 
believe that what we are saying is true often by calling upon 
something that is sacred to the speaker as a witness to the 
truthfulness of the statement. Although this could be seen as 
another type of speech act, I have chosen to omit it from my list 
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of speech acts and to classify it under a list of speech acts that 
I intend to call Formal Speech Acts. It causes no problems for the 
cognitive state approach, except that there is an "external" 
element to the speech act, namely calling upon a deity or some 
other sacred object. 
3.4 Commissive Speech Act Verbs 
3.4.1 Promise 
This is the first of the speech acts that fall into the 
commissive group. Commi: 3sive verbs involve an obligation on the 
part of the speaker, and one of the measures used by Searle and 
Van der Veken for commissive verbs is the degree of strength of 
the commitment (Searle and Van der Veken op. cit. p. 192) This 
linear measurement needs close scrutiny. 
When we promise to do P, we are making a commitment to 
undertake P, even if we promise that someone else will do P 
(Boguslawski 1983 and Wierzbicka op. cit. p. 205) we are still 
making an undertaking to see to it that that person will do P. The 
effect of promise is to cause the hearer to believe that the 
speaker will undertake to do P. Additionally the obligation itself 
is such that what the speaker is doing is to place his credibility 
on the line (Verscheuren 1983, p. 630). Wierzbicka gives the 
following conditions for promise: (Wierzbicka op. cit. p. 205). 
1) I know that you want me to do P. 
2) I know that you think that I may not do it. 
3) I want to do it because you want me to do it. 
4) I say: I will do it. 
5) I want us to think that if I don't do it, people will not 
believe anything that I say I will do. 
6) I say this, in this way, because I want to cause you to be 
able to think that I have to do it. 
It seems reasonable that when I make a promise I have some reason 
to believe that you want me to carry out the promised action. 
Hence 1) can be represented as 
know (S want (H do (S 1111)) 
It also seems reasonable that I am making a promise to do P 
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because I have reason to believe that you may think that I won't 
do P, hence 2) can be represented as 
know (S bel(H poss (-do (S P))) ) 
3) is more problematical, I may promise to do something even 
though I don't particularly want to do it. 3) appears to be an 
attempt to explain the reason for the promise, but I may make the 
promise simply because I ought to. There may be a feeling that I 
am obliged to carry out,; the action. This tentative belief of 
obligation could be represented as 
bel(S poss (O (do (S P))) ) 
where 0(... ) is the deontic obligation operator. 
Perhaps 4) should be a simple representation of the fact that P 
will be carried out in the future: 
SPEAK(S H will(do(S P))) 
5) is an attempt at explaining the obligation placed upon the 
speaker by the promise, but I prefer to represent this as an 
effect of the speech act that the speaker is now under an 
obligation to do P (or see that P is done). Hence we can represent 
it as an effect: 
bel(H 0(do(S P))) 
6) is now in effect redundant. I also believe that it is necessary 
that the speaker believes he is capable of carrying out his 
promise. Hence we need an extra cognitive state: 
bel(S poss(do(S P))) 
This gives us the schema for promise: 
Action: SPEAK(S H will(do(S P))) 
Cognitive States: 1) know(S want(H do(S P))) 
2) know(S bel(H poss(-do(S P)))) 
3) bel(S poss(O(do(S P)))) 
4) bel (S poss (do (S P)) ) 
Presumed Effect: bel(H O(do(S P))) 
Possible problems with promise are firstly that the hearer may 
question the speaker's veracity or commitment to carry out the 
promised action. A violation of condition 1) only occurs if the 
speaker mistakenly comes to the conclusion that the hearer wants 
him to do P. The hearer may be slightly offended because the 
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speaker had to promise to do P, although the hearer never doubted 
that the speaker would do P. The speaker may not want to do P but 
might make the promise anyway. Finally, the hearer might question 
the speaker's ability to carry out P. 
3.4.2 Consent 
In her description of consent, Wierzbicka (op. cit. p. 112) 
spends some time comparing consent and agree, stating that: 
consenting is dependent upon the speaker's goodwill 
whereas agree: 
[takes place] on an equal basis 
However, as Wierzbicka later states (op. cit. p. 113), 
although consent and permit form two comparable speech acts, the 
difference between the two is that consenting is active in that it 
takes place in response to a particular request, whereas permit 
may take place without the knowledge that the hearer is actively 
seeking permission. It is curious that Searle and Van der Veken in 
their taxonomy of speech acts include consent as a commissive 
speech act whereas permit is included in the list of directives. 
Additionally, consenting involves effectively stating that 
OK, I want it to happen, whereas permit involves simply stating 
OK, I don't mind if it does happen. Wierzbicka gives the 
following conditions for consent: 
1) I know that you want X to happen because you have said so. 
2) I assume you think you can't cause it to happen if I don't 
say that I want it to happen. 
3) I say: I want it to happen. 
4) I say it because I want to cause the thing to be able to 
happen that you want to happen. 
5) I assume that no one other than me could cause it to be 
able to happen. 
1) can be simplified to the claim that the speaker knows that the 
hearer wants P to happen: 
know(S want(H P)) 
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2) is in a sense an understanding that the speaker has that the 
hearer knows that P is not permitted. In other words the speaker 
believes that the hearer believes that P is not permitted. Hence 
it can be represented as: 
bel(S bel(H -p(P))) 
Note that here p is used as a deontic operator and has nothing (or 
at least very little ) to do with the speech act permit. 
3) may therefore be thought of as a statement that P is permitted 
with the implied sense that the speaker wants the hearer to do P. 
SPEAK (S H want (S do (11 P) )) 
4) is a statement of the desired effect of the speech act namely 
that the hearer now knows that P is permitted and that furthermore 
the speaker wants the hearer to do P. 5) refers to the fact that 
ordinarily consent relates to something personal about the speaker 
and I have chosen to omit it. This gives the following schema for 
consent: 
Action: SPEAK(S H want(S do(H P))) 
Cognitive States: 1) know(S want(H P)) 
2) bel(S bel(H -pP)) 
Presumed Effect: know(H pP) & know(H want(S do(H P))) 
It is possible, though because of the nature of the speech act 
that the hearer may not have wanted to do P. Interestingly, the 
hearer may question whether the speaker is really sure about 
giving permission to do P. The hearer may have believed that he 
was permitted to do P anyway. Finally, the hearer may question 
whether the speaker really wants the hearer to do P. 
3.4.3 Refuse 
A refusal is a fairly blunt way of saying no, I will not do 
it. Searle and Van der Veken (op. cit. p. 195) suggest that refuse 
is the illocutionary denegation of consent. It is like consent in 
that it is a response to an actual or implied request. 
Wierzbicka (op. cit. p. 94) gives the following conditions for 
refuse: 
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1) I know that you want me to do X (because you said so). 
2) I think you assume that I will do it. 
3) I say: I don't want to do it and I will not do it. 
4) I assume that I don't have to do it if I don't want to. 
5) I say this because I want you to know it. 
6) I assume you understand that X will not happen because of 
that. 
1) is fairly straightforward and can be represented as: 
know (S want (H do (S P))) 
I am not wholly convinced that 2) is necessary but it can be 
represented as a belief held by the speaker that the hearer 
believes that the speaker will carry out P 
bel(S bel(H will(do(S P)))) 
3) therefore is: 
SPEAK(S H -do(S P)) 
We know that a refusal relates to an action that the hearer wants 
the speaker to perform, therefore we have -do(S P). This utterance 
logical form merely provides guidance that the surface form should 
imply in some way that the speaker will not be carrying out the 
action. It need not be explicit, it could for example come out as: 
I'm very sorry or I'm afraid that won't be possible. 
4) can be simply represented as 
bel(S -O(do(S P))) 
5) is a statement of the desired effect of the speech act i. e. 
that the speaker wants to communicate the fact that he will not be 
carrying out P. 
This gives us the following schema for refuse: 
Action: SPEAK(S H -do(S P)) 
Cognitive States: 1) know(S want(H do(S P))) 
2) bel(S bel(H will(do(S P)))) 
3) bel(S -O(do(S P))) 
Presumed Effect: know(H -(do(S P))) 
If the refusal is always in response to a request then condition 
1) is perfectly clear. However for condition 3) the hearer could 
respond by pointing out that the speaker has to do P. 
Additionally, the hearer could attempt to change the speaker's 
mind. 
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3.5 Directive Speech Act Verbs 
We now come to the class of speech acts described by Searle 
(1979) as directives. Direct is described by Searle and Van der 
Veken (op. cit. p. 198) as the primitive directive act. However 
Wierzbicka (op. cit. p. 42) sees it as a complex of different acts. 
Firstly she describes it as being "somewhere between requesting 
and ordering" in that by directing the speaker wants the hearer to 
do something, and expects him to do it without any conflict, and 
yet at the same time is not making an order that the hearer carry 
out the act. In a sense it is co-operative behaviour. Her second 
meaning of direct is akin to giving directions, and, third which 
is really a variant on the second seeks an explanation for why 
directions are sometimes given as imperatives. I choose not to 
include the second and third explanations of direct, because it 
usually relates to a whole sequence of acts, not just one. Hence I 
would include direct when used for giving instructions in the 
same basic category as argue, i. e. a structure and not a speech 
act. 
This leaves only Wierzbicka's first description of direct. 
Because it appears to imply a formal relationship between speaker 
and hearer, namely that in issuing a directive, the speaker has a 
permanent institutionalised position of authority I have decided 
to include it in the list of formal speech acts. 
3.5.1 Request 
Searle and Van der Veken (op. cit. p. 199) describe REQUEST 
as: 
a directive illocution that allows for the possibility 
of refusal. 
Smith (1970, p. 123) describes request as: 
a more polite word for the same thing as ask. 
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At the same time he goes on to point out that there is often 
an implied sense of authority that makes it akin to a command. 
Wierzbicka echoes this using the example: 
(4) Passengers are requested to extinguish their cigarettes. 
However I disagree with this analysis. My analysis of the above 
is that an order is an order however it is dressed up. A command 
with the surface form of a request is explained by considerations 
of politeness which I feel should be an integral part of speech 
act theory. In the particular example passengers are required to 
extinguish their cigarettes; it is a safety requirement of what is 
presumably an airline, therefore there is no possibility of 
refusal. This is a topic that will be explored further later on in 
the thesis. 
Wierzbicka gives the following conditions for request: (op. 
cit. p. 51) 
1) I say: I want Y to happen. 
2) I know that Y cannot happen if someone (X) doesn't do 
something to cause it to happen. 
3) I say this because I want to cause X to cause Y to happen. 
4) I don't want to say that X has to do it. 
5) I assume that X will understand that I have a reason to 
say that I want Y to happen. 
6) I assume that X will cause Y to happen. 
I encode 1) as: 
SPEAK(S H want(S do(H P))) 
In 1) the speaker is conveying a want to the hearer, namely that 
the hearer carry out action P. Whether this is expressed directly 
as in I want you to take out the rubbish or whether it is 
expressed implicitly or indirectly is determined by factors other 
than just the utterance's logical form. 
2) is a statement to the effect that I know that if you do not 
carry out action P, then it won't get done. This can therefore be 
expressed as the knowledge that if Hearer doesn't do P, then not P 
will obtain. 
know(S -(do(H P)) -> -P) 
3) is a statement of the desired effect of the speech act, which 
is want(S do(H P)). Hence, the presumed effect is that the hearer 
knows that the speaker wants him to do P. i. e. 
know(H want(S do(H P))) 
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4) can be expressed as the fact that the speaker does not want the 
hearer to believe that he has to do P (note that this condition of 
Wierzbicka's is in the spirit of a request, but runs contrary to 
her argument given above, that a request has an implied sense of 
authority). 
-want(S bel(H O(do(H P)))) 
5) is a statement of the reason for arriving at the cognitive 
states held by the Speaker, and therefore does not need to be 
represented. 6) can be represented as: 
bel(S poss (do (H P)) ) 
This gives the following schema for request: 
Action: SPEAK(S H want(S do(H P))) 
Cognitive States: 1) know(S -do(H P) -> -P) 
2) -want(S bel(H O(do(H P)))) 
3) bel(S poss(do(H P))) 
Presumed Effect: know(H want(S do(H P))) 
Possible effects of request include firstly that the hearer may 
ask the speaker to do P himself. Secondly, the hearer may refuse 
or decline to do P. It is even possible that hearer may defer P in 
some way by promising to do P at a later date, or even nominating 
someone else to do P. I shall look at request in much greater 
depth particularly in Chapter Six, where I shall consider the 
various indirect forms of request that are used. 
3.5.2 Tell 
Both Searle and Van der Veken (op. cit. p. 200) and Wierzbicka 
(op. cit. p. 41,286) seem to be in agreement that there are two 
different meanings of tell: firstly it can be used in the sense of 
telling someone to do something and secondly in the sense of 
telling a story. The easier of the two meanings is probably the 
first. This meaning is similar to ask and request in that it is a 
way of expressing the fact that the speaker wants the hearer to do 
something. The following are examples of tell: 
Wierzbicka gives the following conditions for tell: (op. 
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cit. p. 41) 
1) I say: I want you to do X. 
2) I assume that I can say this to you. 
3) I say this because I want to cause you to know what you 
should do. 
4) I assume that you will do it because of that. 
1) can be represented quite simply as: 
SPEAK(S H want(S do(H P))) 
2) I have chosen to represent as: 
bel(S poss(INFORM(S H want(S do(H P))))) 
This is another example of where inform is used inside another 
speech act definition. Here, once again it is intended to denote 
the generic act of informing, which could be assuring, reporting 
etc. 
3) is a statement of the desired effect of the speech act. The 
difference between tell and request is that the speaker is not 
giving the hearer the option to say no, therefore the presumed 
effect is: 
know(H want(S do(H P))) & know(H -want(S -do(H P))) 
4) can be weakened to: 
bel(S poss(do(H P))) 
This gives us the following schema for the first version of tell: 
Action: SPEAK(S H want(S do(H P))) 
Cognitive States: 1) bel(S poss(INFORM(S H want(S do(H P))))) 
2) bel(S poss(do(H P))) 
Presumed Effect: know(H want(S do(H P))) & 
know(H -want(S -do(H P))) 
Possible problems with tell include the hearer questioning the 
speaker as to whether he really wants him to do P, or simply, 
refusing to do P. 
As pointed out by Wierzbicka, (op. cit. p. 286) the second, 
meaning of tell has as much to do with the pleasure of hearing 
something as it does with knowing as exemplified by the sentence, 
Tell us "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner". This form of tell is 
not a communicative speech act as it does not involve 
communicating any state to the hearer. The speaker is merely 
-104- 
reciting for the hearer's pleasure and it is thus more akin to an 
action of a narrative type. 
3.5.3 Require 
Searle and Van der Veken (op. cit. p. 201) suggest that 
require differs from telling someone to do something only in that 
it carries with it a greater degree of strength, and that there is 
an additional preparatory condition that it needs to be done. 
Require appears to imply an element of obligation, but the speaker 
has no authority over the hearer. A good example of its use is in 
the "unless" letter that precedes a summons. E. g. "You are 
required to pay the outstanding balance within 28 days or we shall 
initiate proceedings to recover the above mentioned amount without 
further notice. " Here the agent issuing the threat to take legal 
action is notifying the recipient of his obligation, but not 
actually ordering him to pay, as he has no authority to do so. 
Wierzbicka gives the following conditions for require: 
1) I want something (X) to happen. 
2) I know it cannot happen if you don't cause it to happen. 
3) I say: I want you to cause it to happen. 
4) I assume you have to do it. 
5) I say this because I want to cause you to do it. 
6) I assume that you will do it. 
I shall make 1) slightly more specific: 
want(S do(H P)) 
2) becomes 
know(S -do(H P) -> -P) 
3) is simply 
SPEAK(S H want(S do(H P))) 
4) becomes 
bel(S O(do(H P))) 
5) and 6) may be combined into a logical form that states that if 
the speaker believes that the hearer believes that the speaker 
wants him to do P, he will do P. 
bel(S bel(H want(S do(H P)))) -> do(H P) 
This gives us the following schema for require: 
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Action: SPEAK(S H want(S do(H P))) 
Cognitive States: 1) want(S do(H P)) 
2) know(S -do(H P) -> -P) 
3) bel (S 0 (do (H P)) ) 
4) bel(S bel(H want (S do (H P)))) -> do (H P) 
Presumed Effect: do(H P) 
The obvious problem with require is when the hearer does not do P, 
after which the speaker presumably is forced to institute the 
sanction behind the obligation which would vary according to the 
speech act. It is possible that the hearer could inform the 
speaker that P has already been done, which perhaps necessitates 
an extra condition, namely that bel(S -P). 
3.5.4 Permit 
A good example showing the distinction between permit and allow is 
given below. The person who permits something is not concerned so 
much with the action itself as its effect on something. 
The nurse allowed the visitors to remain beyond the 
hospital visiting hours, although it was not permitted. 
(Hayakawa 1969, p. 441). 
Wierzbicka gives the following conditions for permit: 
1) I assume that people think that they can't cause things to 
happen in Y if I say that I don't want them to happen in 
Y. 
2) I assume that some people (someone) will want to do X in 
Y. 
3) I assume that they will think that they can't do it if I 
say I don't want them to do it. 
4) I say: I don't want to say that I don't want them to do 
it. 
5) I say this because I want to cause those people to be able 
to do it. 
6) I assume people would understand that I have reasons to 
say it. 
I have chosen to interpret 1) on a more personal basis, and more 
simply as: The hearer believes that P is forbidden which is 
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bel(S bel(H fP)) 
I have chosen to alter 2) slightly so that it becomes 
bel(S poss(want(do(H P)))) 
In other words, the speaker believes that the hearer may want to 
do P. 
3) can be interpreted as: Unless I state that P is permitted, the 
hearer will believe that P is forbidden, which is 
bel(S -INFORM(S H pP) -> bel(H fP)) 
4) is 
SPEAK(S H pP) 
5) is a statement of the desired effect of the speech act. 
6) does not really seem relevant for the speech act. This gives us 
the following schema for permit: 
Action: SPEAK(S H pP) 
Cognitive States: 1) bel(S bel(H fP)) 
2) bel(S poss(want(do(H P)))) 
3) bel(S -INFORM(S H pP) -> bel(H fP) 
Presumed Effect: know(H pP) 
If permit were used by the speaker in an area outside his scope 
of authority, then it could be questioned by the hearer. The 
hearer may inform the speaker that he doesn't want to do P anyway, 
or may acknowledge the fact that he has been allowed to do P. 
3.6 Declarative and Expressive Speech Act Verbs 
Declare is the first of the declarative acts described by 
Searle and Van der Veken (op. cit. p. 205). I prefer to call these 
"formal" speech acts. Speech acts that appear in Searle's 
declarative category generally have some extra linguistic 
dimension. They can only be used in very specific circumstances, 
examples of these are baptise or excommunicate. 
Expressive speech acts on the other hand are a rather mixed 
group of acts. Some of them appear to be largely formulaic, such 
as greetings, but others do seem to have a function similar to the 
other communicative speech acts. Because of their nature, i. e. 
that they express feelings such as regret, it is rather difficult 
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to define them in the same way as has been done for the other 
types of communicative speech act. However, it is still possible 
to explore their use within discourse. 
3.7 Evidence to Support the Cognitive Thesis in Child Language 
Evidence to support the cognitive state theory may perhaps be 
found from an examination of the way children develop their use of 
speech acts, although there are several interrelated factors that 
come into play here. Additionally, an investigation into the use 
of speech acts in certain disorders such as autism may also help 
to support the cognitive state theory, however the latter is 
beyond the scope of the thesis. 
I was alerted to the possibilities of finding evidence in 
children's language from the performance of my own son as he 
developed the use of a few simple speech acts. He developed at an 
early stage the ability to communicate a want or need through the 
use of directives. For example milk when issued in the absence of 
milk was used as a command. The tone used was very different to 
the one used when pointing to milk. Such wants are very important 
to a small child, and it is not difficult to see how a simple 
representation of this want can be translated into language. On 
the other hand, he unfortunately picked up the word 'Jesus' used 
by myself in the act of exclaiming or blaspheming. But no one 
would seriously argue that in doing so, he is also blaspheming. 
The reason for this is quite simple, he does not know that he is 
taking the name of a deity in vain. This simple explanation 
supports the cognitive state thesis, but of course it could be 
moulded to support other views as well. 
Bock and Hornsby (1981) looked at the development of 
directives in children between the ages of 2.5 and 6.5, in 
particular the difference between the use of ask and tell and they 
found that from an early age, children were more polite when 
asking than telling. In particular, they tended to use 
interrogatives for asking and imperatives for telling. 
Carrell (1981) examined children's understanding of indirect 
requests in the age range 4 to 7 and discovered that they were 
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able to understand a wide variety of indirect requests, and that 
there is a general developmental pattern of acquisition. He also 
found that children found interrogative forms more difficult than 
declarative forms. Furthermore the relationship between the 
request type and the ease of comprehension is strikingly similar 
for children and adults (Carroll op. cit. p. 344). 
Astington (1988a, 1988b) carried out a study into children's 
use of commissive speech acts. Dore (1977) had noted that 
commissives do not appear in pre-school infants and it was 
suggested that this may be due to the fact that in society 
commissives are not necessary in pre-school infants, because they 
have not acquired the sufficient autonomy to make personal 
commitments. This view seems to me to be somewhat of a 
simplification. Consider the sequence: 
(5) P: Will you clear up the toys? 
(6) C: Yes. 
(7) C: (Starts to clear up toys). 
It was suggested by Astington (1988a, p. 418) that this could be a 
commissive, or it might simply be a statement of intention, or 
even just denote the future. But it is worth noting that the 
components of commissives include both statements of intention and 
future components, so this might be regarded as a rudimentary 
commis s ive . 
One of the most interesting findings of Astington is that the 
explicit performative commissive (such as promise) does not come 
until later, even though the concept of promising appears to have 
been mastered before then. This appears to provide evidence for 
the cognitive state approach, because the example given above 
suggests that some of the cognitive states that compose 
commissives such as promise have been mastered but the whole thing 
is not put together until later. It also gives credence to the 
idea that cognitive states exist as an intermediate level. 
Hirst and Weil (1982) examined the acquisition of the 
epistemic and deontic meaning of modals in children between the 
ages of 3 and 6.5. Their general finding was that the greater the 
difference in strength between the modals the earlier the 
difference was appreciated. They stated that modal expressions 
appear as early as 2.5, and that children first distinguish modals 
from factuals before any differentiation within the class of 
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modals occurs. Furthermore they found that modals of possibility 
(may and should) are distinguished from is before is, and the 
modal of necessity is separated. They also noticed that the 
comprehension of deontic modals lagged behind the comprehension of 
epistemic modals. 
Le Bonniec (1974) suggested that an understanding of 
necessity and impossibility doesn't come until around the 11th or 
12th year. This finding appears to be backed up by Coates (1988), 
who has shown that at the age of 8 children only have a 
rudimentary understanding of modal meaning and that at 12 it will 
still "not be isomorphic" with the adult system. The implication 
of these findings is that speech acts containing modals are 
considerably more difficult than those that do not contain them. 
Abbeduto and Rosenberg (1985) examined children's knowledge 
of the presupposition of know and other cognitive verbs and their 
findings indicate that the factives such as know, forget and 
remember are mastered at 4, whereas believe is not properly 
mastered until 7. 
Reeder (1980) looked at the emergence of illocutionary skills 
from the standpoint of Searle's theory and obtained results that 
were not entirely supportive. Reeder concentrated on attempting to 
see whether contextual considerations can be used to distinguish 
requests in 2.5 to 3 years olds. The findings were that the 
ability to use contextual cues develop unevenly across 
illocutionary acts. A finding which would not be out of line with 
the cognitive state approach. One of the more interesting findings 
from the cognitive state point of view was that of Gruber (1975) 
who noted that in the early stages, 'see... ' was used as an 
indication marker and 'want... ' was used as a demand marker. 
To summarise, if we re-examine the simple 'commissive' 
(5) P: Will you put away the toys? 
(6) C: Yes 
(7) C: (puts away the toys). 
what is interesting about this sequence is that it exhibits both 
the direct and indirect responses to the speech act. This is a 
possible hint at how and why indirect speech acts have emerged. 
Furthermore even if we do not accept the above as a commissive it 
contains primitive precursors of the commissive in the form of 
presupposed cognitive states (i. e. the intention to do an act and 
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future indication). It is noteworthy that the performative use of 
promise does not come until later. If the same thing occurs for 
other more 'difficult' speech acts, then the explanation can be 
given in terms of difficulties in mastering the cognitive state 
components. 
Further evidence comes from deontics which are not mastered 
until later in the child's development. Deontics presuppose 
complex cognitive states of obligation etc. which are difficult 
to master from an early age. Although the evidence presented is 
far from conclusive, it does at least give some credence to the 
cognitive state view. 
3.8 What is the Cognitive State Hypothesis? 
In this chapter I have put forward a theory about speech acts 
(or more specifically about speech act verbs). It is still 
possible to think of a speech act in terms of an illocutionary 
force, but what that illocutionary force actually consists of 
needs to be stated. 
Searle originally conceived of seven constituent parts of an 
illocutionary force and realistically only two of those remain in 
the new theory, namely the illocutionary point and the preparatory 
conditions. The illocutionary point is still the point or purpose 
of the speech act, but it is now more focused in that we can 
specify the illocutionary point in terms of its effect upon the 
context. For example, the illocutionary point of a request is to 
make it known that the speaker wants something from the hearer and 
this want forms part of the context as soon as the speech act is 
uttered. The preparatory conditions are a small set of cognitive 
states, some or all of which must be understood and be present in 
the speaker's mind immediately before making the utterance. This 
needs to be qualified, Firstly because I have stated that only 
some of the states need to be present in certain cases. I will 
elaborate on this in coming chapters, but for the time being it 
will suffice to say that the cognitive states for a particular 
speech act should not be thought of as being cast in stone. 
Secondly I state that the cognitive states should be present 
in the speaker's mind immediately before making the utterance. By 
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this I do not intend that this is some conscious process, the 
cognitive states and an understanding of them form the meaning for 
the speech act verb. Hence, when correctly uttering a speech act 
the speaker knows what effect these cognitive states should have 
on the context. The perlocutionary effect remains more or less the 
same. 
The action part of the speech act, acts together with the 
cognitive states to allow the speaker to select the appropriate 
utterance for a particular proposition. However, this process has 
to take account of other factors, such as linguistic style, hence 
the translation process cannot be exactly specified. But the 
implication is that both the utterance logical form and the 
cognitive states will have an, effect upon the final utterance. 
So making a speech act is not only stating a particular 
proposition, but also making public a set of cognitive states 
which will be added to the context. The relational aspect of 
speech acts revolves around the fact that certain cognitive states 
have been made public. 
There are many unanswered questions of which the following 
immediately come to mind: firstly how is an utterance built up 
from the action specified in the schema, plus the set of cognitive 
states? How, given an utterance can the hearer recognise which 
speech act is being uttered (the hearer will need to be able to 
decode the cognitive states in some way)? Where do indirect speech 
acts and politeness come into all of this? I hope to at least shed 
some light on these questions, but before then it is necessary to 
re-examine the existing speech act theories in light of the 
cognitive state hypothesis in order to see whether they are 
themselves cognitive state hypotheses. 
Now it is worth standing back to see how the cognitive state 
hypothesis relates up to theories of human communication. An early 
model of linguistic communication was called the message model 
(see Akmajian, Demers and Harnish 1988 for a fuller description of 
the message model). In the message model, the speaker acts as a 
"transmitter", the hearer acts as a "receiver", and the vocal- 
auditory path (the sound wave) is the relevant channel. The 
speaker encodes some message M which is then transmitted, and 
decoded by the hearer who interprets it as message M. In this way 
private ideas are transmitted by public sounds. This model goes 
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back to John Locke (1691), but it is not without its problems 
(Akmajian et. al. op. cit. p. 395). 
Firstly, the expressions that are transmitted may be 
linguistically ambiguous and it is up to the hearer to determine 
which one is the correct interpretation. Disambiguation is a 
process which, as far as the message model is concerned is not 
governed by any principles, but it is by no means a random 
process. Additionally, the message model does not take into 
consideration the fact that a message contains information about 
particular things being referred to, something that the hearer 
will need to interpret correctly if he is to understand the 
message correctly. Also, there is no account of the speaker's 
intentions, which is not uniquely determined by the message 
itself, and tied in with this is the fact that we often 
communicate non-literally. Clearly, speech act theory in its own 
right has made attempts to solve these problems. 
Bach and Harnish (1979) attempted to solve the problems that 
defeated the message model, and their model is called the 
inferential model which deserves close study. Firstly, linguistic 
communication is possible because the speaker S and hearer H share 
a system of inferential strategies leading from the utterance of 
expression E to H's recognition of S's communicative intent. This 
at least is an idea that is shared by the cognitive state model. 
The inferential model makes the following presumptions: 
1. The Linguistic Presumption (LP). The hearer is presumed 
capable of determining the meaning and the referents of 
the expression uttered. The cognitive state model must 
also make this assumption. 
2. The Communicative Presumption (CP). The communicative 
presumption is that the speaker is speaking with some 
identifiable communicative intent. This assumption is 
also made by the cognitive state model. 
3. The Presumption of Literalness (PL). This is the shared 
belief that unless there is evidence to the contrary the 
speaker is speaking literally. There is no objection to 
this either in the cognitive state model. 
4. Conversational Presumptions (ConPs). In the course of any 
exchange, the speaker S and hearer H presume that at any 
point in the exchange the following principles hold: 
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Relevance: Speaker's contribution is relevant to the 
exchange at that point. Relevance is partially 
explicable in terms of the presupposed cognitive states 
and the desired effect of some speech act. It may also 
be used to determine indirection. 
Sequencing: Speaker's contribution to 
is of a communicative type appropriate 
the exchange. Once again this is not 
cognitive state model, except that th 
model is going to make an attempt 
particular types of exchanges are 
particular points by reference to 
cognitive states. 
the talk exchange 
to that stage of 
at odds with the 
e cognitive state 
to explain why 
appropriate at 
the presupposed 
Sincerity: Speaker's contribution to the exchange is 
sincere in that S has the attitude expressed. On the 
other hand, I would like to play down the importance of 
this somewhat in the cognitive model. On the one hand, 
sincerity is necessary for the interpretation of 
utterances, because the hearer needs to assume that the 
speaker has certain beliefs or wants for a particular 
speech act. On the other hand, however, to rely on it 
too much might rule out acts whereby, for example, the 
speaker wants the hearer to believe that he believes P, 
when in fact he believes not P. 
Quantity: Speaker's utterance provides just the required 
amount of information, not too much, not too little. 
Once again the cognitive state model goes along with 
this presumption. Additionally, although it does not 
form part of the cognitive state model as such, Allen's 
plan based recognition system is a step in the direction 
of helping us to understand the mechanisms that underlie 
this assumption and in fact presupposes the cognitive 
model. 
Quality: Speaker has adequate evidence for what is 
stated or presupposed. This is also an assumption of the 
cognitive state model. 
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Truthfulness: Speaker attempts to make the utterance 
true. I would also like to play down the importance of 
this because it effectively rules out lies and deceit, 
which do after all form a part of communication. 
Manner: Speaker speaks clearly that is, avoids 
ambiguity, avoids obscurity of expression, avoids 
unnecessary wordiness etc. The cognitive state theory 
will also make this assumption but will not have much to 
say about it. 
Politeness: Speaker in speaking. behaves politely, that 
is S is not offensive, abusive, vulgar etc. As 
well as making this assumption, the cognitive state 
theory will have a great deal more to say about the role 
of politeness when examining the relationship between 
surface forms and speech acts. 
Morality: Speaker in speaking behaves ethically, that 
is, S does not reveal information that he ought 
not reveal, he does not ask for information he ought not 
or does not direct hearer to do something that H does 
not wish done etc. This will have only a small part in 
the cognitive state model. 
The implications of this comparison between the cognitive state 
model and the inferential model are clear; the cognitive state 
model, by and large is not at adds with the inferential model, on 
the contrary it is an attempt to fill in detail that is missing 
from some areas of the inferential model. 
The inferential model also includes a description of the 
strategy used to recognise an utterance. It consists of four 
parts: 
1. The Direct Strategy. 
Step 1. The hearer H recognises what expression, E the 
speaker S has uttered. 
Step 2. Hearer recognises which meaning of E is intended 
-115- 
to be operative. 
Step 3. Hearer recognises what speaker is referring to. 
Step 4. Hearer recognises what speaker is intending to 
communicate directly, if speaking literally. 
2. The Literal Strategy. 
Step 5. The hearer recognises that it would be 
contextually appropriate for speaker to be speaking 
literally. 
Step 6. Hearer recognises what speaker is intending to 
communicate literally (and directly). 
3. The Non-Literal Strategy. 
Step 5'. Hearer recognises that it would be contextually 
inappropriate for speaker to be speaking literally. 
Step 6'. Hearer recognises what speaker is communicating 
nonliterally (and directly). 
4. The Indirect Strategy. 
Step 7. Hearer recognises that it would be inappropriate 
contextually for speaker to be speaking merely directly. 
Step 8. Hearer recognises what speaker is also intending 
to communicate indirectly. 
This forms the inferential model for speech act recognition. The 
cognitive state model is not necessarily at odds with this, 
however it would attempt to fill in more detail as to how some of 
the steps listed above are actually carried out. 
It now seems appropriate to summarise exactly what the 
cognitive state model is and what aspects of the pragmatic 
presumptions need to explained in more detail. Firstly the 
linguistic presumption (LP), communicative presumption(CP) and 
presumption of literalness(PL) are also presumptions held by the 
cognitive state model. The principal area where the cognitive 
state model attempts to expand upon the inferential model is in 
the description of the Conversational Presumptions. 
Relevance is of importance, and an assumption of relevance is 
necessary for the cognitive state model, but it is not expected to 
reveal much more about what relevance actually is other than in 
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terms of cognitive states i. e., given a speech act that expresses 
some cognitive state, the model will have something to say about 
responses to that speech act in terms of cognitive states, but not 
in terms of the propositional content and how it is relevant to 
the preceeding utterance. Generally, it will use a relevance 
relation R between two utterances Pi and P2. On the other hand the 
cognitive state model will attempt (in Chapter Four) to explain 
sequencing relationships between utterances, but in doing so it 
will recognise that larger structural elements of discourse are 
not explainable by speech act theory alone. 
Sincerity is an issue where the cognitive state model is 
slightly at odds with the inferential model, however I hope to say 
more about sincerity conditions when looking at formal speech 
acts. Quantity is a presumption that is interesting in its own 
right, because of its possible explanation by plan based models, 
but it will not form a significant part of the cognitive state 
theory. 
Quality is also a presupposition of the cognitive state model 
but will not be explored much further. Truthfulness is a 
presumption that I will examine when looking at formal speech 
acts. Manner is assumed by the cognitive state model as is 
politeness which is an area that will be greatly expanded by the 
cognitive state model. Finally morality is something that will 
come into the model, but will not receive a complete treatment. 
Thus the aims of the cognitive state model are: 
1. To use the cognitive state preconditions to provide 
an explanation in greater detail as to how and why 
sequencing occurs. (Chapter Four) 
2. To use the ideas of politeness to build a more 
complete picture of how politeness can be used to 
explain phenomena such as indirect speech acts. (Chapter 
Six) 
3. To build up a description of the possible steps that 
are necessary when constructing an utterance from a 
speech act description (consisting of the utterance 
logical form, cognitive pre-conditions and all 
presumptions). (Chapter Five). 
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3.9 Formal Speech Acts and Expressives 
In the earlier part of this chapter, a distinction has been 
made between "ordinary" (i. e. communicative) speech acts and what 
I have called formal speech acts. However something needs to be 
said about formal speech acts. Many of the speech acts that 
comprise the category of declaratives are very specialised, verbs 
such as baptise, excommunicate and name are correctly uttered by 
very few. Austin started out his Harvard Lectures (Austin 1962) by 
examining just such acts, before moving on to communicative acts. 
He was however cautious about applying the same sort of analysis 
to both types of act. However Searle apparently had no such 
reservations, and in (Searle and Van der Veken 1985) attempted to 
describe both sort of act in the same way. However I share 
Austin's reservations and feel that formal speech acts should be 
considered in a different way to communicative acts. I am not 
alone in this view, Bach and Harnish (1979) also appear to have 
arrived at the same conclusion calling such acts conventional 
speech acts. Whereas I only intend to briefly consider formal 
speech acts, having made the distinction, Bach and Harnish go into 
much more detail. 
Firstly they distinguish two types of conventional speech 
acts: effectives and verdictives. Effectives effect changes in 
institutional affairs, whereas verdictives are judgements that are 
binding because they have been issued in an official context. Bach 
and Harnish (op. cit. p. 117) also state that: 
Conventional illocutionary acts are not essentially 
communicative and do not require R-intentions. 
The hearer is not so much concerned with the uptake of such 
acts but is merely an onlooker. Consider the speech act baptise, 
assuming that the subject of baptism is a baby, although this is 
not always the case, then the parents are merely there as 
observers of the ceremony. However as Bach and Harnish have also 
pointed out, the fact that a distinction is being made does not 
imply that a speaker cannot with the same breath say a formal 
speech act and a communicative one. However these acts are 
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different, and it would be a mistake to try to fit them into the 
same framework. Hence, I feel that the notion of cognitive states 
is not applicable to speech acts such as baptise: on the other 
hand, sincerity conditions seem to have a meaning in formal speech 
acts that is fundamental to the act, whereas it is possible to 
conceive of a communicative speech act that breaks the rules where 
sincerity conditions apply, e. g. a lie. I could perhaps define a 
lie as a speech act that attempts to communicate the state bel(S 
P) with the condition held by the speaker of bel(S -P). The 
consequences of breaking the sincerity conditions for formal 
speech acts are much different. 
If we consider the declaration in a marriage ceremony, then 
the sincerity of the participants is explicitly tested before they 
are committed (a process that has been likened to two-phase commit 
protocol to ensure the consistent updating of a distributed 
database, where the master process asks the slave processes if 
they are ready to accept an update, after which they are 
committed, see Date (1983)). 
Additionally certain formal speech acts may not even be 
speech acts. Consider testify, I testify under oath, and the 
formal aspect of this act is the act of taking the oath. Yet 
testifying may involve going into considerable detail, during 
which I might make assertions, report on things etc. In other 
words, while I am uttering several different types of speech acts 
I am also testifying, to include such a speech act in the same 
class as assertives, etc. is to say the least dubious. 
For additional proof that formal speech acts cannot be 
considered using the same sort of analysis as communicative speech 
acts, consider indirect speech acts. One cannot baptise or marry 
using indirect acts. The marriage ceremony would not be correct if 
the officiator were to end with "Well from henceforth you might be 
seen wearing a wedding ring", formal speech acts are precise and 
quite often formulaic. It is difficult, for instance, to conceive 
of an indirect speech act that can be interpreted as testifying. 
It is the swearing of an oath that primarily determines whether 
the speaker is testifying or not. If there are indirect forms for 
certain speech acts only, one must ask the question why this is so 
and if indirect speech acts are to form a part of speech act 
theory, then the very fact that certain speech acts cannot have 
-119- 
indirect forms must be judged significant. 
Additionally we must also consider the class of speech acts 
that Searle has called expressives. I have not referred to any of 
these in my descriptions earlier in this chapter. With this class 
I remain on the fence as to exactly where they should go. On the 
one hand it is tempting to consider them using an analysis similar 
to that of Goffman (1972), where expressive types are considered 
to be mini-discourse structures, but on the other hand when I 
thank someone there is more than just a formal ritual, I am 
communicating that fact that I want to show gratitude for what 
they have done - sometimes at least. Whatever the analysis that is 
used to describe expressives, it will not adversely affect the 
cognitive state theory. 
3.10 Conclusions 
In this chapter I have worked through examples of several 
speech act verbs to develop action schemas, which I expressed in 
what I have called the utterance logical form. The utterance 
logical form can be used, along with other information to build up 
the final utterance. There are also a set of states, which are 
essentially pre-conditions for the act to take place, which I have 
expressed as cognitive states. Finally, there is a presumed 
effect, which is an expression of the effect the speaker would 
like to have upon the hearer. In making a comparison with the 
inferential model of Bach and Harnish it becomes clearer what I am 
hoping to achieve. The notion of sequencing and how one speech act 
may affect another will be explored in more detail in Chapter 
Four. 
Secondly, I hope to show how speech act descriptions in the 
cognitive state model can be used in conjunction with the 
pragmatic maxims outlined in section 3.8 to influence the choice 
of surface form, and an analysis of this will take place in 
Chapter Five. This contrasts with the approach taken by Bach and 
Harnish to show how, given an utterance, the appropriate speech 
act may be inferred from it. Finally, I hope to greatly extend the 
view that politeness forms part of the overall theory by 
demonstrating its effect on surface forms in Chapter Six. 
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4. Speech Acts and Discourse Structure 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous section, I developed a schematic definition 
of speech acts. The schematic definition contained the following 
separately identifiable components: 
i) A state or set of states that define what an individual 
believes or wants as preconditions for a particular 
speech act to take place. 
ii) A state that is to be communicated to the hearer, 
perhaps a belief or a want for example. 
iii) A state or a set of states that enable the speaker to 
comprehend the sort of response that he is likely to get 
from the hearer. Perhaps, for example an understanding 
that the hearer may not believe what he is asserting. 
iv) A desired effect of the speech act, i. e. what we want 
the hearer to know, believe or do as a result of hearing 
the speech act. 
v) An action that specifies what sort of form the 
utterance used to perform the act is to take. 
In this section I hope to indicate how such a speech act 
definition can be used to put speech acts into the framework for a 
theory of discourse structure. The first component, above has 
little to do with discourse structure, but the second is what is 
to be communicated to the hearer. If we assume that the point of a 
speech act is to communicate some state such as: bel(S P) then 
this state may be added to the context of the discourse. In other 
words, before uttering some statement that may be interpreted as 
conveying: bel(S P). the speaker is not committed to P in the 
discourse context. After making this utterance, the speaker is now 
committed to P. The hearer must respond in some way to the 
speaker's expressed belief in P and in this section, I intend to 
elaborate on the ways in which the hearer can respond to the state 
expressed by a speech act. The third category in the list above 
also has some bearing on this, because it is an attempt to 
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describe some of the ways that a hearer may respond to a given 
act. 
Traditional speech act theory has little or nothing to say 
about relations between speech acts. Indeed, Searle states that 
the relationships between speech acts are of insufficient interest 
to warrant study (Searle 1986). On the other hand conversational 
analysis (see Chapter Two) describes such things as adjacency 
pairs without specifying very much in the way of a theory as to 
how the first element in an adjacency pair constrains the second. 
If speech act theory is to stand as a viable alternative 
theory, then it ought to be able to say why, for example answer is 
not thought of as a speech act category, or indeed it ought to be 
able to specify what constitutes an answer to a question which is 
thought of as a speech act category. I hope to show that the 
schematic approach to speech acts can help to answer both of 
these questions as well as providing an answer to some even more 
difficult questions. 
To pose the question more formally, if I make an utterance 
that is a surface form utterance used to perform some speech act 
Si with cognitive state set Ci and propositional content Pi in 
some context T, then how, if at all does Pi constrain the hearer's 
response S2 with propositional content P2? 
This question is about of the notion of sequencing described 
in the inferential/cognitive state model in the last chapter. In 
addition to the above question we also have to ask some 
additional subsidiary questions that are not unrelated. Firstly, 
given some speech act Si is it possible to categorise in any way 
the types of responses that are possible to that speech act? By 
types of responses, I do not necessarily mean just speech act 
types, I am referring to the strategy of response that can be 
employed. Secondly, given that discourse has several hierarchical 
layers of structure, and both the discourse analysis and 
conversational analysis models seem to agree on this, must speech 
act theory provide a total explanation for all hierarchical 
levels, or is it merely applicable to a limited subset of the 
hierarchy? 
A third question that is no less important, is can or must 
speech act theory be capable of explaining all discourse 
phenomena? Here I am referring particularly to insertion 
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sequences. 
Before moving on to consider the main questions, it is worth 
briefly examining the relationship between speech act theory and 
hierarchical levels of discourse structure. I think the answer to 
this question is "no", speech act theory does not and need not 
explain strategies at all levels of discourse but I will explore 
this further. 
The question of range of responses is one that should also be 
examined. If I assert that P, then what type of responses can I 
conceivably expect to get, or are they so varied that it is not 
even meaningful to talk about being able to predict in what form 
the responses can take? 
Firstly, the hearer may have difficulties with the mode of 
delivery, he may object to it or the utterance may be 
unintelligible because of it. An example of an objection to it 
might be (1) 
(1) There's no need to shout. 
An example of a case in which it might be unintelligible might be 
something like (2): 
(2) Sorry, can you repeat that, its rather noisy in here. 
The most common response is a response P2 to some Pi with 
relevance relationship rel(Pi, P2) meaning that P2 coming after Pi 
as it does is relevant according to the conversational presumption 
of relevance. Speech act theory alone should not need to be 
burdened with an explanation why two propositions are relevant to 
each other. A full explanation of relevance may only come when we 
have a more detailed cognitive explanation of the mind. If this is 
the case then can speech act theory have anything to say about 
sequencing? I think it will become clear that the answer to this 
question is yes. 
Thirdly, it is possible for the hearer to change topic, in 
which case there is no relevance relationship between the two 
propositions, however topic change is normally marked in the 
utterance (see for example Schiffrin 1987). This means that two 
propositions Pi and P2 effectively break the conversational 
presumption of relevance, however they must still obey the 
sequencing presumption, which is largely speech act driven. In 
other words, it is speech acts that largely determine at what 
point a topic change may take place. For example it would not be 
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permitted to introduce a topic immediately after a question, for 
example: 
(3) Do you know whether that was true or not? 
(4) By the way, did you hear about the government minister 
who was responsible for tougher legislation on drunk 
drivers and then got breathalysed and was found to be 
over the limit? 
Response (4) would be seen as evasive. However if we consider the 
following response, it is clear that the rule is not just a matter 
of forbidding two questions together? 
(5) Do you know whether that was true or not? 
(6) What exactly did you mean by 'The Model Theory'? 
In (6), assuming that 'Model Theory' has something to do with what 
has gone before then (6) is wholly relevant. This brings us on to 
the final category of response, which I intend to call meta-speech 
acts. 
A meta-speech act is one that relates to the contents of a 
previous speech act. For example: 
(7) The cirrus clouds have formed a mackerel sky, there must 
be better weather ahead. (Si) 
(8a) Since when did you learn about meteorology. (S2) 
(8b) What exactly is a mackerel sky? (mSi) 
(8a) is another speech act following on from (7), whereas (8b) is 
an example of a meta-speech act. I hope to be able to show that by 
introducing the idea of meta-speech acts, I will be able to 
provide an explanation of insertion sequences. The idea of meta- 
speech acts is very similar to the idea of meta-plans introduced 
by Litman (1985). Insertion sequences provide a challenge to 
conversational analysis, for the simple reason that they can be 
inserted between the first and second parts of an adjacency pair. 
If we are to have a theory of speech acts that allows for a 
pairing between speech acts within a discourse structure, then we 
must take account of insertion sequences. The idea of meta-speech 
acts is the proposed answer to the problem of insertion sequences. 
The difference between an ordinary speech act and a meta-speech 
act is largely functional. If I make some assertion, then I would 
expect the hearer to react to it in some way, even if it is only a 
grunt of acknowledgement. It is this reaction to my assertion that 
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will form the second half of the speech act pair (I will describe 
this idea in considerable detail in this chapter). However, the 
hearer may not have understood my assertion or may perhaps want me 
to elaborate on what I have just asserted and reactions such as 
requests for clarification, elaboration and so on, form insertion 
sequences. In order to maintain the idea of a relation between a 
pair of speech acts, an insertion sequence can be seen as 
necessary for the hearer to react to the speaker's original 
utterance. In the example? above, the hearer cannot comment on the 
speaker's assertion unless he knows what a mackerel sky is. 
To summarise there are four broad categories of response to a 
given speech act Si: 
i) A communication problem speech act - one that relates to 
the way in which the speech act was communicated. 
ii) An ordinary speech act, with a relevance relation between 
the two speech acts. 
iii) A change of topic, which is constrained according to 
sequencing rules. 
iv) A meta-speech act, which can be roughly defined as 
something that is necessary in order to make a 
reasonable response to the original speech act. In the 
example above, in (8b) the respondent didn't know what a 
mackerel sky was and in order to say something 
intelligent, he would need this information. 
I shall not consider category 1 any further and will be 
concentrating mostly on category 2. 
Having stated that the relevance relationship itself is not 
something that is to be defined as part of speech act theory, 
there is still the question of how a speech act shapes the sort of 
response that can be given to it. I believe that there are two 
main ways in which this can happen. 
Firstly, the hearer may produce a response that bears a 
logical relationship to one of the states that is necessary in 
order to utter a particular act. To make this clear, lets assume 
that one of the states that needs to be present in order to plead 
is that the person making the plea has a reason for doing so, say 
Q. So, if I plead for you to do P, then I am doing so because of 
Q. One of the ways that a hearer may respond to the plea is by 
referring to Q. Hence, one way that we may define a hearer's set 
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of responses is by referring to the cognitive states that act as 
preconditions for the speech act. 
Another way in which a response may be related to the speech 
act that it forms a response to is the communicated state itself. 
I shall spend some time in this chapter elaborating on this. For 
example, if I assert that P, then by the schema definition given 
in the previous chapter, I am expressing the cognitive state: 
bel(S P). The hearer may respond by (effectively) asserting that 
they also believe that P, on the other hand, they may not believe 
in P. Thus one of the aims of this chapter is to examine 
communicated cognitive states logically and to attempt to define 
the sort of responses that can logically be given to them. This 
leads to a sort of discourse logic. 
4.2 Cognitive States and Context 
It is now time to examine exactly how the presupposed 
cognitive states influence the sequencing of speech acts. That is, 
given two adjacent speech acts within an item of discourse, Si and 
S2, with relevance relation rel(Si, S2), how do the cognitive 
states constrain the sequencing between these speech acts? 
Winograd and Flores (1986) describe conversation as a "dance" 
taking place with speaker and hearer as partners. They draw out a 
series of possibilities for a request in the form of a graph 
structure (figure 4.1). A request from A to B specifies some 
conditions of satisfaction. After the request there are five 
possible courses of action (according to the Winograd and Flores 
model): firstly the hearer can accept the conditions, can reject 
them or ask to negotiate a change in them. Additionally, they add 
that the speaker can also withdraw the request before a response 
is received or modify its conditions. Each of the actions in turn 
leads to a new state within the graph. In a sense, what Winograd 
and Flores have attempted to achieve is a sort of outline 
conversational structure for a request/response pair. 
The Winograd and Flores model raises an interesting question; 
namely do speech acts only act within a framework of sequencing 
between pairs (omitting complications such as insertion sequences) 
or can they also be restricted by a larger structure, such as the 
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Figure 4.1 
The Basic Conversation for Action 
(Winograd and Flores op. cit. p. 65) 
A: Request 
1 'ýl 2 
B: Promise 
A: Accept 
B: Counter 
A: Counter 
B: Reject 
A: Withdraw 
A: Reject 
B: Withdraw 
A: Declare 
B: Assert 
3 
B: Renege A: Declare 
5 
A: Withdraw 
A: Withdraw 
9 
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one described by Winograd and Flores? After all some of the 
actions described in the Winograd and Flores structure are in fact 
speech act categories such as promise, on the other hand others 
such as counter are not. 
If there are two different levels of discourse that serve to 
constrain speech acts, then it is possible that this may serve to 
explain why for example a question is regarded as a speech act, 
whereas an answer is not. Clearly, it will be necessary to look at 
speech acts operating both as adjacency pairs and within a larger 
discourse framework. However, it should be made clear that this 
does not mean that all discourse structure can be described in 
terms of speech acts. 
If we consider first of all the speech act verb assert, then 
it has four cognitive states according to the description in the 
last chapter: 
1) bel(S [Ex: bel(x -P)]) 
2) +bel(S P) 
3) bel(S poss (bel (H P)) ) 
4) want(S INFORM(H [Ex: bel(S x)])) 
Then the first cognitive state has no effect on the context, it 
merely serves to prepare the speaker for the fact that some people 
will disagree with what he is asserting. The second cognitive 
state is the one that is effectively "transmitted" by the 
utterance of an assertive, namely that the speaker believes P to 
be true. Hence within the context in which it is spoken, the 
speaker has become committed to the fact he believes that P 
is 
true. Similarly, within the context, the hearer now knows that the 
speaker believes that P is true hence we can add to the context: 
know(H bel(S P)) 
The third cognitive state simply prepares the speaker for the fact 
that he might be believed by the hearer, because this is an 
internal state of the speaker, it has no effect on the discourse 
context. 
The fourth cognitive state is concerned with the reason for 
the speaker making the assertion and is of no direct concern when 
considering the effect of the speech act upon the context. 
Having described the effect that making an assertion has upon 
the context, we now need to consider the hearer's likely responses 
to the assertion and whether an assertion in any way constrains 
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what follows it. Obviously, the speaker is prepared for the hearer 
to either accept or reject P, but are more alternatives possible? 
First of all, we are making the assumption that the hearer 
will not attempt to change topic or issue a meta-speech act, these 
will be dealt with later on. So given that 
bel(S P) and 
know(H bel(S P)) 
have been added to the context, what possibilities are open to the 
hearer? Clearly we have the possibility of either 
bel (H P) or bel (H -P) ; 
but there are others, consider first of all the different 
categories of speech act and whether each might follow an 
assertion. Firstly, there is the assertive act, the act of 
accepting that P is true would be an assertive act so many 
different sorts of assertive acts might follow an assertion. 
Secondly, directives; the hearer may question why the speaker 
believes that P, hence it is possible to have a directive 
following an assertive act. The final category, commissives pose 
more of a problem. It is not clear how a promise for example may 
follow an assertion, consider the following: 
(9) A: Your presentation is rather untidy. 
(10) B: I will improve it for next time. 
In (9), A is making what might at first sight seem like an 
assertion, but in fact it is more like a criticism. The problem 
with promise is that if it is not directly relevant to P then it 
represents a change of topic. If it is directly relevant then it 
can only come about because the hearer perceives that the speaker 
wants him to do P. It is possible to provide an explanation of why 
this is so by reference to the presupposed cognitive states. One 
of the preconditions or cognitive states for promise was that the 
speaker knew or believed that the hearer wanted him to do P. This 
analysis suggests a method using the cognitive state approach by 
which we can determine the way by which one speech act constrains 
another. Going back to the result of the assertion, then in 
addition to simply 
bel(H P) or bel(H '-P) 
if epistemic, modal and deontic operators are involved, there are 
other possibilities, however before going on to examine these some 
explanation of these operators is necessary. 
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4.3 Speech Act Schemas and Logical Schemas 
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall be using operators 
from epistemic logic as well as both alethic and deontic modal 
logics. Furthermore I shall introduce logical schemas that use P 
and this raises two major questions: can these different systems 
be used together and what exactly can P represent? 
So far, P has been used to represent a proposition and where 
necessary, it has been explicitly modified by modal or deontic 
operators, but no mention was made of whether P itself was 
schematic and if it was, whether modal or deontic operators could 
be substituted into P. P has also been used in formulae using 
epistemic operators such as bel and want. I will make the 
assumption throughout that P is schematic in that it may be 
replaced by any wff in propositional logic. Hence P may represent 
formulae such as: 
PvQ 
P& -Q 
but not 
necc (P) 
However the same does not apply to the operators on P itself, 
such as necc, poss etc. The reason why this should be so requires 
some justification. Firstly, consider the basic modal operators 
necc and poss. These have been extensively studied in different 
systems of modal logic, see for example Hughes and Cresswell 
(1968). Some of the most popular systems are the system T (first 
propounded by Robert Feys (1937). Also the systems S4 and S5 are 
important (Lewis and Langford 1932). In the system S5 there are 
only six distinct modalities, namely P, necc(P), poss(P) and the 
negation of these. The system T has an infinite number of 
modalities and there are 14 distinct ones in the system S4 (Hughes 
and Cresswell op. cit. ). A problem with systems of modal logic is 
that they refer to logical necessity which is not of much use for 
a study of language. There is no exact correlation between the 
distinct modalities in these systems and the ones that occur in 
English. Although it is possible to have iterated modalities in 
English, I have chosen only to analyse the cases where modalities 
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are not iterated, namely: poss, necc, -poss and -necc. 
bel (S poss (P) ) 
bel (S necc (P) ) 
bel(S -necc (P) ) 
bel(S -poss(P)) 
Combinations of the necc and poss operators are possible but have 
not been considered. 
The deontic operators 0(... ) p and f come from systems of 
deontic logic. An extensive survey of deontic logic is given in 
Hilpinen (1971). The modern foundations of deontic logic were laid 
by Von Wright (1951). Von Wright stated that there is a 
significant analogy between the deontic notions of obligation and 
permission and the modal notions of necessity and possibility. For 
example a proposition is necessary if and only if its negation is 
not possible. Similarly, a proposition is obligatory if and only 
if the negation of the proposition is not permitted. Permission is 
the primitive of Von Wright's system and there are three basic 
axioms: 
Op <-> -P-p 
Pp V P-p 
0(p & -p) and -P(p & -p) are not valid. 
(Note that in the above notation, p is a proposition and P is the 
operator denoting permission. ) 
Von Wright stated that deontic operators must be prefixed to 
names of acts and not to descriptions or states of affairs. Hence 
he intended the deontic operators to be used as act-predicates and 
the implication of this is that the iteration of operators is not 
permissible, i. e. 00p <-> Op is not a wff (Follesdal and Hilpinen 
1971, p. 10). However Follesdal and Hilpinen (op. cit. ) state that 
it is almost impossible to determine whether iterated wffs are 
acceptable as principles of deontic logic or not. 
Anderson (1958) suggested that deontic logic might be reduced 
to alethic modal logic by means of the reduction schema 
Op <-> N (-p -> S) 
where N is necessity and S is a propositional constant. Anderson 
interprets S as a 'bad thing' or a sanction which results from 
violation of one's duties. Hence the above formula means 
P is obligatory if and only if -p (necessarily) implies the 
sanction S, in other words p is forbidden if and only if it 
implies the sanction. 
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It has been noted that the standard system of deontic logic can 
give rise to certain paradoxes, for example the paradox of 
commitment (Chisholm 1963). However this should not affect its use 
in speech act theory as Chisholm's point is that we need a way of 
deciding what we ought to do after we fail to do something we 
ought to do. 
Given that it is unclear whether iterated wffs should be 
accepted in deontic systems, we could assume that they are not 
acceptable and this then leaves six possible operators on the 
proposition P (assuming that deontic operators refer to human acts 
then more properly they may only apply to the formulae do(... P)): 
0 (do (x P) ) 
-O(do(x P)) 
p (do (x P) ) 
-p(do(x P)) 
f (do (x P) ) 
-f(do(x P)) 
This reduces to four because of the symmetry of p and f. It is 
cleaner to eliminate the two negative forms, leaving us with: 
0 (do (x P) ) 
-O(do(x P)) 
p(do(x P)) 
f (do (x P) ) 
This leaves the operator will, which could be called the operator 
of intention. If we make the assumption that all propositions 
represent either states of affairs or acts, then we can 
distinguish between the two by representing them as P and do(x P) 
respectively. The operator will is only intensional when it 
prefixes do(x P), i. e. will(do(x P)) when it has the rough 
meaning: x has the intention of doing P. When it prefixes P it 
simply denotes the future tense, i. e. will(P) means P will happen 
in the future. 
Using two distinct types of logic plus the intensional 
operator means that we must consider the possibility of their 
combination. There is sometimes a fine distinction between 0(do(S 
P)) and necc(do(S P)) for example if I say: I have to inform you 
that you have failed your exam. In this case 0(... ) seems correct. 
On the other hand, when used in a sentence of the form: You have 
-132- 
to ..., whether it denotes necessity or obligation seems to depend 
upon what exactly the hearer has to do. In practice, I shall make 
the assumption that necc and poss refer to states of affairs and 
the deontic operators refer to acts (I do this because I am not 
going to consider the cases where modals and deontic can be 
combined, although in practice this can occur, however, it does 
make sense sometimes to apply modal operators to acts and this 
will occur in the analysis below). This means that they cannot be 
combined, however it is theoretically possible to do so in certain 
cases. For example poss appears to meaningfully prefix 0(... ). 
Consider: You have to give up your seat. A sentence pointing out 
an obligation to act. This could be: You may have to give up your 
seat. A sentence pointing out the possibility of an obligation to 
act. On the other hand the operator necc doesn't appear to combine 
with 0(... ). Consider: *You must have to give up your seat. Other 
combinations are possible, for example: I might have to forbid you 
from seeing her. This sentence indicates that poss(f(do(H P))) is 
possible. I won't consider these combinations when examining the 
set of operators on P and do(x P). 
The operator will appears to be superfluous when used in 
conjunction with deontic operators, for example O(will(do(H P))) 
and 0(do(H P)) appear to have roughly the same meaning, i. e. It is 
obligatory that you will do P and It is obligatory that you do P. 
Will may also be used with the modal operators, e. g. I might 
give you a lift to work tomorrow. This becomes: poss(will(do(S 
P))). Once again, I will only consider cases with will alone. 
Having examined the possible operators upon the proposition 
P, I must say at once that these apply for use with the epistemic 
operator bel in formulae such as: bel(S .. P). I will not consider 
the operator know as a separate case, although I acknowledge that 
there are indeed differences between the two. The epistemic 
operator want appears to be a lot simpler. It doesn't seem to 
allow for any operators on P. I may want the state of affairs P to 
come about, or want you to do P. However it makes no sense to say 
that I want P to be necessary or want P to be forbidden. That is 
different to my wanting you to forbid P. 
Therefore, given a communicated state of the speaker of bel(S 
P) there are a certain set of responses that the hearer can make 
to the speaker's expressed belief in P. After all, my contention 
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is that the hearer must respond in some way to the speaker's 
belief in P. Firstly, we have 
bel (H P) 
this is the simplest case, the hearer accepts P as true. Thus if 
the speaker makes an assertion, such as: 
(11) The daffodils flowered late this year, 
in order to communicate the fact that the hearer also believes 
that P, he only has to say something like: 
(12) Yes, 
or even 
(13) Mm. 
On the other hand, the hearer may not believe that P. In this 
case, in order to maintain the schematic nature of the formulae, I 
choose to represent this as: 
-bel(H P) 
If, for example, the speaker asserts that: 
(14) Shostakovich's fifth symphony was a tremendous climbdown 
in terms of artistic direction, when compared with his 
fourth, 
in order to respond with -bel(H P) the hearer only has to say: 
(15)What rubbish! 
or 
(16) Not at all. 
The hearer's response can be taken to express: I don't believe 
that. 
Next, I shall consider the modal operators. The first case is 
where the hearer believes that P is possible, it is either an 
expression of doubt or a hedged acceptance of what the speaker has 
just asserted. For example, the speaker may assert that: 
(17)Kasparov is the strongest chess player ever, 
To which the hearer may respond: 
(18)Perhaps. 
This response gives an indication that P is possible, the hearer 
has expressed the cognitive state: bel(H poss(P)). Note that 
intonation allows us to make such a response sound like either: 
(19a) Perhaps {With a downward tone} (but I don't think so) 
(19b) Perhaps (With a rising tone) (possibly you are right) 
(19b) truly expresses the desired cognitive state whereas (19a) 
is perhaps a pragmatic device that enables the hearer to avoid 
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disagreement. 
The second possibility is -poss(P). For example, the speaker 
may assert (state? ) that: 
(20) Your dog's in my garden again, 
leading to a response by the hearer of: 
(21) That's not possible! 
or 
(22) He can't be, I blocked up that gap in the hedge 
yesterday. 
I suggest that the effective meaning of this is the same as for 
-bel(H P). 
The next case is necc(P). For example, if the speaker 
asserts (states) : 
(23) The solution went clear when I added the acid. 
If the hearer responds with something like: 
(24) Well that is what is supposed to happen. 
then he is effectively stating that it is necessarily the case 
that P. (Note that I have been using speech acts such as assert 
and state almost interchangeably, I shall explain what I feel is 
the principal difference between these shortly. ) When the hearer 
adds that P is necessarily the case, it is like a comment appended 
onto the assertion. 
The next group of operators on P are the deontic operators, 
of which I shall consider: 0(P), '0(P), fP and pP. When 
considering the deontic operators, P must be an act, hence it must 
be of the form: do(x P). The first case is when 0(P) is used as a 
response to an assertion (statement) that P (i. e. do(x P)). 
Typically, this arises as a form of agreement, consolation or 
sympathy with the speaker's position, for example if the speaker 
states: 
(25) I took our dog to the vets this morning to have her put 
down, 
the hearer may respond with: 
(26) Well, you had to do it, she was suffering. 
The speaker has stated that he has just carried out an action that 
he did not feel comfortable about doing, and the hearer responds 
by pointing out that the speaker had a moral obligation to carry 
out the action and should not therefore feel bad about it. 
-0(P) on the other hand may indicate that the hearer is 
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commenting on the fact that the speaker has done something over 
and above his obligations. This may even be used as a form of 
thanks for an action of kindness, for example, if the speaker 
states that: 
(27) I booked you in a first class seat, because I know the 
trains are very crowded on Friday evening, 
the hearer may respond with something like: 
(28) Oh, you shouldn't have, its very expensive. 
The next deontic operator is fP. The use of this operator depends 
very much upon who has the authority to do the forbidding. Lets 
consider the case where the speaker states that he has done P. If 
the hearer is in authority with respect to this action, then he 
might retort: but that is forbidden, or I forbid you ever to do 
that again. If the speaker is in a position of authority, the the 
hearer's response becomes a question: But that's forbidden? If 
neither party are in a position of authority it becomes a comment 
or assertion: I think that is forbidden. 
A similar sort of situation exists for pP. It depends very 
much on who is in a position to grant permission with respect to 
P. If the speaker has asserted/stated that he is doing P, then if 
he is in a position to grant permission for P matters, then the 
hearer's response: You are permitted to do that? is in the form of 
a question. If neither party is in a position of authority with 
respect to P matters, then it is a comment: Well, you're within 
your rights. On the other hand if the hearer is in a position of 
authority with respect to P matters, then it may come across as a 
mild rebuke for not asking permission, or a confirmation that P is 
permitted: You may do that if you wish. 
Finally, we must consider the operator will. Specifically 
with an action, when it expresses intention, rather than when it 
is used simply to denote the future tense. If the speaker has just 
asserted that P, then there seems to be little point in the hearer 
stating that he will do P. Thus, if the first utterance in the 
pair can be interpreted as: bel(S P), the response will(do(H P)) 
looks an unlikely second part. 
In the course of this section, I have given examples that 
looked more like statements than assertions, and this needs to be 
explained. I stated that the communicated cognitive state 
presupposed by assert was bel(S P). I also referred to the notion 
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of authority in various places. Firstly, one of the differences 
between assert and state is that the communicated cognitive state 
for the speech act state is know(S P). This is not necessarily a 
difference that manifests itself in the surface form, but comes 
about because when the speaker states that P, he is assumed to be 
an authority on P matters. For example I might state that I am 
studying the works of Robert Schumann, because I am assumed to be 
an authority on knowing what subjects I am studying (but not 
necessarily the subject matter itself). There is a thin dividing 
line between those things that may be stated and those that are 
asserted. For example, I might assert that I am improvising in the 
style of Robert Schumann, because that is open to debate, but I 
would not normally expect to be queried if I stated that I was 
currently building a patio in my garden. Exactly what can be 
asserted and what stated is not however a problem for speech act 
theory. 
We can therefore give the rough formulae to equate assert and 
state: 
assert (S P) + auth(S P) = state (S P) 
There are two aspects to authority: firstly that A is an authority 
on P matters (auth(A P)) and secondly that A is an authority over 
B with respect to P matters (auth(A B)). 
A summary of assert/state and the possible responses that 
refer directly to it are given in table 4.1. Table 4.1 gives the 
state communicated by the speaker and the state communicated by 
the hearer in response to that state, it also lists the authority 
relationship, where it has a. bearing on the outcome of the 
exchange. A name is then given in the last column to the hearer's 
act in response to the speaker's assertion or statement. 
The second case that I shall consider is where the speaker 
communicates a cognitive state of bel(S poss(P)). The speech act 
verb that this corresponds most closely to is perhaps suggest, 
although there are others such as conjecture, guess, estimate etc. 
The difference between these and suggest appears to lie either in 
how the conclusion was reached or the certainty that can be given 
to P. Once again, I shall consider the ways in which the hearer 
can respond with respect to P. 
If the hearer agrees with or accepts the suggestion, then he 
is communicating the cognitive state: bel(H poss(P)). On the other 
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Table 4.1 The Structural Relationships of ASSERT/STATE(P) 
Speaker State Hearer State Authority Hearer Act 
bel(S P) bel(H P) - accept 
bel(S P) -bel(H P) - dispute 
bel(S P) bel(H poss(P)) - hedged 
acceptance/ 
doubt 
know(S P) bel(H -poss(P)) auth(S P) dispute 
bel(S P) bel(H necc(P)) - comment 
bel(S P) bel(H -necc(P)) - comment 
know(S do(S P)) bel(H O(do(S P))) auth(S P) sympathise 
console 
comment 
know(S do(S P)) bel(H -O(do(S P))) auth(S P) comment 
thank 
know(S do(S P)) bel(H f(do(S P))) auth(S P) question 
auth(H P) forbid 
- comment 
know(S do(S P)) bel(H p(do(S P))) auth(S P) comment 
auth(H P) rebuke 
confirm 
- comment 
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hand, he can reject it (-bel(H P)) or confirm it (bel(H P)). 
For example if the speaker suggests that: 
(29) People seem to be getting taller generally, 
examples of responses by the hearer might be: 
(30a) You might be right. [ (bel H poss(P)) ] 
(30b) I don't think official statistics would bear that out. 
[ -bel(H P) ] 
(30c) Yes, I seem to recall reading that that was the case. 
[ bel (H P) ] 
The communicated hearer response: bel(H -poss(P)) is similar to 
that for assert, except that the hearer response seems to be 
softened as a result of the speaker merely suggesting that P. e. g. 
(31) A: When I looked at Saturn last night I fancied I saw 
one of its moons. 
(32) B: I don't think that's possible. [with your telescope] 
The case of bel(H necc(P)) is again similar to that for assert. 
When the speaker suggests that something is the case the hearer 
responds that it is bound to happen, in this case it becomes a 
confirmation that P is the case. 
The final modal case: bel(H -necc(P)) may occur in an 
exchange such as: 
(33) A: I think the crystal will take on a regular shape. 
(34) B: It doesn't have to. 
When the response to the speaker state bel(S poss(do(S P))) is 
0(do(S P)). Then this suggests the hearer urging or persuading the 
speaker to do P. For example: 
(35) A: I might visit him tomorrow. 
(36) B: I think you ought to do so. 
On the other hand, when the hearer response is: bel(H '0(do(S P))) 
then it acts more like a comment, for example: 
(37) A: I will return the book to you this evening. 
(38) B: Don't feel that you have to. 
Once again, when the operator fP is used, it is heavily dependent 
upon who can forbid. For example consider the following: 
(39) A: I think I might leave my car at the back in future. 
(40a)B: Are you allowed to do that? (Authority with A) 
(40b)B: That is strictly forbidden. (Authority with B) 
(40c)B: I think that is forbidden. (neither party has 
authority) 
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The same thing applies to permit: 
(41) A: I think I might leave my car at the back in future. 
(42a)B: Well that's your right. (Authority with A) 
(42b)B: Yes, you may do so. (Authority with B) 
(42c)B: Yes, I think you're allowed to do that. (Neither 
party has authority) 
The cases: bel(S necc(P)) and bel(S -necc(P)) don't appear to 
have any interesting cases that are distinct from their 
equivalents in the case: bel(S P), therefore, for the sake of 
simplicity and brevity, I shall not consider them. 
The next case is: bel(S O(do(S P))). It is also worth 
examining the case where the speaker believes that the hearer has 
an obligation to do P. The only operators on P that seem to make 
sense as a response by the hearer to the expressed speaker belief 
state that: bel(S O(do(S P))) are the deontic operators. If the 
hearer also believes that it is the speaker's duty to do P then we 
have a form of acceptance or acknowledgement. e. g. 
(43) A: I shall have to report what you did. 
(44) B: I know. 
If on the other hand, the hearer believes that P is not 
obligatory, then he disputes the speaker's claim. 
If the hearer believes that P is forbidden and is an 
authority over P matters, then he may either forbid the speaker 
from doing P or may simply inform the speaker that P is forbidden. 
If the speaker is in a position of authority with respect to P or 
neither party is in a position of authority, then it may take the 
form of sympathy for the speaker's position - being obliged to do 
that which is forbidden. 
If the hearer believes that. P is permitted (or is authorised 
to permit P), then the hearer's response is going to be an act of 
informing, if neither party is in a position of authority, or 
granting of permission if the hearer is in a position of 
authority. 
If the speaker communicates that he believes that the hearer 
is obliged to do P then the only belief states of the hearer that 
look plausible are either bel(H O(do(H P))) or bel(H -0(do(H P))). 
However it is also possible for the hearer to believe that P is 
forbidden which may act as a form of objection. 
The cognitive state bel(S -O(do(S P))), which may be 
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Table 4.2 The Structural Relationships for SUGGEST(P) 
Speaker State Hearer State Authority Act 
bel(S poss (P) ) 
bel(S poss (P) ) 
bel(S poss (P) ) 
bel(S poss (P) ) 
bel(S poss (P) ) 
bel(S poss(do(S P))) 
bel(S poss (do (S P)) ) 
bel(S poss(do(S P))) 
bel(S poss(do(S P))) 
bel(S poss(do(S P))) 
bel(H P) - confirm 
-bel(H P) - reject 
bel(H poss(P)) - agree 
bel(H -poss(P)) - as for assert 
bel(H necc(P)) - confirm 
bel(H -necc(do(S P))) disagree 
bel(H O(do(S P))) urge 
convince 
bel(H -O (do (S P))) comment 
bel(H f(do(S P))) as for assert 
bel(H p(do(S P))) as for assert 
Table 4.3 Structural Relationships for FORBID(P) 
Speaker State Hearer State Authority Act 
bel(S fP) bel(H poss(fP)) - hedged accept 
auth(S, P) question 
authority 
auth(H, P) evade 
bel(H fP) accept 
bel(H pP) - dispute 
auth(S, P) challenge 
auth(H, P) correct/inform 
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represented in surface form as something like: I don't have to do 
P looks more appropriate as a response to something rather than a 
leading statement. In terms of the pairing notion that is being 
developed, it appears to fit better in the secondary position. 
When examining the deontic operator f, I shall assume that it 
refers either to something being forbidden (fP) as in You are not 
allowed to be in this room and the doing of something that is 
forbidden as in: You are not allowed to enter this room. Hence, if 
the speaker communicates the cognitive state: bel(S fP) and is an 
authority over P matters, it is assumed that an act of forbidding 
is taking place. When considering this particular cognitive state, 
it is important to examine three possibilities with respect to 
authority. The first is that neither party is an authority with 
respect to P in which case the speaker is effectively 
asserting/informing the hearer that P is forbidden. If the speaker 
is an authority on P matters, then the speaker forbids the hearer. 
If the hearer is an authority with respect to P matters, then the 
speaker is effectively asking a question here. There are a wide 
range of possible responses by the hearer to the presupposed 
cognitive state bel(S fP), although some of them are rather 
bizarre. Firstly, the case where the hearer believes that it is 
possible that P is forbidden, where neither party is in a position 
of authority, is no different from the case with P. The hearer 
accepts the possibility that P is forbidden, hence it is a form of 
hedged acceptance. For example: 
(45) A: I believe it is now illegal for children not to wear 
safety belts in the rear of cars. 
(46) B: Oh, yes, I think you may be right. 
When the speaker is an authority with respect to P matters, then 
we have a rather strange form of defiance. Whereas, if the hearer 
is an authority with respect to P, then the response is seen as 
evasive and in fact the expressed cognitive state is infelicitous 
because being an authority with respect to P the hearer can be 
assumed to know whether P is forbidden or not. 
The case where the hearer believes that it is necessarily the 
case that P is forbidden is also odd. If the hearer accepts that P 
is forbidden, then the necessity of P being forbidden doesn't 
appear important. 
For the next case: bel(H -necc(fP)) we must make the 
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distinction between it not necessarily being the case that P is 
forbidden and the hearer believing that it is not necessary for 
the speaker to perform the act of forbidding. The cognitive state 
given above describes the former rather than latter case. This 
case is unusual, but not impossible. 
The two cases involving the operator of obligation (bel(H 
0(fP)) and bel(H '-0(fP)) ) although theoretically possible don't 
appear to be important. 
When the hearer believes that fP this forms an acceptance of 
the speaker's expressed state: 
(47) A: I'm sorry but you are not permitted to go in there. 
(48) B: Oh, sorry, I didn't know. 
B accepts that P is forbidden, while expressing the fact that this 
was not known to him. 
If the hearer believes that P is permitted, then this amounts 
to a dispute if neither party is in a position of authority with 
respect to P. Where the hearer is an authority with respect to P 
it acts as a correction, and where the speaker is an authority 
with respect to P it becomes a challenge of authority. The more 
important cases for the speaker state: bel(S fP) are summarised in 
table 4.3. 
The last case that I shall consider is the one in which the 
speaker communicates the cognitive state: bel(S pP). Once again 
this is very dependent upon who is considered to be an authority 
on P matters. If we consider first of all, _ 
the responses by the 
hearer involving the modal operators: the hearer state bel(H 
poss(pP)) only appears to be plausible if neither party is an 
authority with respect to P matters. For example: 
(49) A: I think I can go into the red lane. 
(50) B: Yes, perhaps you can. 
The case: bel(H -poss(pP)) seems to be of no significance. The two 
operators: necc and -necc combined with pP look very unlikely. The 
only other operators that are of any significance are fP and pP. 
The hearer state: bel(H fP) leads to a dispute if neither party is 
in a position of authority with respect to P. 
(51) A: I think I can go into the red lane. 
(52) B: No you can't, that's for buses only. 
When the speaker is in a position of authority, it acts as a 
challenge to his authority. When the hearer is in a position of 
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authority with respect to P the response by the hearer acts as a 
correction. 
The relationships of the cognitive state: bel(S pP) are 
summarised in figure 4.4. 
Having examined in some detail the ramifications of the state 
expressed by the speaker, bel(S xP) I shall now consider another 
major category; namely that in which the speaker uses a different 
epistemic operator, want. 
The most common form of this arises when the speaker wants 
the hearer to do something or wants a state to come about. These 
may be described as: want(S do(H P)) and want(S P) respectively. 
Note that in this case no operators on do(H P) or P are 
meaningful. It is not meaningful for the speaker to want it to be 
obligatory that the hearer does P. Nor would it be meaningful for 
the speaker to want it to be necessary that the hearer does P. The 
speaker may want the hearer to make P possible, but in this case, 
what the speaker wants is for the hearer to do Q in order to make 
P possible. 
The expressed cognitive state: want(S do(H P)) occurs in 
directives such as request, order etc. These speech acts are 
normally realised by interrogatives and Wh-questions. 
Consider first the case where the speaker utters a surface 
form expressing the cognitive state: want(S do(H P)) (lets call it 
a request). The hearer states with respect to this state can be 
compound, for example, the hearer may want to do P and be able to 
do P, but first I shall consider the simple cases. If the hearer 
is willing to do P then this can be expressed as: will(do(H P)). 
In this case, the hearer has accepted the speaker's want and will 
carry it out. The hearer may also not want to do P in this case, 
if this is expressed directly, it serves as a refusal. 
If the hearer expresses the state: bel(H poss(will(do(H P)))) 
then this acts as a tentative acceptance (note that bel(H 
poss(do(H P))) means soiething different, it means that it is 
possible for the hearer to do P-a necessary pre-condition for 
the hearer to do P). If the hearer expresses the state: bel(H 
-poss(do(H P))), then it serves as a refusal of the speaker's 
request. 
If the hearer expresses the state: bel(H necc(do(H P))) then 
it is a statement that the hearer was going to do P anyway. The 
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Table 4.4 The Structural Relationships of the State bel(S pP) 
Speaker State 
bel(S pP) 
Hearer State 
bel(h poss(pP)) 
bel(H fP) 
bel(H pP) accept 
Table 4.5 Possible hearer Responses to want(S do(H P)) 
Speaker State Hearer State 
want(S do(H P)) will(do(H P)) 
-want(do(H P)) 
bel(H poss(will(do(H P)))) 
bel(H -poss(do(H P))) 
bel(H necc(do(H P))) 
bel(H -O(do(H P))) 
Authority Act 
- hedged agreement 
- dispute 
auth(S, P) challenge 
auth(H, P) correction 
Act 
accept 
refuse 
tentative 
acceptance 
decline 
statement 
refuse/ grant 
favour 
bel(H f(do(H P))) refuse 
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case bel(H O(do(H P))) is rather odd as an expressed cognitive 
state, it is more likely that the hearer would either make a 
commitment to do P, by expressing the cognitive state: bel(H 
will(do(H P))) or state that he was not going to do P. 
The case bel(H -O(do(H P))) comes about when the hearer feels 
that he is under no obligation to do P. It may have one of two 
outcomes: firstly the hearer by stating he is under no obligation 
to do P effectively refuses to grant the request. Secondly, the 
hearer says he will do it anyway, but perhaps sees it as a favour. 
The response bel(H p(do(H P))) appears to be irrelevant, but 
bel(H f(do(H P))) is important because it can be used as a reason 
for not doing P. The responses to the request are summarised in 
table 4.5. 
The final case that I shall consider is when the speaker 
promises to do P. In this case, the speaker is expressing two 
states: firstly O(do(S P)) that he is under an obligation to do P 
and secondly that he will do P- will(do(S P)). This form of 
speech act is in the class that Searle calls commissives, so it is 
worth examining. 
It is possible for the hearer to believe that P (i. e. that P 
has been carried out already) in which case the hearer's response 
would be a statement to that effect. The belief by the hearer that 
the speaker will do P can be taken as the default case (we assume 
that if someone says that they will do something that they will do 
it). 
If the hearer believes that it is possible for the speaker to 
do P (bel(H poss(do(S P))))) this is a necessary precondition for 
the hearer to believe that the speaker will do P. On the other 
hand, if the hearer believes that it is not possible for the 
speaker to do P his response may be either to state that it is so, 
or to perhaps question the felicity of the speaker. 
The case: bel(H necc(do(S P))) seems odd. On the other hand 
the case: bel(H -necc(do(S P))) if expressed by the hearer 
indicates that the hearer regards the speaker's promise as a 
favour (assuming that what was promised was good for the hearer). 
The state: bel(H 0(do(S P))) seems superfluous as does bel(H 
p(do(S P))) but bel(H -O(do(S P))) is similar to the case for 
-necc. If the hearer believes that P is forbidden, he may either 
say so or remain silent. 
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Finally, the hearer may believe that the speaker will not do 
P. In which case the hearer simply does not believe the speaker. 
4.4 Discourse Pairs and Cognitive States 
Having analysed the relationships between various presupposed 
cognitive states in some detail, it is now time to restate what 
the objective of this exercise actually is. 
The central part of the thesis is that each (communicative) 
speech act (with some possible exceptions) effectively expresses a 
cognitive state. It is this expressed state that shapes the 
response by the hearer. This acts as a form of bonding between the 
utterance pair, so that the first part in some way constrains the 
second part. 
The idea of speech act pairs linked by these states forms a 
rival theory to the theory of adjacency pairs. It also has 
distinct first parts and second parts which must be uttered by 
different speakers. The parts (with some notable exceptions) must 
be adjacent, and finally certain responses are preferred over 
others. 
One question that has not been adequately addressed is the 
situation where two speech acts are adjacent, but the second 
although relevant to the first does not directly relate to it. In 
the example, 
(53) A: I hate Mahler's works. 
(54) B: So do I. 
B's response relates directly to A's initial utterance, because it 
is effectively saying: Yes, I hate Mahler's works too. Contrast 
this with: 
(55) A: I hate Mahler's works. 
(56) B: Ah, but have you heard his Ruckert Lieder? 
B's response is relevant to A's initial utterance but does not 
relate to it directly (although the hearer may indirectly be 
expressing -bel(H P)). The distinction between responses that 
relate directly to the previous utterance and those that are 
relevant but do not relate directly is in some cases a fine one. 
However it is not crucial to the theory that this distinction can 
be made. When a response is relevant but does not relate directly 
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to the previous utterance, then it may be decoded correctly by 
observance of discourse markers used with it. Preferred responses 
tend not to be marked, but dis-preferred options are marked in 
various ways. For example: Yes, but ... indicates that the hearer 
acknowledges the speaker's viewpoint but does not agree with it. I 
consider a detailed study of the use of markers is beyond the 
scope of this work. 
These findings give rise to several points and questions that 
need to be discussed further. Firstly it should be made clear that 
the cognitive states themselves are not speech acts. Given that 
there are several existing speech act taxonomies, I have refrained 
from attempting another such listing of speech act verbs. Many 
(but not all) speech acts lead to the expression of a cognitive 
state, such as a speaker belief or want and this constrains the 
response that can be made by the hearer. In this way it is 
possible to build a larger structure from a simple unit. For 
example if the speaker expresses the state: bel(S P) and the 
hearer makes a response that expresses the state: bel(H P) then we 
might call this an agreement (note that the hearer's response may 
only be something like Mm or Yes). On the other hand, if the 
speaker expresses the state: bel(S P) and the hearer expresses the 
state: -bel(H P) then we might call this structure a dispute. The 
dispute is the foundation for an argument (Schiffrin 1987). So by 
linking speech acts via cognitive states we can describe larger 
discourse units. Note that certain of these larger discourse units 
are more desirable than others. For example, it is generally 
considered better to form an agreement than it is to have a 
dispute. 
Another case that is potentially more serious arises out of 
the expressed state: want(S do(H P)). The hearer may not want to 
do P (-want(H do(H P))). This gives rise to what Leech (1983) 
calls will flouting and is generally considered to be undesirable. 
In Chapter Six, I describe this further using such conflicts as 
the basis of a theory of, indirect speech acts. There are other 
questions that arise from this idea of grouping speech acts in 
this way: 
1. Assuming that the acts are actually speech acts, then 
given some speech act Si with an adjacent related speech 
act S2, then if that speech act S2 has an adjacent 
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related speech act S3, is it possible to infer the 
sequence Si --> S2 --> S3 ? In other words, can we impose 
a greater structure than merely relational pairs? 
This may be possible, as an analysis of actual discourse 
suggests that the simple idea of speaker initiation 
followed by hearer response needs to be extended 
somewhat. For example, the speaker may not only make an 
utterance with propositional content Pi, but may also 
follow this up with a further utterance P2. This may be 
extended indefinitely, but the speaker often indicates 
when he is about to end this sequence (one marker that 
tends to be used for this is so). For example: 
(57) Coz there's no bag meeting. So I though it'll be an 
opportunity for me to do it. 
Another example of where the simple pairing idea might be 
extended would be cases in which for example a dispute leads 
rise to an argument. In this case further speech act pairs 
are functionally related to the first pair (as supporting 
evidence for the claim and counter-claim). 
2. The acts that have been described do not match exact 
speech act categories. An issue that is important is why it 
is for example that, a question is accepted as a speech act, 
but an answer is not. The reason that this has come about may 
be because it is possible to link a question to a certain 
type of surface form (interrogative), whereas answers may 
come in many different forms. For example, no is a perfectly 
acceptable answer as is Its in the box behind you and Did you 
look in the box? as well as: I'll look in the box. All of 
these might be answers to the question Do you know where the 
newspaper is? (i. e. Can you find the newspaper for me - 
want(S do(H P))). According to my theory, all three answers 
relate directly to do(H P); in the first case the hearer 
provides the speaker with the information necessary to do P, 
in the second the hearer intimates that there is a 
possibility of P. In the third he states that he will carry 
out some action that might lead to P being achieved. The 
variety of answers make much more sense when examined in 
terms of presupposed cognitive states in this way. 
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When a person A makes some utterance U with 
propositional content P, they are expressing some cognitive 
state about P, either explicitly or implicitly. When a person 
B makes a response, they must make a response that says 
something about P, and they do so either directly by making 
an utterance that relates to P or implicitly relates to P by 
the relevance relationship, in which case B's attitude to P 
is marked linguistically. (The exception here is where a new 
topic is introduced, but this is heavily marked also). The 
reason that this pairing is not more obvious is that in 
making a response to P, B may not only implicitly accept or 
reject P but may also include in his utterance the 
expression of a cognitive state about some new proposition 
Pi. On the basis of this analysis, we can then divide speech 
acts into primary speech acts and secondary speech acts. 
Primary speech acts serve to introduce a new proposition into 
the context, and secondary speech acts are used as a response 
to an established proposition within the context. Primary and 
secondary speech acts do not need to be adjacent within 
discourse and furthermore, a secondary speech act need only 
be marked, perhaps by stress or the use of a discourse 
marker. 
3. Since, not all speech act verbs have been analysed, the 
question arises how if at all do the other speech act verbs 
fit in to the structures described above? Also, some thought 
must be given to where exactly expressives fit in, in 
addition to those speech acts that I have named as formal. 
Firstly, many of the performative speech acts such as: 
declare, excommunicate, baptise etc. clearly have no place in 
a theory of discourse structure. We don't suddenly launch 
into a marriage ce: _emony in the middle of a conversation. 
Expressives appear to fit in just about everywhere. We can 
start off a conversational pair (primary position) with an 
expressive: 
(58) I love Shostakovich's Tahiti Trot, its so witty. 
Or they may appear in the secondary position: 
(59) A: Do you know Shostakovich's Tahiti Trot? 
(60) B: I love it, its so witty. 
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There is another class of speech act that I have called 
formal: some of these acts are concerned with "changes in 
knowledge state". For example, if I inform, then I am 
discharging a duty to let someone know about something, after 
which everyone may assume that they are in possession of this 
information. If I warn someone about something, then I have 
fulfilled my obligation to let them know that if they 
proceed with their course of action, then something bad may 
come of it. These acts do not express cognitive states, they 
express information in a way that an assumption can then be 
made that the recipient of this information may be assumed to 
be in possession of it. They are in a sense declarative in 
that they make a change to the world. Such acts make most 
sense in the primary position. 
From the idea of there being a primary speech act and a 
secondary speech act that go together to form a pair, I 
pointed out that traditional pairs such as question/answer 
fit into this scheme and the reason that answer is not 
regarded as a speech act type is that it is a generic term 
for a whole set of speech acts that form an answer to a 
question. Further, if we consider the question/answer pair in 
terms of presupposed cognitive states, then it is possible to 
define a formal relationship between the two parts of the 
pair that enable us to precisely define an answer in relation 
to a question. 
Going through the main speech act verbs briefly, 
Wierzbicka (1987) groups them into 37 main groupings and I 
shall briefly examine some of these groupings. The first set 
is the order group, containing order, command, demand, etc. 
These speech act verbs appear to be mostly primary, i. e. they 
would occupy the first slot in the speech act pair. The ask 
group containing ask, request, implore etc. are also likely 
to be primary. The forbid group, containing speech act verbs 
such as forbid, decline, refuse may be primary, but could 
also be secondary. In fact many of them such as refuse 
or decline occupy the secondary slot more often. The permit 
group including permit, allow, accept etc. also tend to be 
more used in the secondary position. 
Wierzbicka also gives a grouping called the argue 
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group, this consists of verbs that are not speech acts at 
all, but name structures. For example, dispute only occurs as 
a secondary and tends to occur after an assertion. Thus in 
order to describe an argument, we may start with A: asserts 
P. In response, B: asserts that not P. B has disputed A's 
stance, but merely asserting not P is not in itself a 
dispute. This tends to explain why surface form is more 
important for some types of speech act than other. After this 
sequence, the exchange could be described as a dispute. If A 
then defends his position, we have an argument. All the verbs 
given in Wierzbicka's argue group are either larger 
structures such as argue or name secondary position speech 
acts such as disag: _ee. Another group that tends to name 
mostly secondary acts is the reprimand group, including verbs 
such as reprove and rebuke. There are many other groups in 
Wierzbicka's list, however the point is that she has 
attempted to group together speech act verbs that share 
certain properties, and these groupings tend to yield verbs 
which are either mostly primary or mostly secondary. 
4. What about meta-speech acts (introduced briefly above)? 
What exactly are they and what are the rules for their usage? 
A meta-speech act, as the term suggests is a speech 
act about a speech act. This idea comes from the idea of 
meta-plans (Litman 1985). Instead of the normal sequence of: 
A: s1P 
B: s2P 
where sl and s2 denote states of P, described in terms of 
epistemic, modal or deontic operators, a meta-speech act 
refers more directly to the speech act itself. For example, 
consider a typical insertion sequence: 
(61) A: Where do you keep the spanners? 
(62) B: Do you mean for the car? 
(63) A: Yes. 
(64) B: Under the stairs. 
Here there are two questions and two answers, except that 
question (1) is paired with answer (4) and question (2) is 
paired with answer (3). There is no problem for the theory 
here. (1) is a speech act forming a question. (2) is a meta- 
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speech act of request for clarification. (3) provides the 
answer to the meta-act and (4) an answer to the main 
question. For this reason, insertion sequences are no problem 
for the theory. 
Litman (1985, p. 28) describes meta-plans as plans about 
plans and states that they deal with introducing plans, 
executing plans, specifying parts of plans, abandoning plans 
etc. In the same way meta-speech acts deal with clarifying 
speech acts, modifying speech acts or in some way forcing the 
speaker to change part of the utterance. In the sequence 
given above, 2) is a meta-speech act which is an attempt to 
obtain clarification. It is this idea of a speech act 
relating speech act that enables us to explain insertion 
sequences. 
4.5 The Thesis Restated 
In the last section, several ideas were introduced which need 
to be pulled together. The cognitive state theory builds on the 
inferential theory of Bach and Harnish (1979) described in Chapter 
Three. The work of this chapter seeks to explain sequencing of 
speech acts within a discourse structure. It does this by using a 
relevance relationship between adjacent speech acts, and also 
describes how certain cognitive states can be used to explain a 
form of pairing between speech acts that relate to the same 
proposition. In Chapter Three I described several speech act verbs 
in terms of an action (not specified in detail yet) that allowed 
the speaker somehow to arrive at the right sort of utterance and a 
set of cognitive states that acted as preconditions. It became 
clear in this chapter that the cognitive states could be 
classified under three different headings. Firstly there were 
those that effectively justified the speaker uttering a certain 
speech act. Secondly there were cognitive states that allowed the 
speaker to predict the sort of response that might be made by the 
hearer, and thirdly there were cognitive states that were 
communicated to the hearer (either directly or indirectly). 
Having described speech act verbs in this way and forgetting 
about formal speech acts and expressives, it is still possible to 
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live with the framework provided by Searle, i. e. assertives, 
directives and commissives and give an account of these in terms 
of cognitive states: 
i) Assertives - speech acts in which the Speaker makes 
public his knowledge or belief about some proposition. 
ii) Directives - speech acts in which the Speaker makes 
public his wants or needs. 
iii) Commissives - speech acts in which the Speaker makes 
public his intentions. 
I have no wish to draw up long lists of verbs to fit into these 
categories, save to point out that there would be some migration 
from Searle's lists. e. g. permit is looked upon as an assertive in 
my scheme. 
Many speech act verbs such as agree, rebut etc. serve a dual 
function in my scheme, they are not names of speech acts in their 
own right but name an action that takes place relative to another 
speech act. For example if the speaker asserts that P, the hearer 
may agree with the speaker's assertion. Thus agree may on the 
surface appear to be an assertive, which form-wise it is, but it 
names a position and an action relative to another speech act. 
Answer can be described in the same way. 
At the level of discourse where speech acts are relevant, 
speech acts may be connected by a relevance relation, which was 
not thought to be sufficiently restrictive to allow meaningful 
analysis of the possibilities between speech acts, except to state 
that in uttering a speech act with a relevance relationship to the 
previous speech act, an acceptance or rejection of the previous 
speech act is implied. On the other hand when two adjacent speech 
acts relate to the same proposition it is possible to describe 
this exchange pair in terms of primary and secondary speech acts. 
The primary speech act is the leading speech act in the pair, 
which serves to constrain the secondary speech act which acts as a 
response to the primary speech act. So at the lowest levels of 
discourse structure, speech acts may be paired. At higher levels 
of discourse, speech acts are not thought to be useful as a means 
of describing discourse structure. 
This approach gives a basis for explaining the relational 
elements of speech acts and at the same time describing how speech 
acts fit into discourse structure. The picture is complicated by 
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meta-speech acts, which act as speech act clarifying or correcting 
speech acts. 
Having presented this theory in terms of existing speech act 
theory, it would be interesting to also examine it in terms of 
discourse structure. The question then is how does the pairing 
notion of speech acts fit in with a theory of discourse structure 
such as the one described by Sinclair and Coulthard? 
The Sinclair and Coulthard model of discourse structure was 
described in Chapter Two and consisted of a hierarchical level 
going down from lessons to acts, which were not necessarily 
identifiable with speech acts. At the level of moves, one level up 
from acts, they describe a sequence consisting of an initiation 
move followed by a response move with an optional feedback move. 
This structure is not out of the line with the speech act model 
described above. The primary speech act would act as the 
initiation move and the secondary speech act would act as the 
response. According to Burton (1981), the feedback part of the 
structure is missing from open dialogue (as opposed to classroom 
dialogue studied by Sinclair and Coulthard), and this is broadly 
in line with the ideas presented here. 
It is fairly easy to see why, in a classroom situation there 
might be an additional move attached to the initiation response 
pair. So the structure presented is not greatly out of line with 
existing theories of discourse. Of course, at higher levels in the 
hierarchy, speech acts have no direct role to play. 
It is also possible to equate the speech act pairing idea 
with the adjacency pair which is at the heart of the 
conversational analysis model. Schegloff and Sacks (1973) defined 
an adjacency pair as a sequence of two utterances That are: 
i) adjacent 
ii) produced by different speakers 
iii) ordered as a first paßt and a second part 
iv) typed, so that a particular first part requires a 
particular second part. 
The speech act pairing theory also fulfils these criteria. 
Firstly the primary and secondary speech acts form a sequence of 
two utterances which are adjacent. They may of course be separated 
by meta-speech acts (insertion sequences). Secondly, they are 
produced by different speakers. Thirdly they are ordered as a 
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first part and a second part, because there is a primary and a 
secondary position. Finally, they are typed because certain 
primaries require certain secondaries. The speech act pairing 
theory also provides some explanation for preferred (and 
dispreferred seconds). 
Conversational analysis also attempted to provide an 
alternative theory of indirect speech acts. In Chapter Six, I 
shall examine indirect speech acts and pull them into the 
framework described in this chapter. The theory of indirect speech 
acts will rest partly on the notion that certain pairings of 
cognitive states are undesirable (for example: bel(S P) and -bel(H 
P) or want(S do(H P)) and -want(H do(H P))) and that many indirect 
speech acts help to prevent disputes from arising. 
In Chapter Five, I shall consider the relationship between 
speech act and surface form, concentrating on common sentence form 
and speech act type and the relationship between the alethic and 
deontic modal logics used in this chapter and modal auxiliaries 
used in language itself. 
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5. From Speech Act to Utterance 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described how cognitive state elements 
can be used to pair speech acts together and in doing so provide a 
theory for the integration of speech acts and discourse structure 
in terms of sequencing and relevance relationships. 
The aim of this chapter is to look at surface forms and their 
linguistic components to firstly describe how a surface form might 
be chosen for a particular speech act, and secondly to look for 
evidence to support the theory described in the previous chapter. 
In Chapter Four, I put forward the idea that it is possible 
to relate speech acts because of the presupposed cognitive states. 
The speaker in uttering something expresses a belief, want, or 
intention and the hearer in turn must respond to this cognitive 
state. This gives us some idea of why for example there is a set 
of responses to a question. In this chapter, I propose to try to 
relate the cognitive states to actual linguistic forms. This will 
consist of two parts, firstly, an examination of sentence types 
and their possible relationship to cognitive states, and secondly 
an examination of modal auxiliaries and their relationship to the 
modal and deontic operators that have been used in the earlier 
chapters. 
In carrying out this exercise, I am accepting that it is at 
best an incomplete analysis. However the main point to be put 
forward is that certain speech acts may be considered to be "base 
types" because their definition is bound up with a particular 
sentence type. For example, it is possible in principle to make a 
distinction between an assertion and a request by surface form, 
because an assertion is made using the declarative sentence form, 
whereas a request is made, at least directly, using the 
interrogative sentence form. I suggest that base type (or 
primitive) speech acts should correspond to basic sentence types. 
This will lead to taxonomy of speech acts of sorts, but the main 
point is that by uttering a sentence in the declarative form, the 
speaker knows that it will not be interpreted as for example, a 
request (once again, in its direct interpretation). The same 
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applies to an interrogative sentence, which is not going to be 
interpreted as an assertion (I shall consider the case of so 
called declarative questions in this section). 
The same could not be said of a speech act type such as 
boast. This is not dependent upon it being realised by a 
particular sentence type (although boasts normally employ 
declaratives they do not have to, for example: Do you know where I 
might buy a good second hand Rolls Royce?, may seem to be a rather 
vulgar expression of wealth to someone of more modest means). 
Furthermore, the distinction between a boast and a statement say 
is highly sensitive to context and cultural considerations in a 
way that the distinction between an assertion and a request is 
not. Leech (1983) gives an example of two Japanese ladies 
discussing the garden of one of them: 
(1) A: You have a beautifully kept garden. 
(2) B: Oh no, not at all, the lawn is very untidy. 
A response of the form: 
(3) B: Well, we try to keep it looking neat. 
might be acceptable in Britain, but in Japanese society it would 
be regarded as boasting. 
I suggest that a speech act such as boast is not so much an 
assertion that uses pride as a mode of achievement, thus entailing 
assert, but is rather an assertion that contravenes a pragmatic 
maxim (perhaps Leech's maxim of modesty (Leech op. cit. )). 
The second part of this section will be concerned with an 
examination of modal auxiliaries and their possible relationship 
to the modal and deontic operators used in previous chapters. 
Another part of this theory is that it includes an idea very 
similar to preference organisation used in conversational analysis 
to determine the most suitable second part to some first part of 
an adjacency pair. This necessarily would include an analysis of 
discourse markers, which is a highly specialised topic, which I 
have chosen to omit, although, the use of discourse markers is 
noted in Appendix I, which includes a section on a possible 
discourse grammar based on speech acts and discourse markers. 
Having examined sentence forms and modal auxiliaries, I then 
briefly discuss speech act taxonomies. 
In the final part of this chapter, I proposed a speech act 
generation schema, which is based on the speech act recognition 
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schema of Bach and Harnish (1979), except that it is intended to 
serve as a framework for explaining how a surface form is chosen 
for a particular speech act. This is incomplete, as it excludes 
indirect speech acts which will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
If speech act theory is to be regarded as valid, then there 
ought to be some evidence in grammatical structure to support it. 
For example, if there are three basic categories of speech act 
then perhaps there ought to be three basic types of sentence 
structure. According to Quirk et al. (1973) there are four basic 
types of sentence, namely: declarative statements, interrogatives, 
commands (note: Quirk et al. prefer command as a sentence type, 
rather than imperative, a--id it is used as a sentence type here and 
not as a speech act verb) and exclamatory statements. 
In declarative statements the subject is always present (with 
the exception of certain elliptical statements), and it generally 
precedes the verb, for example: 
(4) John saw Mary through the telescope. 
Questions are sentences that are marked by one or more of the 
following devices: 
i) The auxiliary is placed immediately before the subject. 
ii) The positioning at the beginning of an interrogative or 
wh-element. 
iii) The use of rising intonation. 
Examples of these are: 
(5a) Will John leave today? 
(5b) Who will leave today? 
(5c) John will leave today? 
Commands are sentences that generally have no subject and whose 
verb is in the imperative form: 
(6) Leave this instant. 
Finally, exclamatory statements are sentences which have an 
initial phrase that is introduced by what or how: 
(7) What a noise they are making. 
Comparing these forms with speech acts, we can roughly equate 
declaratives to assertives, interrogatives can be equated to 
questions or requests and commands may be equated to certain 
speech act verbs such as command, order etc. Exclamatory 
statements on the other hand appear to be half way 
between 
assertives and questions, although they seem to 
function more like 
assertives. 
-159- 
5.2 The Four Basic Sentence Types 
Quirk et al. (op. cit. p. 166) give seven basic clausal forms: 
i) SVA (subject verb adverbial): John is in the house. 
ii) SVC (subject verb complement): John is kind. 
iii) SVO (subject verb object): John met Mary. 
iv) SVOA (subject verb object adverbial): John met Mary at 
the dance. 
v) SVOC (subject verb object complement): John held the 
book tightly. 
vi) SVOO (subject verb object object): John gave Mary the 
book. 
vii) SV (subject verb): John laughed. 
Of the elements used above, the ones that are significant for 
speech act identification are subject, verb and object. The subject 
is important because it denotes whether the speaker is referring 
to himself, the hearer or someone or something else. The verb is 
important in many aspects; for instance, the type of verb may be 
significant, tense is also significant and auxiliary verbs seem to 
be of particular importance, so much so that they will be given an 
extensive analysis. 
The second sentence category is the interrogative form which 
can be subdivided into three classes: 
i) Yes/No questions: which expect only affirmation or 
rejection as a response. 
ii) Wh-questions that expect an item of information to be 
supplied. 
iii) Alternative questions that supply two or more options to 
be chosen from. 
Yes/No questions are usually formed by putting the operator before 
the subject and using a rising intonation. e. g. Has the train 
left? Yes/No questions may also have a positive or negative 
orientation, in other words it can be biased towards a positive or 
negative answer. For example: Has the train left already? 
indicates that the speaker thinks the answer is yes but is seeking 
confirmation. On the other hand a question such as: Can't you 
drive straight? could be restated as: I thought you were able to, 
but obviously you can't. In this way, it acts as a combination of 
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an old assumption (that you can drive) with a new assertion (that 
you cannot). If question as a speech act category is a fixed 
structure as suggested in Searle's theory, then it is difficult to 
explain why there are different surface forms such as yes/no 
questions with positive/negative orientation, on the other hand 
this dichotomy poses no problem for the cognitive state approach. 
Because, by using a form where the speaker expresses his belief 
that -P having previously believed P as in a form like: Can't you 
drive straight? it is possible not only to give an illocutionary 
force, but also give some indication of the presupposed cognitive 
states. 
Yes/No orientation questions allow the speaker to express his 
own belief while at the same time seek confirmation of it. A 
question with a positive orientation might be paraphrased as: I 
believe that P, am I correct? 
Another form of question is the tag question which consists 
of operator plus pronoun, with or without a negative particle, for 
example: The train has left, hasn't it? 
Here there is a crossing of positive and negative in that if 
the superordinate clause is positive then the tag is negative and 
vice versa. The use of tag questions is quite subtle and there are 
four identifiable forms: 
i) Positive + Negative with rising tone. 
e. g. He likes his work, d6esn't he? 
(positive assumption + neutral expectation) 
ii) Positive + Negative with falling tone. 
e. g. He likes his work, doesn't he? 
(negative assumption + neutral expectation) 
iii) Negative + Positive with rising tone. 
e. g. He doesn't like his work, d6es he? 
(positive assumption + positive expectation) 
iv) Negative + Positive with falling tone. 
e. g. He doesn't like his work, dries he? 
(negative assumption + negative expectation) 
The meaning of i) is: I assume he likes his work, am I right? 
The meaning of ii) on the other hand is: I assume he doesn't like 
his work, am I right? There is a similar contrast between iii) and 
iv). 
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There is also an exceptional type of yes/no question called a 
declarative question, e. g. You've got it with you ? It is 
identical to a declarative sentence except that it uses a final 
rising intonation. Additionally there are a set of yes/no 
questions that operate with modal auxiliaries, but these will be 
examined when I look at modal verbs. 
The next group of questions are wh-questions which are formed 
with the aid of an interrogative or Q-word: who/whom, whose, what, 
which, when, where, how, why. Alternative questions may either 
resemble yes/no questions, for example: 
(8) Would you like pizza or spaghetti? 
or a wh-question, for example: 
(9) Which type would you like, chocolate, vanilla or 
raspberry? 
There are two other minor types of questions: exclamatory 
questions and rhetorical questions. Exclamatory questions 
generally invite the hearer's response to something that the 
speaker feels strongly about. e. g. 
(10) Wasn't it noisy in there. 
The next major category of sentence forms are commands. The 
most common category of command differs from a statement in that 
it has no subject and has an imperative verb. It may be noteworthy 
that modal auxiliaries do not occur at all in commands. Commands 
may be toned down by politeness markers such as please. The 
subject is usually implied in the meaning of a command and so is 
absent except in a few cases, such as: 
(11) You, be quiet! 
or 
(12)Somebody close the door. 
A first person imperative can be achieved by placing let in front 
and adding the subject: Let me see. Negative commands may be 
achieved by adding don't onto the front of the sentence: Don't go! 
Do may be used to create what Quirk et. al. call persuasive 
imperatives: 
(13) Do have another glass. 
Finally, there are two categories of sentence that are worth 
mentioning: firstly exclamations, which resemble wh-questions in 
their initial placement of a wh-operator, except that there is 
generally no subject-operator inversion: 
-162- 
(14) What a lot of people we met! 
The second category is what Quirk et al. (op. cit. p. 203) call 
formulae: there are certain irregular wh- questions such as: 
(15) What about the house? 
There are also some irregular exclamatory types and additionally 
some forms that still employ archaic elements such as: 
(16) Suffice it to say we lost. 
The point of this survey is to identify the basic sentential 
structures and to see whether it is possible to match speech act 
types onto them. 
The evidence that I am seeking in this chapter is threefold: 
firstly to see whether it is possible to match basic speech act 
types onto sentential structures and possibly to be able to 
explain in terms of speech act theory why the range of sentential 
structures exists. Secondly, I hope to be able to show how the 
various cognitive operators are communicated, here, for instance, 
a study of modal auxiliaries will be necessary. Thirdly I will be 
looking for linguistic evidence to support the view that 
acceptance or rejection of propositions is in some way marked. 
This section should ideally involve an examination of discourse 
markers, however for reasons mentioned previously, I decided that 
such an examination would extend the thesis beyond reasonable 
limits. 
5.3 Speech Acts and Sentential Structure 
In this section, I will concentrate on interrogatives, wh- 
questions and commands, leaving declaratives until the next 
section when I will consider the role modal auxiliaries have to 
play. If we consider simple yes-no questions first of all, then 
clearly the speaker wants to know something, hence the underlying 
cognitive state might be: want(S know(S P)). However there are 
more complex forms that have to be considered. Quirk et al. (op. 
cit. p. 192) consider questions with positive or negative 
orientation. A question has a positive orientation, when it has 
what Quirk et al. call an assertive form. An example is the use of 
a quantifier that suggests 'at least one' rather than 'some or 
none'. For example, someone gives a question a positive bias 
whereas anyone remains neutral. For example: 
(17) Did anyone come last night? 
(18) Did someone com' last night? 
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(17) remains neutral, whe. eas (18) has a positive orientation. The 
explanation for questions with a positive orientation in terms of 
cognitive states is fairly simple. If the speaker believes that P 
might be the case, i. e. bel(S poss(P)) and wants to know for 
certain that P is the case, then it seems natural to phrase the 
question by using positive orientation. In other words, the 
speaker is effectively saying, I think that P might be true, but I 
want to know for sure. The advantage of using positive orientation 
is firstly that it seeks agreement between speaker and hearer 
which is generally accepted to be a desirable state, secondly it 
provides the speaker with a surface form that explicitly 
acknowledges the hearer as an authority with respect to P matters. 
Negative orientation, on the other hand is more complex, as 
Quirk et al. (op. cit. p. 193) state, it implies that the speaker 
once believed that P was the case, but now has evidence that -P 
and wants to confirm it. In other words, the speaker once held the 
state: bel(S P) but now suspects that P may not be true and now 
holds the state: bel(S poss(-P)) and wants to confirm that -P is 
in fact true. Once again, there are good reasons for having such a 
surface form: the speaker seeks evidence to support a change in a 
cognitive state, tentatively putting forward his thesis and at the 
same time acknowledging the hearer as an authority on P matters 
A second form of negative orientation question combines not 
with positive orientation, e. g. Haven't you left yet? This is 
similar to forms that show disbelief. 
The next main category of interrogative is the tag question. 
Tag questions are also analysed by Sadock (1974). There are four 
main types(described above). Positive + negative with a rising 
tone is a reported assumption plus a question. e. g. You take 
sugar, don't you. In order to explain this in terms of cognitive 
states, we should consider the possibilities where the speaker 
believes that P is the case: 
i) I believe that P is the case, and I want you to know 
about it. (assert) 
ii) I know that P is the case, and I believe that you have 
to accept my ability to say this (state). 
iii) I know that P is the case, and I believe that it is my 
duty to tell you about it. (inform). 
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iv) I believe that P, but I know that it is something on 
which you are an authority, but you can tell me whether 
it is correct or not. (Tag question i). 
v) I believe that P, but I know that it is something on 
which you are an authority, so can you confirm that P? 
(Tag question iii). 
Tag question i), appears to be the case where the speaker 
believes that P is true, but knows that the hearer is an authority 
on P; thus it can be explained by a combination of belief and 
authority and is distinct from other cases. 
Tag question ii) is negative + positive with a rising tone, 
e. g. 
(19) You don't take sugar, do you? 
This means that the speaker believes that -P and wants to know 
whether it is the case or not. It is a negative form of tag 
question i). 
Tag question iii), on the other hand is made with the 
expectation that it will be confirmed. Epistemically, these are 
all distinct cases. 
Declarative questions e. g. You take sugar? appear to be very 
similar linguistically to type i) or type iii) tag questions and 
appear to be used where the answer is (assumed to be) a foregone 
conclusion. Wh- questions on the other hand are epistemically of 
the form want(S know ... . 
An interesting form is the exclamatory question, e. g. 
(20) Didn't she sing well! 
It invites the hearer's agreement to something that the speaker 
strongly believes in. What the speaker assumes is that bel(S P) 
and bel(S necc(bel H P)). An exclamatory question may act as a 
device to indicate that the speaker believes strongly in something 
and is seeking agreement, but not a negative response. In other 
words, by making an exclamatory statement the speaker is in effect 
saying: I believe strongly in this and it would be unwise for you 
to question it. It might be a means of avoiding disagreement, but 
there is also a certain dramatic effect of using exclamatory 
statements, for example: Didn't he do well has far more effect 
than the rather deadpan: He did that well. But this is an issue of 
stylistics rather than one of speech act theory. 
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The other major sentence category is the command (Quirk et 
al. op. cit. p. 200), of which the simplest form has no subject 
and an imperative verb. It is noteworthy that modal auxiliaries do 
not occur in imperative sentences, however commands may be toned 
down by the use of politeness markers, such as: 
(21) Please, shut the door. 
Commands serve epistemically to express wants of the speaker when 
it is assumed that the hearer will carry out an action which 
satisfies the want. 
Commands may have a subject in for example: 
(22) You, be quiet. 
They may also have a subject when they serve in the function that 
Sinclair and Coulthard call nomination, e. g. 
(23) You, at the back 
(teacher pointing to a pupil). Negative commands are formed by the 
use of don't, e. g. 
(24) Don't open the window. 
In addition to these forms, there are also persuasive imperatives, 
(listed as such by Quirk et al. (op. cit. p. 202), but they refer to 
the other sentence types in this category as commands) e. g. 
(25) Do go with us. 
This appears to function as an order without the element of 
authority, except that its primary use now appears to be a form of 
politeness where the speaker expresses a strong desire that the 
hearer perform some action, perhaps to indicate hospitality, e. g. 
(26) Do have another cointreau. 
Its use as a form of admonishment now seems rather archaic, e. g. 
(27) Do pipe down. 
This section is only a survey of surface forms, however some 
of the variety of for example interrogatives cannot satisfactorily 
be explained by a theory that thinks only of speech act verbs 
without an examination of the cognitive states underlying the 
corresponding acts. If we simply think of a speech act in terms of 
a verb, e. g. question, then this give no indication of why there 
are so many ways of asking questions nor how particular surface 
forms may be chosen to represent the question. The cognitive state 
theory, by examining a speech act, not just in terms of its 
illocutionary force, but also in terms of the cognitive states 
that are presupposed by the speech act can give us reasons for the 
range of basic sentence types. 
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5.4 Modal Auxiliaries and Cognitive States 
The cognitive state theory uses deontic and modal operators, 
hence modal auxiliaries are bound to be important as surface 
markers of cognitive states. However it is not easy to use them as 
evidence for the cognitive state theory for the simple reason that 
deontic and modal logic arose because of the existence of these 
verbs. Of course any theory of speech acts ought to be able to 
explain some of the variety of sentential structures, and one 
that includes an explanation of the existence (or requires the 
existence) of modal auxiliaries cannot be totally wrong. After 
all, if a theory only explains language usage in terms of lexical 
verbs, then it is missing something. The approach taken in this 
section will be to examine the modal auxiliaries semantically and 
the types of sentence structure in which they can appear in order 
to explain what sort of cognitive states they are conveying or 
signalling. It has been noted for example in the previous section 
that modals are missing from commands. 
Will 
The modal will may, according to some, be used to denote the 
future tense. Quirk et. al. (op. cit. p. 47) describe will as 
denoting a "colourless, neutral" future. However Boyd and Thorne 
(1969) state that there is no future tense in English and that the 
function of the modal will in sentences such as He will arrive 
tomorrow is to make a prediction. They also dissolve the habitual 
form of will into a simple habitual form, e. g. 
(28) She will cross her legs while reading. 
This is equivalent to the sentence She crosses her legs while 
reading. Quirk et al. (op. cit. p. 55) give four meanings for the 
modal will: 
i) Willingness. Used in polite requests, e. g., Will you 
have another cup of coffee? 
ii) Intention. Mainly used in the first person, e. g. I'll 
see you when I have time. 
iii) Insistence. e. g. He will keep going, whatever you say. 
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iv) Prediction. Quirk et al. define three forms of 
prediction: specific prediction, e. g. The hero will die 
in the last act. Timeless prediction, e. g. Aqua regia 
will dissolve gold. Habitual prediction, e. g. He will 
talk for hours if you don't stop him. 
Clearly, the person of the main verb plays some role in defining 
the meaning of the modal. Consider the sentence 
(29) I will help if you ask. 
and the variant forms 
(30) You will help if [he] asks. 
(31) He will help if you ask. 
The second person has a different meaning to the first and third 
person. In the first and third person the sentence appears to have 
the willingness interpretation, whereas in the second person it 
has the insistence meaning. The expression of intention occurs 
mainly in the first person, insistence however can occur for any 
person, e. g. I will speak my mind. You will leave immediately. He 
will keep going, whatever you say. Note that the difference 
between intention and insistence is denoted by stress on the 
modal, i. e. insistence in the first person is marked by stressing 
will. The differences in forms of prediction are of no importance 
for this study as the first and second denote the differences 
between a specific event and a universal law. 
There appears to be a linguistic difference between the use 
of will denoting intention and other uses. For other uses, it is 
possible to omit will and still arrive at the same meaning, 
whereas this is not the case for its use denoting intention. For 
example, it is possible to rephrase the polite request: 
(32) Will you have another cup of coffee? 
as 
(32a): Please have another cup of coffee? 
or its use to indicate prediction: 
(33a): The hero dies in the last act. 
(33b): Aqua regia dissolves gold. 
(33c): He talks for hours if not stopped. 
But when used to indicate intention, e. g. I'll see you when I have 
time., it cannot be re-phrased and still denote intention, neither 
it seems can the example of insistence given above. However it 
might be paraphrased as: 
-168- 
(34): He keeps going, whatever you happen to say. 
but the meaning seems slightly different. Insistence is arguably 
observed intention (i. e., I know that his intention is x). This 
suggests perhaps that the principal use of the modal will is to 
denote intention and that its other uses are secondary. 
Lyons (1977) suggested the notion of (future) tense as a 
modality, and this appears to make some sense when put in the 
context of a possible wo:: lds model. The operator poss refers to 
something being possible in a future world that is accessible from 
the current one. However will may describe an intention that 
something be true in a future world accessible from the current 
world. 
More importantly, from the point of view of speech act theory 
it is worth examining the operator will in conjunction with 
person. In the first person will denotes intention on the part of 
the speaker. In the third person however, it represents a 
prediction (but may also denote the habitual form). In the second 
person it denotes insistence. The cognitive states that these 
represent are: 
i) will (do (S, P) 
ii) will(do(H, P)) 
iii) will(do(x, P)) 
The first of these gives us no real problems, in stating that I 
will do P, I am making a commitment and making a statement of 
intention. But the other two cases are not so obvious. Taking the 
third person first, the predictive and habitual case can be seen 
to blur to some extent. If we consider non-personal forms such 
as: It will ... then it 
is easy to see that we are dealing with 
predictions, however whether we are talking about a prediction or 
a habitual form depends upon what is being described. If for 
example I am referring to the weather, e. g. 
(35) It will rain in Aberystwyth, it usually does. 
Then I am not talking abo". t a habit of the weather, I am making a 
prediction based on experience. On the other hand if I talk about 
an animal say, then it is easy to predict the habits of that 
animal, for example: 
(36) When the cat comes in it will sit in front of the fire. 
A prediction based on known habits. The modal use of will gives no 
problems for the third person. 
-169- 
The second person is more tricky, a sentence such as: 
(37) You will leave immediately, 
indicates insistence. It is worth examining how this differs from 
a command such as: 
(38) Leave immediately, 
and a request such as: 
(39) Would you be so good as to leave immediately. 
The command is issued in anticipation that it is likely to be 
carried out, on the other hand insistence using the modal will 
indicates that the hearer is reluctant to carry out the command. A 
command is an invocation of authority to get something done, 
whereas by saying: You will do ... the speaker is indicating a 
requirement that in any future world P must have been done by the 
hearer. In a sense, the speaker is invoking authority to counter 
the intention of the hearer to not do P. Hence there is a 
consistency between the three basic meanings of will. When used in 
the first person, it is an indication that the speaker has made a 
commitment to do P in a future world. When it is used in the third 
person, it acts as a prediction that P will be true a future world 
and when it is used in conjunction with the second person it 
indicates an insistence on the part of the speaker that the hearer 
do P in a future world. Hence, the operator will(x, P) can be used 
in the cognitive state theory to provide an explanation of the use 
of the modal auxiliary will. 
The modal will may also be used in a question as in the form: 
Will you do P? The person also affects the use of will in this 
simple form of question. When used with the first person it is a 
rhetorical or internal question meant to be answered by the 
speaker: 
(40) Will I be a party to this? 
When used with the third person it becomes a question of a third 
party's intention: 
(41) Will he come this evening? 
This is similar to its use with the second person. This may be 
expressed as: 
want(know(S will(do(x P)))) 
When used in the negative form, will in simple declarative 
sentences simply negates all the positive forms. The same appears 
to hold true for questions. 
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CAN 
Quirk et al. (op. cit. p. 52) list three uses for the modal can: 
i) Ability. For example: You can translate it if you set 
your mind to it. 
ii) Permission. For example: Can I leave now? 
iii) Theoretical Possibility. For example: The snake pass can 
get blocked by snow in the winter. 
Ability can be represented by the operator poss(e). Can may be 
used with all three persons to denote ability: I can lift the 
chair onto the table, You can lift the chair onto the table, He 
can lift the chair onto the table. Although in the second person, 
the modal is stressed to denote ability. 
In order to represent permission, we simply use the deontic 
operator: pP. Theoretical possibility can be represented as simply 
poss(P). Permission is an interesting case: in the interrogative 
form first person, it is treated as an informal request for 
permission: Can I go now? This may be represented as: want(S do(H 
P)) where P is schematic for pP. In the second person it is 
unclear whether a request is being made, or the speaker is 
questioning the hearer's ability, but it does not denote 
permission. In the third person it depends upon the propositional 
content as to whether the speaker means: Is he able to do P? or 
Will you give him permission to do P? For example: 
(42) Can he go now? (Request Permission) 
(43) Can he juggle with three skittles? (Questioning ability). 
In the declarative form, the unstressed use of can denotes a 
statement of permission: I can leave any time I want to. In the 
second person, unstressed can denotes permission: You can go. The 
same applies for the third person. 
There is a distinction between theoretical possibility and 
possibility, I shall consider this when examining the modal may. 
MAY 
Quirk et al. (op. cit. p. 53) give two uses for may: 
i) Permission. For example: You may stay out until eleven 
o'clock. 
ii) Possibility. For example: It may be a rough passage. 
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However, there appears to be a third use, may can also denote 
possible intention: 
(44) I may come and visit you tomorrow. 
This should be considered to be distinct from possibility and can 
be represented as: poss(will(do(S P))). 
When used to indicate permission, may is a polite form as 
opposed to can which is generally considered to be less correct, 
however modern usage has tended to blur the distinction, but may 
still remains more formal. It can be represented by the operator 
pP. Whereas I can ... may denote permission in the first person 
declarative form, I may appears rather odd: 
(45) I may go any time I like. 
In the first person it more usually denotes possible intention. In 
the second person it denotes permission: 
(46) You may come and visit me any time you like. 
In the third person, it also seems rather odd to use may to denote 
permission: 
(47) He may leave now. 
The more normal use for may is to denote possibility in the third 
person: 
(48) He may be rather annoyed with you. 
If we consider the use of may in interrogative forms, then in 
first person it is exclusively used for permission: 
(49) May I leave now? 
It is also used in this way in the third person: 
(50) May he be permitted to leave now? 
It doesn't appear to be used in the second person in the 
interrogative form. 
The following example should make clear the distinction 
between theoretical and actual possibility: 
(51) The snake pass can get blocked by snow in the winter. 
(Spoken on a fine summer's day) - Theoretical Possibility. 
(52) The snake pass iaay be blocked by snow, so lets go by the 
M62. (Actual Possibility). 
There is a similarity between theoretical possibility and ability. 
We talk about someone having the ability to do something, and 
theoretical possibility is rather like talking about an object 
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having the ability to do something: 
(53) Aqua Regia can dissolve gold. 
This could be re-phrased as: 
(53a) Aqua Regia has the ability to dissolve gold. 
Hence we can link theoretical possibility to ability and this 
perhaps explains the reason why can is used rather than may. 
SHALL 
Quirk et al. (op. cit. p. 54) list three uses of the modal shall. 
i) Willingness on the part of the speaker in the second and 
third person. For example: He shall receive what is his 
due. 
ii) Intention on the part of the speaker, only used in the 
first person. For example: I shall let you know in due 
course. 
iii) Insistence or legal injunction. For example: We shall do 
exercise 35b. The tenant shall maintain the property in 
good order throughout. 
The use of shall to denote willingness on the part of the 
speaker in the second and third person is interesting because it 
appears to be an expression of the speaker's intention to do 
something, or at least the intention to see that something will be 
done. The speaker effectively expresses the intention to see that 
P gets done and this perhaps explains why the usage of shall in 
this form is restricted to the second and third persons. 
Intention on the part of the speaker, used in the first 
person only merely confirms the analysis above, in this form it is 
interchangeable with will. Insistence, or legal injunction, is 
marked by the use of shall in conjunction with a dynamic verb 
(i. e. a verb where the subject is the agent of some action). For 
example: The tenant shall maintain ... as opposed to 
You shall 
receive ... In the former case it is insistence or 
injunction that 
the subject do such and such a thing. In the latter case, the 
subject will be the beneficiary of some action. Insistence is best 
denoted by use of the epistemic operator want: want(S do(H P)). 
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SHOULD, OUGHT and MUST 
Quirk et. al. (op. cit. ) list four uses of should: 
i) Obligation and necessity: You should always cover 
your mouth when you cough. They should be home by now. 
ii) Putative use after certain expressions: I am sorry that 
this should have happened to you. 
iii) Contingent use in the first person only: I should love 
to move to a larger house. 
iv) Formal Real conditions. Should you change your mind, 
just let me kno-T. 
From the point of view of cognitive states, only the first use 
appears to have any importance. There is a very strong link 
between the first use and the obligation operator regardless of 
person: I/you/he should ... all point to a statement of obligation 
which is represented by: O(do(x P)). 
The obvious way to represent necessity is to use: necc(P) but 
the use of should seems weaker than must. 
Ought may be used to denote obligation, necessity or 
expectation. The use of ought for obligation or necessity appears 
interchangeable with should, however there is a separate case: 
(54) They ought to have finished by now. 
This use is not specifying that "they" are obliged to be finished 
by now. It is almost as if the obligation operator is being 
applied to a state of affairs. Thus the previous example could be 
expressed as: This situation is obliged to yield up the result 
that they are finished. 
Must may be used to denote obligation or compulsion or 
necessity. An example of obligation is: 
(55) You must be home before 11 O'Clock. 
An example of necessity is: 
(56) There must be something wrong. 
These cases can be represented by: 
0(... ) and necc(P). 
5.5 The Logical and Pragnº-itic Use of Modal Auxiliaries 
The difficulty with modal auxiliaries is that they have both 
a logical and pragmatic function (Leech 1987) which is difficult 
to unravel. If we are to accept the cognitive state approach, then 
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it seems reasonable to assume that modal auxiliaries are used to 
communicate cognitive states that have modal forms, but any theory 
that goes from speech act to surface form must also be able to 
give some explanation of the pragmatic use of modal auxiliaries. 
The main uses of modal auxiliaries are to indicate ability, 
permission, theoretical possibility, possibility, willingness, 
intention, insistence, prediction, obligation and necessity. 
If we look first of all at ability, theoretical possibility 
and possibility then all of these may be represented using the 
operator poss(p) in the case of some state or situation or 
poss(do(x P)) in the case of some action. Ability tends to relate 
to human or animal performance, e. g. 
(57) Babies can usually walk by the time they reach fifteen 
months, 
or 
(58) The leopoard can climb trees. 
But when we come to sentences describing inanimate objects, the 
distinction between ability and theoretical possibility becomes 
blurred, e. g. 
(59) The lamborghini sports can do 150 m. p. h. 
This suggests that the distinction between ability and theoretical 
possibility is dependent upon what is being described. It 
therefore seems correct to describe both using the operator 
poss(... ) . 
Possibility itself is slightly different, when I say for 
example: 
(60) I may leave tomorrow. 
I am not so much expressing my ability to do so, as a possible 
intention, but without committing myself. There is another 
possible use of the operator poss. It may also be used to express 
what I will call hedged predictions, e. g. 
(61) It may rain tomorrow. 
This allows us to represent this group as follows: 
i) Ability: poss(do(S P)) 
ii) Theoretical Possibility: poss(P) 
iii) Possible intention: poss(will(do(S P))) 
iv) Hedged predictions: poss(will(P)) 
Note the use of the modal will in these examples. 
The second group of modal meanings are intention, insistence 
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and prediction. An example of intention is 
(62) I will leave tomorrow morning. 
An example of insistence is 
(63) You will move that car now. 
Finally, an example of prediction is: 
(64) It will rain tomorrow. 
The representation of intention is: will(do(S P)). Prediction can 
be represented as: will(P). However, insistence is more tricky. 
When I insist on something being the case, firstly I believe that 
the hearer does not want to do P, secondly I want to convey the 
fact that I will not accept a refusal on the part of the hearer. 
In order to understand this better, if we compare it with 
prediction: when I make a prediction about the hearer I leave the 
modal auxiliary will unstressed, e. g. 
(65) You will fall ill tomorrow because that was way past its 
sell-by date. 
Whereas, when I insist, will is always stressed. What is being 
conveyed with the prediction is: will(do(H P)), or will(H P). That 
appears to be the same when insistence is used, except that the 
purpose of the stress indicator on the modal is to convey the fact 
that the speaker will not accept a refusal on the part of the 
hearer. 
Permission may be indicated by the modal auxiliaries can and 
may. The suggestion is that may is more formal or more polite than 
can. Examples such as : You may leave now and You can leave 
whenever you like may be represented as pP. However there is a 
pragmatic aspect that needs consideration. I shall consider 
politeness in its own right in Chapter Six. 
Necessity is usually indicated by the use of the modal must, 
which can be represented as necc(P). This leaves us with 
obligation. Three modals are commonly used to denote obligation: 
ought, should and must. I will deal with must first: must is used 
to denote 0(P). Must may be used to state obligation, e. g. 
(66) You told me that you must leave before ten o'clock. 
Or to put someone under obligation, e. g. 
(67) You must be back before ten o'clock. 
Ought and should are much more problematical however. White 
(1975) suggests that oug'zt can be defined as descriptive of what 
is owing in a set of circumstances. If I say: 
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(68) You ought to (should) finish your Ph. D. write-up. 
Then what is being expressed is something that is good for the 
hearer, it is as White suggests (op. cit. p. 140) something that is 
missing from a set of circumstances. This suggests a pragmatic 
rather than logical aspect to the use of these modals. 
Looking more directly at the modal auxiliaries, their uses 
and relation to cognitive states, it is possible to provide some 
sort of account of the way the modal auxiliaries are used. If we 
consider the use of the modal auxiliaries in conjunction with the 
person of the sentence, then it is possible to think in terms of 
the action that is being denoted and the interaction between 
speaker and hearer. For example requesting permission: the speaker 
may request permission for himself or for a third party, but it 
makes little sense for him to ask the hearer to permit himself to 
do something. We find that there is no form of May you ... This 
form of analysis enables us to build up a more complete picture of 
the relationship between the logical and pragmatic uses of modal 
auxiliaries. 
Consider the modal auxiliary can: its main uses are ability 
and permission in declarative sentences. It is not meaningful for 
the speaker to grant himself permission, but he can do so for the 
hearer or a third party (to the hearer). It is also possible for 
the speaker to state that such and such an act is permissible (for 
all three persons). Permission has little meaning with the non- 
personal pronoun, except in the case of: 
(69) It (Your dog) can run around in our garden. 
The use of can to denote ability is also consistent, it is 
possible for the speaker to state ability in any of the three 
persons. When we come to the non-personal pronoun it tends to be 
used to denote theoretical possibility, though as I pointed out 
previously, the distinction between theoretical possibility and 
ability is slightly blurred. 
When can is used in the interrogative form, its use is 
consistent though more pragmatic. When the speaker requests 
permission, he can do so in the first and third person, it makes 
no sense for the speaker to ask the hearer to grant himself 
permission, therefore in the second person, it may be used to ask 
if permission has been granted to do P. The pragmatic aspect of it 
is that the question: Can you ...? sometimes is used as a request 
-177- 
and I shall consider this in Chapter Six when I examine indirect 
speech acts. 
May is used in the declarative form to denote possibility or 
permission. In the first person it is used only to denote 
possibility (or as I have described earlier, possible intention). 
It is interesting to compare can and may in their use as modals of 
permission. I can ... may be used to state that I have been given 
permission to do P. I may ... on the other hand cannot have this 
meaning and it is interesting to speculate why this is so. 
If I am granted permission to do P, this only has meaning if 
I am able to do P, i. e. I have the ability to do P. On the other 
hand, granting permission to do P does not necessarily mean 
checking to see that the hearer has the ability to do P, but it 
does mean making it possible for the hearer to do P (assuming he 
has the ability to do so). This is perhaps the reason why the 
modals are used in this way. 
In the interrogative form, may is only used to request 
permission, because the hearer becomes the authority, it is not 
meaningful to request that the hearer grant himself permission and 
hence there is no second person interrogative form. 
The analysis of modals in conjunction with a model of speaker 
and hearer using cognitive states containing modal operators seems 
to reduce many of the problems caused by the interaction between 
the logical and pragmatic use of modal auxiliaries. 
5.6 Speech Acts and Discourse Markers 
Studies of discourse markers indicate that their use is very 
much culturally based. Schiffrin (1987) for example gives a very 
comprehensive account of their use, although her account is based 
on observations from one particular type of culture (The Jewish 
New Yorker). However, as I observed when analysing some of the 
work in discourse analysis (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975), 
discourse markers seem to have some role to play. In order to 
explain the part that discourse markers might have in speech act 
theory a summary of what has been stated seems an appropriate 
starting point. 
Having pointed to several deficiencies with the Searle model 
of speech act theory (Chapter One), I went on to examine the role 
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that speech act theory might have to play in discourse structure, 
contrasting the two rival approaches. In Chapter Three I 
introduced the idea of a speech act as an act communicating a 
cognitive state (or states) to the hearer. Within this system, 
there is still a locutionary act, which is the surface form 
realisation of the speech act. The illocutionary act effectively 
becomes the speaker's cognitive states with an associated action 
that translates the cognitive state that is to be transmitted into 
the appropriate surface form. I suggest that the remaining 
cognitive states associated with the speech act represent an 
explanation of the "use" of the speech act and may be inferred by 
the hearer from the surface form. My suggestion is that an 
explanation of the use of a particular speech act can be given in 
terms of the cognitive states that comprise its description. 
The perlocutionary effect of the speech act is the presumed 
(or preferred effect), and if this preferred effect (the rules of 
which are governed by convention) is carried out by the hearer 
then his response does not need to be marked in any way. 
The cognitive state that is transmitted between speaker and 
hearer may be expressed in terms of some proposition P. I used 
epistemic, modal and deontic operators to describe the 
possibilities. On this basis, speech acts may be roughly broken up 
into two distinct groups: those that express belief - assertives 
to use Searle's taxonomy and those that express a want of the 
speaker - directives. The commissive class may express intention. 
Thus, an assertive communicates to the hearer a cognitive 
state of the form 
bel S ... 
whereas a directive communicates to the hearer a cognitive state 
of the form 
want S ... 
It is also possible to think of a commissive speech act as 
communicating intention in the form 
will(do(S P)) 
In addition to the cognitive states there are positions of 
authority between speaker and hearer. There are four 
possibilities: 
1. The speaker is in an undisputed position of authority. For 
example if I state that my son suffers from atopic eczema, 
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then I would not expect the hearer to dispute the fact, 
unless of course they happened to be my son's general 
practitioner. The subject matter of the proposition can give 
rise to a mutually held belief that the speaker is in a 
position of authority with respect to his utterance. 
2. The hearer is an undisputed position of authority. This 
fact can subtly alter the speech act, for example an 
assertion becomes a question: 
(70) (Client to stamp dealer). Four margin penny blacks 
are worth substantially more than three margins? 
3. The position of authority is disputed. For example in an 
academic argument. 
4. Neither party is in a position of authority. For example 
two individuals exchanging social niceties at a bus stop. 
It is noteworthy that position of authority may sometimes have to 
be refined as in certain circumstances an individual may be in a 
formal position of authority (as opposed to being an authority on 
P matters), and yet know less than the hearer. In this case, I 
choose to adopt the terminology used by Berry (1982) to describe 
this situation. She used the term position of authority to 
describe the situation where one speaker is in a formal position 
of authority over another and primary knower where one speaker is 
a recognised authority on a subject. It is the second situation 
that I have described above. However, formal authority does have a 
role to play. It might, for example change the level of politeness 
used by both the subordinate (to more polite), and the superior 
(perhaps to less polite). It also can have a dramatic effect upon 
speech acts conveying cognitive states of want. 
Returning to the cognitive states themselves, I stated that 
there where two basic types of speech act, those communicating a 
belief and those communicating a want. Looking first of all at the 
category that communicate a want - the directives. These may be 
subdivided into two broad classes: questions and requests. 
Questions communicate the cognitive state: 
want (S P) 
Requests on the other hand communicate the cognitive state: 
want (S do(H P)) 
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5.7 On A Taxonomy For Speech Acts 
There have been several attempts to describe the variety of 
speech acts in terms of a taxonomy of speech act verbs. For 
example Searle and Van der Veken(1985), Bach an Harnish(1979) and 
Wierzbicka(1987) have given an extensive verb-based taxonomy. 
Because I have chosen to express speech acts in terms of cognitive 
states rather than verbs, I shall refrain from attempting another 
such taxonomy. That is not to say that certain speech acts should 
not be described in this way, for example, Austin's performatives 
largely appear to be verb-based. How else should actions such as 
baptism or excommunication be described? 
Additionally, there are verbal actions that I have not 
considered such as expressing regret, apologizing etc, Perhaps, 
these should also be categorised using a verb-based taxonomy. 
Searle and Van der Veken (op. cit. ) and Wierzbicka(op. cit. ) have 
included in their taxonomy speech act verbs that do not appear to 
speech acts at all, for example: argue. 
One of the problems with a verb-based taxonomy, indeed with 
any form of taxonomy is that the speech act that is conveyed by 
some utterance, may be heavily dependent upon the interpretation 
of that utterance. For example, two syntactically similar 
declarative sentences may be interpreted as very different speech 
acts, consider: 
(71) I made a mess of the putty on the window. 
(72) I made a mess of the caviar on the Concorde. 
(71) forms part of a conversation to a joiner as a request to have 
a look at some botched up do-it-yourself work. (72) might be seem 
as boasting. Perhaps, therefore, some speech acts can only be 
categorised not just in terms of what the speaker says, but also 
in how the hearer reacts. Or putting this more generally, perhaps 
a speech act is categorised according to how the propositional 
content expressed in the utterance is judged within the language 
community. Taking the problem of boast as a speech act. Boasting 
is highly dependent upon culture and therefore can only be 
described in terms of cultural norms. 
During the course of this thesis, I have been concerned with 
studying speech act theory in relation to discourse structure and 
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have arrived at a theory based on the notion of presupposed 
cognitive states. There might be a temptation to base a taxonomy 
upon cognitive states, however, I suggest that this would be very 
difficult. It is easy to think of declarative sentence types as 
expressing belief or interrogative sentence types as expressing 
wants, but that only splits up speech acts into two. Furthermore, 
it poses problems for indirect speech acts. 
Another idea might be to categorise speech acts according to 
the set of presupposed cognitive states and the action that make 
up the description of the act (see Chapter Three). However, that 
is difficult because I believe that there ought to some 
flexibility in the description of an act, i. e. it might be 
possible, given the description of an act comprising of n 
cognitive states, that a speaker can still express that act in 
some utterance if he only uses n-1 cognitive states. i. e. there 
ought to be a certain amount of flexibility in the description of 
a speech act. This flexibility makes a taxonomy a very difficult 
undertaking. 
I also believe that certain speech acts can only be described 
in terms of pairs, e. g. an acceptance, and this makes the 
undertaking even more difficult. 
5.8 Summary and Formal Model of Utterance Generation 
I set out to do two things in this thesis: firstly to provide 
an explanation of speech act theory in discourse structure, i. e. 
how speech acts can be used as building blocks for discourse 
structure, and secondly to give some explanation as to how it is 
possible to derive surface forms from speech act schemas. 
Consider the first of these, we need to go back to the 
schemas of Chapter Four. These schemas attempt to describe the 
role that speech acts have to play in discourse structure by 
pairing speech acts connected by a cognitive state that 
effectively binds the pair together. The notion of a pair of 
speech acts (or perhaps just acts, if one rejects the notion of 
speech acts) is a common factor in both rival models of discourse 
described in Chapter Two. The conversational analysis approach has 
at its heart the adjacency pair, which matches very closely to the 
speech act pairing described in Chapter Four. The adjacency pair 
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has four characteristics: firstly the two component parts are 
required to be adjacent (insertion sequences apart - insertion 
sequences are explained in this theory in terms of meta-speech 
acts). Secondly, the two component parts must be produced by 
separate speakers, again this applies to this theory. The third 
characteristic of adjacency pairs is that they are ordered; i. e. 
they have a first part and a second part. In the cognitive state 
theory this is also true. Finally, the component parts of an 
adjacency pair are typed. This also applied to the cognitive state 
theory, though some second parts may appear corresponding to 
different first parts. This may be partly explained because the 
cognitive state theory is specified in much greater detail. 
It appears that the notion or pairing introduced in Chapter 
Four is not incompatible with the idea of adjacency pairs. 
Furthermore, there is a natural pairing in the discourse analysis 
models, for example, the Sinclair and Coulthard model (1975, p. 26) 
includes a level called the teaching exchange. The teaching 
exchange consists of three moves of which only the first part is 
essential: initiation, response and feedback. However, this 
applies to a classroom situation where feedback from the teacher 
would be a sound conversational (and pedagogic) strategy. In 
ordinary conversation feedback would be inappropriate, and Burton 
(1981) suggests that in order to modify the Sinclair and Coulthard 
model to everyday conversation, the feedback move should be 
eliminated. This leaves us with a pairing of initiation and 
response. It appears that there is common ground between the 
discourse analysis approach and the conversational analysis 
approach. 
The basis of the cognitive state theory is that speech acts 
may be paired in virtue of a cognitive state presupposed by the 
first part that influences or steers the second part. In order to 
build a discourse structure based on speech acts, we need to build 
combination rules of speech act pairs to form larger units. A 
simple example of this is when speaker asserts that P and the 
hearer responds to the effect that he agrees with P. 
The Formal Model 
Finally, the time has come to attempt to describe how a 
surface form may be generated from a particular speech act schema, 
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however incorporation of indirect forms will have to wait until 
the next chapter. I shall need to modify the basic presumptions of 
the Bach and Harnish model slightly in order to adapt them for use 
in the Generation Model. The Linguistic Presumption (LP) becomes: 
The Hearer is presumed capable of determining the meaning and 
referents of the expression E generated in its base form from 
the speech act schema Si. 
In other words the Linguistic Presumption is a presumption that 
speaker and hearer share a basic set of speech acts and commonly 
perceive how they are represented linguistically, e. g. both accept 
that there is such a thing as an assertive and that it is 
generated in the form of a declarative sentence. 
The Communicative Presumption remains as before, but I shall 
modify the Presumption of Literalness into a Presumption of 
Directness (PD). I have chosen to avoid the added complication of 
the speaker speaking non-literally as opposed to indirectly which 
I will incorporate in the next chapter. In using the Presumption 
of Directness, I am making the assumption that unless there is 
good reason to do otherwise, the speaker will speak directly, i. e. 
generate a direct surface form from the speech act schema Si. The 
Presumption of Directness is therefore: 
The speaker will, unless there is a good reason not to do 
so, use a direct utterance form Ud to perform the speech act 
Ste. 
In addition to these, I require a Pragmatic Presumption (PP): 
The speaker assumes in performing some speech act Si that the 
hearer understands the preconditions, illocutionary force and 
effect on the communicative context of the speech act Si. 
In other words, there must be a shared understanding of the 
mechanics of the speech act. An understanding of the preconditions 
of the act includes for example, the fact that when making an 
assertion, the speaker wants the hearer to believe that what he is 
saying is true, but at the same time recognises that not everyone 
will believe him etc. The illocutionary force is effectively what 
the speech act is intended to convey. The effects are that a 
certain cognitive state is being conveyed to the hearer. 
This allows us to define the direct strategy for the 
generation of surface forms from speech act schemas. Here I shall 
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recognize only three basic speech act forms (excluding 
performative speech acts); assertive acts which typically have a 
declarative sentential construction, directives which form either 
imperative sentences or questions. Finally there is speaker 
intention, which would usually be expressed by a declarative 
sentence type. 
The Direct Strategy: Speaker recognizes his wants, beliefs and 
intentions with respect to some proposition P. Speaker recognizes 
the authority relationship with the hearer with respect to P. 
Speaker recognizes some basic speech act form Si. From this he 
generates a basic sentential form Ui. 
i) Assertive form: Speaker modifies declarative form (Ui) 
to add (modal) operators, if any. 
ii) Directive form: Speaker modifies surface form (Ui) to 
reflect authority relationship with respect to P. 
Speaker modifies Ui to reflect his own feelings and perception of 
P. 
In proposing this strategy, I am making no assumptions about what 
actually happens in human thought processes, for example, because 
modal auxiliary clauses are added later, I am not claiming that 
that is actually what happens, it may be that it occurs in 
parallel. I am merely claiming that the addition of modal 
auxiliary clauses plays an important part in reflecting the 
required speech act in the final surface form. The last part of 
the strategy reflects changes that may be made to the utterance in 
order to change an assertion into a critical assertion for 
example, or an expression of regret about P. 
I believe this is justifiable because these acts do not map 
directly onto their own sentential forms. An unexplored avenue of 
research here would be to examine this model in relationship to 
theories of systemic grammar and how they direct the structure of 
surface forms (see for example Halliday (1990) and Berry(1975)). 
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6. Indirect Speech Acts 
6.1 Introduction 
One of the greatest difficulties facing speech act theory has 
always been the problem of how to incorporate indirect speech acts 
into the theory. In this section, I shall initially examine 
Searle's work on Indirect Speech Acts before going on to examine 
theories of politeness, which appears to be connected with 
indirect speech acts. The idea that will be developed in this 
section is that indirect speech acts come about for a variety of 
reasons. Firstly, they may arise because of positions of 
authority. I shall develop my ideas of indirect speech acts in 
accordance with the structures developed in previous chapters, in 
particular the "use" model of speech acts developed in Chapter 
Three. If we accept the idea that the avoidance of what Brown and 
Levinson call "face threatening acts" is one of the driving 
factors behind politeness and hence some types of indirect speech 
acts, then attempts must'be made to avoid a loss of face by both 
parties when uttering certain speech acts. 
An example that is easy to understand is making a request. In 
this section, I shall argue that there are associated with 
requests certain cognitive states, such as knowing whether the 
hearer is able to carry out the request, or if the request 
involves the hearer giving something, whether he has the object in 
the first place etc. Therefore rather than making the request 
directly, the indirect act involves finding out if there is an 
obstacle to the hearer servicing the request. For example, the 
hearer may not be able to service the request, the hearer may not 
have the object being requested or even not want to service the 
request. 
We cannot treat all requests equally, for some requests such 
as passing the salt, we would not reasonably expect the hearer not 
to want to service such a request. On the other hand requesting a 
lift home from someone we don't know too well might be difficult 
because they might not want to service our request. I intend to 
describe why certain strategies for requesting are used which 
allow a way for both parties to keep face. 
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Other indirect acts may come about because of the existence 
of additional knowledge states associated with a speech act. For 
example, when pleading, we may plead with the hearer to do P 
because of Q. If, however the hearer is perfectly aware of P, then 
we could simply assert Q as an indirect form. After all, what is 
important in making a plea is not so much the plea itself as the 
reason for making it. 
The contention is that each speech act type (such as a 
request) has associated with it a set of cognitive states, which 
concern what the speaker knows or believes with reference to P, 
how the speaker came to the conclusion that P, what the speaker 
perceives the hearer knows about P (i. e. whether the hearer is an 
authority on P matters or an authority over the speaker on P 
matters, or simply what the hearer believes about P). Additionally 
a speech act type has associated with it a description of what the 
speaker is attempting to convey to the hearer and what the speaker 
expects the hearer to believe or do in response to P. It is also 
associated with a description of how the hearer may respond to the 
speech act (the second half of the speech act pair). Furthermore, 
there are a set of strategies (that may not be the same for 
everyone) that are used to perform the speech act in accordance 
with a cultural set of politeness requirements. This I have called 
the speech act schema or plan. 
Furthermore, in Chapter Four, I examined how speech acts may 
be related via cognitive states to form a pairing of speech acts 
which acts as a building block for discourse structure. Certain 
cognitive states may lead to conflict, for example where the 
speaker makes an utterance that indicates that he believes that P 
(bel(S P)) and the hearer doesn't believe that P (-bel(H P)). This 
may lead to conflict in the form of an argument; but as these are 
socially undesirable (in most cultures), there may well exist a 
strategy for avoiding this form of conflict. 
Even worse, if the speaker wants the hearer to do P (i. e. has 
requested that the hearer does P) and the hearer does not want to 
do P then we have what Leech (1983) calls will incompatibility. 
Again this is undesirable and should be avoided. 
Rather than think of the reason for making most indirect 
speech acts in terms of the avoidance of face threatening acts, it 
is more logical to think of it in terms of a strategy for avoiding 
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undesirable pairings of cognitive states. After all, when making a 
request which is turned down, who loses face? According to the 
Brown and Levinson model (Brown and Levinson 1987), it appears to 
be the speaker who loses face, but in many societies, it is the 
hearer who loses face if he cannot grant the request. I shall 
examine notions of politeness in conjunction with the cognitive 
state model in this chapter. 
6.2 Searle's Theory of Indirect Speech Acts 
Searle (1969) first proposed the notion of indirect speech 
acts, a work that he substantially revised in Searle (1979). 
According to Searle, a speaker may utter the sentence: 
(1) Can You pass the salt? 
and 
mean it not merely as a question but as a request 
to pass the salt. 
(Searle 1979, p. 30). 
Searle states that in order to understand an indirect speech act: 
the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he 
actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared 
background information, both linguistic and non- 
linguistic, together with the general powers of 
rationality and inference on the part of the hearer. 
Searle op. cit. p. 32). 
Furthermore, he states that the means of understanding an indirect 
speech act include: 
a theory of speech acts, principles of co-operative 
conversation and mutually shared factual background 
information of the speaker and hearer, together with an 
ability on the part of the hearer to make inferences. 
(Searle op. cit. p. 32). 
The ideas presented in this chapter will not disagree greatly with 
this approach except that much missing detail will be filled 
in. 
In order to understand how Searle visualised these ideas 
being 
brought together, it would be illuminating to study his example 
(Searle op. cit. pp. 33-35). 
Searle cited the utterance pair: 
(2) X: Let's go to the movies tonight. 
(3) Y: I have to study for an exam. 
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The question that arises is: how does X know that Y's utterance 
constitutes a rejection of his suggestion? Searle describes the 
rejection of the proposal of X the primary illocutionary act and 
the statement of fact the secondary illocutionary act. He then 
puts together a reconstruction of how X might have arrived at the 
conclusion that his proposal is being turned down. (Searle op. 
cit. p. 34). 
Step 1: I have made a proposal to Y, and in response he has made a 
statement to the effect that he has to study for an exam (facts 
about the conversation). 
Step 2: I assume that Y is co-operating in the conversation and 
that therefore his remark is intended to be relevant (Principles 
of Co-operative Conversation). 
Step 3: A relevant response must be one of acceptance, rejection, 
counterproposal, further discussion, etc. (Theory of Speech Acts). 
This is the first step that needs clarification. By assuming that 
the response is of a particular type, Searle is implicitly 
accepting the notion of speech act pairing, his theory as it is 
rules that speech acts stand alone and are not affected by their 
immediate predecessors. Yet here we have a tacit acceptance of 
either the notion of an adjacency pair, or of the ordering of two 
(or more) speech acts within a discourse structure. The cognitive 
state theory would also allow us to carry out step 3, but 
it 
explains it in terms of the cognitive state expressed by the 
proposal which limits the response that can be made. 
Step 4: But his literal utterance was not one of these, and so was 
not a relevant response (inference from steps 1 and 3). 
This important step outlines something that will be discussed 
in great detail in this chapter, namely the idea of conflicting 
pragmatic principles, namely relevance and sequencing. Relevance 
specifies that utterance Ui must be relevant to utterance 
Uj 
following it. The sequencing maxim states that when the primary 
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speech act is a proposal (the exact name given to it is not so 
important), then the secondary speech act must be of a certain 
type, giving rise to a mis-match of pragmatic principles. The 
response should be relevant if the second speaker obeys the 
relevance maxim, but the actual response, doesn't appear to obey 
the sequencing maxim, because a direct interpretation of it 
indicates that the second speaker is making a statement. A 
statement of this sort is not an appropriate response to a 
proposal. Therefore, there must be an indirect interpretation 
which is appropriate as a response to the proposal. 
To summarise: 
i) Utterance 1 is a proposal (say). 
ii) Utterance 2 must be relevant. Secondly, according to the 
sequencing maxim, it must be an appropriate response to 
a proposal. 
iii) Its direct interpretation indicates either that it is 
not relevant or that it violates the sequencing maxim, 
because it is not an appropriate response to the 
proposal. 
iv) There must be an indirect interpretation that does not 
violate the sequencing maxim. 
Step 5: Therefore, he probably means more than he says. Assuming 
that his remark is relevant, his primary illocutionary point must 
differ from his literal one (inference from steps 2 and 4). 
This inference can be made because of the apparent conflict 
between the pragmatic principles, but this is not the only reason 
why an indirect speech act can be interpreted as such. 
Step 6: I know that studying for an exam normally takes a large 
amount of time relative to a single evening, and I know that going 
to the movies normally takes a large amount of time relative to a 
single evening (factual background information). 
The notion of factual background information is rather vague 
here, there is something far more precise in the utterance that 
can be used to form the correct conclusion, namely the fact that 
in the utterance the modal auxiliary of necessity is used, compare 
it with the responses: 
(4) I want to study for an exam. 
(5) 1 will be studying for an exam. 
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Both of the above utterances seem noticeably less friendly than 
the one given by Searle, probably because the inference that can 
be drawn is that Y has to do something by necessity, thus implying 
that he cannot do anything else. 
Step 7: Therefore he probably cannot both go to the movies and 
study for an exam in one evening (inference from Step 6). 
Step 8: A preparatory condition on the acceptance of a proposal, 
or on any other commissive, is the ability to perform the act 
predicated in the propositional content condition (theory of 
speech acts). 
Step 9: Therefore, I know that he has said something that has the 
consequence that he probably cannot consistently accept the 
proposal (inference from steps 1,7 and 8). 
Step 10: Therefore, his primary illocutionary point is probably to 
reject the proposal (inference from steps 5 and 9). 
In this example, the indirect speech act occurs in the secondary 
position in the speech act pair. Were it the case that the 
indirect speech act was in the primary position, then step 3 would 
no longer apply. As we shall see in this chapter, there are many 
reasons why indirect speech acts are used. 
Searle goes on to examine sentences that are conventionally 
used in the performance of indirect directives. He identifies 
certain categories of indirect directives: 
i) Sentences concerning H's ability to perform A. e. g. Can 
you pass the salt? 
ii) Sentences concerning S's wish or want that H will do A. 
e. g. I want you to do A. 
iii) Sentences concerning H's doing A. e. g. Would you kindly 
get off my foot? 
iv) Sentences concerning H's desire or willingness to do A. 
e. g. Would you mind not making so much noise. 
v) Sentences concerning reasons for doing A. e. g. You 
should leave inanediately. 
-191- 
vi) Sentences embedding one of these elements inside 
another. e. g. Might I ask you to take off your hat? 
Searle then states that certain facts pertain to these sentence 
types (Searle op. cit. p. 39). 
1. The sentences in question do not have an imperative force 
as part of their meaning. 
Searle provides as support for this statement the fact that such 
sentences can be linked with the denial of any imperative intent. 
e. g. 
(6) I'd like you to do this for me, but I am not asking you 
to do it or requesting that you do it or ordering you to do 
it or telling you to do it. 
This argument seems to be particularly feeble as it could just as 
easily be linked with an imperative force: e. g. 
(7) Might I ask you to take off your hat? 
This could just as easily have been 
(7a) Take off your hat. 
The only difference is of course that the former is more polite. 
2. The sentences in question are not ambiguous as between an 
imperative illocutionary force and a non-imperative force. 
The question of ambiguity is a difficult one and it is not simply 
a case of saying that all of these indirect speech act types are 
inherently non-ambiguous, certain indirect speech act types such 
as: Might I ask you to ... one could argue are 
inherently non- 
ambiguous, but indirect forms such as hints may be deliberately 
ambiguous to give the hearer "a way out". 
3. Notwithstanding Facts 1 and 2, these are standardly 
used to issue directives. 
Searle states that there is a systematic relation between these 
type of utterances and directive acts in a way that there is no 
systematic relation between an utterance such as "I have to study 
for an exam" and rejecting proposals. In this respect, I agree 
with Searle. 
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4. The sentences in question are not, in the ordinary sense, 
idioms. 
5. To say that they are not idioms is not to say they are not 
idiomatic. 
6. The sentences in question have literal utterances in which 
they are not also indirect requests. 
7. In cases where these sentences are uttered as requests, 
they still have their literal meaning and are uttered with 
and as having that literal meaning. 
8. When one of these sentences is uttered with the primary 
illocutionary point of a directive, the literal illocutionary 
point of a directive, the literal illocutionary act is also 
performed. 
Searle suggests that the difference between the cases that have 
been categorised and the refusal to go to the movies is that the 
categorised cases are systematic. In the explanation that I shall 
develop, I hope to be able to show that cases such as the refusal 
to go to the movies do not have to be treated in an entirely 
separate way, but at the same time recognising that indirect 
speech acts arise for a variety of reasons. 
Searle then attempts to furnish an explanation in terms of 
felicity conditions and preparatory conditions, which give rise to 
certain generalisations: 
1. S can make an indirect request (or other directive) by 
either asking whether or stating that a preparatory condition 
concerning H's ability to do A obtains. 
2. S can make an indirect directive by either asking whether 
or stating that the propositional content condition obtains. 
3. S can make an indirect directive by stating that the 
sincerity condition obtains, but not by asking whether it 
obtains. 
4. S can make an indirect directive by stating that or asking 
whether there are good or overriding reasons for doing A, 
except where the rea; >on is that H wants or wishes etc., to do 
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A in which case he can only ask whether H wants, wishes etc. 
to do A. 
Although these may be valid observations (Searle himself states 
that these are generalisations and not rules) there is no way of 
explaining what constraints there are on these generalisations. 
For example, what are the circumstances that result in a statement 
that the propositional content obtains being treated as an 
indirect speech act? Without giving some thought to the ways in 
which the statement of some proposition becomes a directive, then 
the generalisation is almost meaningless. More importantly, there 
is no explanation why these mechanisms for indirection exist. In 
my analysis of indirect speech acts, I shall also be concerned 
with why indirect speech acts are performed. Finally, Searle 
extends his analysis to include indirect commissives producing a 
set of generalisations similar to the ones for the directives. 
6.3 A New Theory of Indirect Speech Acts 
6.3.1 Introduction 
It should be noted first of all that there are many reasons 
why indirect speech acts are performed. The main thrust of this 
work however will be to examine the role that pragmatic maxims 
have to play in determining surface form and the theory that will 
be developed is that indirect speech acts arise mostly because of 
potential conflicts between either pragmatic maxims or presupposed 
cognitive states that are socially deemed to be undesirable. 
Additionally, an attempt will be made to explain why indirect 
speech acts are used as forms of politeness. 
There appear to be (at least) four potential types of 
indirect speech acts: 
i) Indirect speech acts that arise because of authority. 
ii) Indirect speech acts that arise because of conflicts 
between pragmatic maxims. 
iii) Indirect Speech acts that arise because of politeness 
considerations. 
iv) Indirect Speech acts that arise because of additional or 
missing cognitive states presupposed by a speech act. 
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The first category includes cases where a speaker in 
authority uses toned down orders, e. g. 
(8) I suggest you look at Sacerdoti's work on planning. 
The second and third categories in many ways overlap, to take 
Searle's example: 
(9) A: Shall we go to the movies tonight? 
(10)B: I have to study for an exam. 
Sequencing demands that a proposal such as the one made requires a 
response, but the direct response "no" seems impolite and hence a 
conflict is set up. The way out is indirection that hints at the 
reason why the proposal is being turned down. 
An indirect speech act that arises because of a missing or 
additional presupposed cognitive state occurs when the direct form 
is no longer appropriate. Consider for example pleading; when we 
plead with someone, we plead with them to do P because of some 
reason. That reason might only be an appeal to their moral sense 
of duty, but there might a good reason of which the hearer is 
unaware. In its direct form this could lead to a surface form: 
Please do X because of Y. 
However, if the hearer knows that we want them to do X but is 
unaware of the reason why the speaker wants the hearer to do X, 
then what does the speaker say? If he repeats the above formula 
then a violation of the "pie informative" maxim occurs. The example 
below illustrates what usually happens in such circumstances: 
Taken from (Maltby and Boublil 1989) which depicts the fall of 
Saigon at the end of the Vietnam war. The American troops are 
pulling out and thousands of Vietnamese want to be airlifted out 
of the country (hence it is obvious what the speakers are pleading 
for the hearers to do): 
(11) One Vietnamese: Take me with you! (The direct form) 
(12) Another: I have a letter look! 
(13) Another: I helped the CIA. 
(14) Another: I have an aunt in New York. 
(15) Another: I have gold I can pay. 
(16) Another: They'll kill all they find here. 
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In this case it is self evident that everyone wants to leave, but 
they have different reasons, so what happens is that indirect 
speech acts are used that state the reason why the hearer should 
do P. 
6.3.2 Indirect Speech Acts and Authority 
One type of indirect speech act that has already been 
discussed arises when the speaker asserts that P when the hearer 
is in a position of authority. In that situation it was described 
as a question (see Chapter.: Four), and indeed there seems to be a 
special linguistic form for this type of act. The declarative 
question is an exceptional type of yes-no question which is 
identical in form to a statement except that it is distinguished 
by a final rising intonation: 
(17) You've seen the headmaster? 
Quirk et al. (1973) state that a declarative question is assertive 
in character because non-assertive forms are inadmissible, e. g. 
(18a) You've had something to eat? 
(18b)*You've had anything to eat? 
Declarative questions seem to apply not so much when the hearer is 
an authority over the speaker, but when the hearer is an authority 
on P matters (Berry's primary knower). They are possibly related 
to certain types of tag questions, but they are indirect because 
they are assertive in form and yet function as questions. 
It is quite possible that certain speakers may not use them 
at all and they differ from direct questions in only a subtle way. 
Whereas a question functions thus: 
Is P true? Yes or No, 
a declarative question appears to function as a request for 
confirmation, as Quirk at al. state (op. cit. p. 195). They suggest 
that the speaker takes "yes" or "no" as a foregone conclusion. 
Hence a declarative question appears to mean: 
I believe that P is true, but can you confirm? 
This explanation and the fact that such a form of question exists 
at all fit in well with the cognitive state theory. 
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6.3.3. Pragmatic Maxims, Politeness and Indirect Speech Acts 
In order to determine just how the application of pragmatic 
maxims result in indirect speech acts, we first of all need to 
decide just what pragmatic maxims there are and how they may 
conflict with each other. 
Grice (1975) first postulated the idea of a set of pragmatic 
maxims, given the broad heading of 'The Cooperative Principle'. 
The Cooperative Principle is subdivided into four categories of 
maxims: 
i) Quantity. Give the right amount of information: i. e. 
1. Make your contribution as informative as 
required. 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative 
than is required. 
ii) Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true: 
i. e. 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate 
evidence. 
iii) Relation: Be relevant. 
iv) Manner: Be perspicuous; i. e. 
1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
2. Avoid ambiguity. 
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
4. Be orderly. 
Bach and Harnish (1979), adopted the Gricean maxims and included 
them in their Inferential Model (described in Chapter Three). They 
added the following useful maxims: 
i) Sequencing. The speaker's contribution to the 
exchange is of a communicative type appropriate to that 
stage of the exchange. 
ii) Sincerity. The speaker's contribution to the exchange is 
sincere in that the speaker has the attitude expressed. 
iii) Politeness. The speaker in speaking, behaves politely, 
that is, is not offensive, abusive, vulgar etc. 
iv) Morality. The speaker in speaking behaves ethically, 
that is, does not reveal information that he ought not 
reveal, does not ask for information he ought not or 
does not direct the hearer to do something that the 
hearer does not wish done etc. 
-197- 
If we consider relevance first of all. This is used as an 
assumption that what follows bears some relationship to what has 
gone before. It is also used to determine that something is 
indirect when it appears to bear no relationship to what has gone 
before. Sequencing on the other hand allows us to decide that a 
certain set of speech acts must follow what has gone before. 
Sequencing results from the pairing of speech acts discussed in 
Chapter Four. If a question occupies the primary position, then an 
answer is expected, and it is natural to attempt to decode what 
follows a question as an answer. 
Sincerity may come into play in indirect speech acts where 
convention or politeness demands that an answer is of a certain 
type even if in making that type of answer one is not being 
sincere. An obvious example is the response to "How are you? ", 
where convention demands that an answer of "Very well thank you", 
rather than "Really bad thank you" is given. There is a sort of 
half way house that can be used as a compromise: "Not so good" 
which gives some indication that the standard response is 
inappropriate. 
Quantity may sometimes interact with the basic co-operative 
principle in that it is sometimes useful to give more information 
than has been asked for. Allen (1983) attempted to explain this 
computationally in terms of plan inference, where the speaker has 
identified a potential obstacle in the plan of the hearer and has 
supplied information that helps the hearer overcome this obstacle. 
This maxim is probably of less importance from the point of view 
of indirect speech acts. Quality and truthfulness likewise appear 
to be of only minor importance in indirect speech acts. Manner is 
the maxim that has often been criticised. However its inclusion is 
almost certainly correct as one could argue that it is a 
justification for the direct assumption, outlined in Chapter Five. 
Using direct speech acts where possible means obeying the maxim of 
manner whereas an indirect speech act is adding an extra layer of 
difficulty that has to be overcome. 
6.4 Politeness and Face 
Several attempts have been made to explain politeness. Fraser 
(1990) for example describes four alternative views of politeness. 
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The first of these is the social norm view (Kasher 1986) in which 
each society has a particular set of social norms consisting of 
more or less explicit rules that prescribe certain behaviour, 
states of affairs or a way of thinking in a context. The second 
view is what Fraser calls the conversational maxim view of which 
the basis is Grice's set of pragmatic maxims. This was applied by 
Lakoff (1973) who derived the following extra maxims: 
i) Be clear 
ii) Be polite 
With the sub-rules: 
a) Don't Impose 
b) Give options 
c) Make A feel good 
However this system gives no mention of how the level of 
politeness is to be measured. This approach has been extensively 
discussed by Leech (1983) whose theory distinguished between the 
speaker's illocutionary goals and his social goals. Leech's work 
will be described in greater detail below, but to summarise: he 
extends the maxim of politeness into six individual maxims. These 
maxims are measured on five sets of scales: the cost-benefit 
scale, optionality scale, the indirectness scale, the authority 
scale and the social distance scale. The details of exactly how 
these measurements are made is however somewhat vague. 
A further approach is the face-saving view of Brown and 
Levinson (1987). Brown and Levinson (op. cit. p. 59) define a model 
person (MP), who has positive face and negative face and who is a 
rational agent. Positive face is seen as the positive consistent 
self-image, whereas negative face is seen as basic claim to 
territory, personal preserves and rights to non-distraction. They 
suggest that it will be in an MPs mutual interest to maintain 
face; however some acts are intrinsically face-threatening and in 
order to minimize the effects of such face threatening acts, 
individuals resort to using certain strategies that best enable 
both parties to maintain face. 
Fraser (op. cit. ) also puts forward the conversational 
contract view which associates deference with linguistic form 
(Fraser & Nolan 1981). 
Kasper (1990) points out that there is no satisfactory 
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definition of politeness. I suggest that it is a combination of 
two things: firstly regard to certain behavioural norms imposed by 
a society. This aspect of politeness is sometimes known as 
etiquette, particularly with regard to eating habits. These norms 
may be contradictory from one culture to another, for example in 
British society it is considered rude to make a noise when 
drinking soup. On the other hand, it is looked upon favourably in 
Japan to loudly slurp a bowl of noodles. Smithies (1984) is a 
guide for Chinese in Western society on what we would call 
etiquette. He has the following to say on table manners: 
Slurping liquids for whatever reason, usually because 
they are hot, is considered vulgar in the west,..., it 
is safer to sip one's tea or one's soup and not to suck 
in air at the same time to cool either down. 
Such norms don't necessarily have anything to do with linguistic 
behaviour. The pragmatic maxim approach has more to do with an 
explanation of polite language and this leads onto a second 
definition concerned with linguistic politeness: politeness is the 
use of language to express one's beliefs, wants, desires etc. in a 
manner that is acceptable to the addressee. One problem with the 
pragmatic maxim approach is that the maxims do not seem to hold 
for all cultures. Gu (1990) has postulated four maxims for 
Chinese: 
i) The self denigration maxim - denigrate oneself, elevate 
the other. 
ii) The Address maxim - it is important to use the correct 
form of address. 
iii) The Tact maxim 
iv) The Generosity maxim 
iii) and iv) are more or less the same according to Leech's 
definitions. The address maxim is particularly important in 
Chinese, a society in which naming is very important. Family 
members for example are identified in a much finer way than in 
British culture and language. For example, uncles and aunts are 
addressed by family members from the generation below, according 
to their position and whether they are of the family or married 
into the family. In Hokkien, uncles and aunts are numbered 
according to seniority: tua - first, jee - second, sar - third, 
see - fourth, goh - fifth. Then they are identified either as 
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family members or in-laws: the - uncle, koh - aunt, teow - uncle- 
in-law, chim - aunt-in-law. For example, third uncle (the third 
male) is known as sar-che, his spouse would be sar-chim. 
Similarly, fourth aunt would be see-koh and her husband would be 
see-teow. 
The approach of Brown and Levinson is based almost entirely 
on the notion of face and they have described this as a language 
universal, but it is far from clear that this is so. Ide (1986) 
cast doubt on this idea, claiming that in Japanese there is a much 
greater level of discernment and less of a volitional element. As 
I pointed out to her at the IPRA Pragamatics conference in 1987, 
her data indicates a form of discernment for Chinese also. 
Although this work is primarily about linguistic politeness 
and its effect on indirect speech acts, it is worth noting that 
the Brown and Levinson definition of face seems inadequate to 
explain all cultures and cannot therefore be viewed as a language 
universal. In Chinese society, face is all important and quite 
explicit. There are however, aspects of it that don't fit into the 
Brown and Levinson model. 
In Chinese society (primarily, Malaysian Hakka and Hokkien 
speaking Chinese), face appears to be concerned with the 
interaction between two individuals or groups in the presence of a 
third party. For example: donsider a dinner, which is fairly 
formal, between a family with one daughter (or son) and some 
relatives (perhaps, an aunt and uncle of the daughter living 
abroad). It would be customary for the daughter to "call" senior 
members of her family before eating the meal. This consists of 
saying: "Father eat rice, mother eat rice ... " a ritual, where the 
daughter must address each family member in order of seniority. If 
the daughter fails to do this, then it would be considered rude 
(of her), but her parents would lose face for being seen not to 
have brought up their daughter correctly. In the absence of 
guests, she would merely be castigated for her lack of manners. No 
loss of face is involved. 
In another example, a male discusses a former girlfriend with 
a male friend in the presence of his girlfriend. In this way, he 
is not giving his girlfriend face, she is seen to lose face. In 
the absence of his friend, whether he discusses his former 
girlfriends or not is a matter for him and his girlfriend, loss of 
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face does not come into it. 
In Malaysian society, it is customary to see departing guests 
to the gate. Failure to do so would be seen as impolite or be 
taken as a snub. However not to do so in the presence of another 
party would be a failure to give face to the departing guests. 
A man arranged to meet his wife at his place of work, but 
then forgot and went off to the pub with his friends. His wife on 
arrival was furious to find that he had already left and knowing 
his habits sought him out in the pub. To castigate him in front of 
his friends would make him lose face, so she waited until he got 
home before doing so. Such an act, by Brown and Levinson's 
definition is face threatening, and yet in Chinese society, it 
only involves a loss of face in the presence of a third party. 
Clearly, there is something wrong with their definition of face. 
It is not quite as simple as this however: consider two 
individuals of the same rank in a loosely knit environment, such 
as an academic environment. A upbraids B for something privately, 
and at a later date, B asks a favour of A. In Chinese society, it 
would be said that B has not given himself face. A would realise 
that B is not giving himself face. This is almost a reflexive form 
of face. So although, it is often the case that face gain or loss 
takes place in front of a third party, it is not always so. 
However, the model definitely does not fit with the Brown and 
Levinson model of face. Many of the examples used were only face 
threatening acts when performed in front of another party. A face 
threatening act (by the Brown and Levinson definition) such as the 
wife telling off her husband is only face threatening in Chinese 
society when used in front of a third party. Despite all that, 
some of the strategies described by Brown and Levinson are 
interesting with reference to indirect speech acts. 
Returning to the problem of indirect speech acts and 
politeness, clearly some of the face threatening acts described by 
Brown and Levinson are often uttered as indirect speech acts, 
however, it seems unlikely that these acts are totally independent 
of culture. An act which is face threatening in Japanese society 
is to ask someone a question about their performance in say an 
examination. If they have to answer that they have failed, then 
they lose face, hence such a question is never asked. The same 
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does not apply in British society. The general thesis that will 
be presented is that indirectness is used for a variety of 
reasons, but some of the more important reasons are: conflict of 
maxims, speech act minimisation and conflicting presupposed 
cognitive states. 
6.5 Strategies For Indirectness Based On Cognitive States 
First of all, let's consider some very simple speech acts and 
their responses. Leech (op. cit. p. 112) describes conflict in 
descending order of severity: 
1. Actual Conflict (strongest). 
i) A makes B do X, but B tries not to do A. 
ii) A stops B from doing X, but B tries to do it anyway. 
2. Disobedience. 
i) A tells B to do A, but B does not do A. 
ii) A forbids B from doing A, but B does A. 
3. Will Flouting. 
i) A communicates to B that A wants B to do A, but B 
does not do A. 
ii) A communicates to B that A wants B not to do A, but 
B does A. 
4. Will Incompatibility (Weakest). 
i) A communicates to B that A wants B to do A, but B 
communicates to A that B does not want to do A. 
ii) A communicates to B that A wants B not to do A, but 
B communicates to A that B wants to do A. 
Clearly, conflict is to be avoided where possible. Leech's 
politeness maxims are an explanation of strategies to achieve just 
this. 
He postulated six maxims of politeness that he says explain 
polite behaviour and these go together to form the Politeness 
Principle. His six maxims of politeness are: 
i) The Tact Maxim, in which the speaker attempts to 
minimize the cost to another and maximize the benefit to 
another. 
ii) The Generosity Maxim, in which the speaker minimizes the 
benefit to himself and maximizes the cost to himself. 
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iii) The Approbation Maxim, in which the speaker attempts to 
minimize dispraise of another and maximize praise of 
another. 
iv) The Modesty Maxim, in which the speaker minimizes the 
praise of himself and maximizes dispraise of himself. 
v) The Agreement Maxim, in which the speaker minimizes 
disagreement between himself and another and maximises 
agreement between himself and another. 
vi) The Sympathy Maxim, in which the speaker minimizes 
antipathy between himself and another and maximizes 
sympathy between himself and another. (Leech op. cit. 
p. 132) 
Leech then suggests that the maxims that comprise the Politeness 
Principle plus the maxims of the Cooperative principle go together 
to form what he calls the Interpersonal Rhetoric (Leech op. cit. 
p. 149). He then describes how this may be applied to define what 
he calls the pragmatic force of an utterance. 
One problem with Leech's set of politeness maxims is their 
lack of universality, Gu for example (see section 6.4), postulated 
a set of politeness maxims for Chinese that differ from those 
given by Leech. However, Leech's ideas are very interesting and as 
he states (op. cit. p. 171), they provide us with an alternative in 
speech act theory to sets of speech act rules (for example, 
Searle's essential conditions, preparatory conditions and 
sincerity conditions of illocutions). 
If we now consider these politeness principles when applied 
to assertives, such as one might find opening a conversation 
between strangers, then most people would start of with a fairly 
innocuous statement such as: 
(19a) Nice weather we're having aren't we? 
(19b) Its lovely here isn't it? 
Considering Leech's maxims in turn: the tact maxim and generosity 
maxim aren't applicable for opening line assertives. The third 
maxim, the approbation maxim if applied, may be treated with 
suspicion in most circumstances as people often think that when a 
relative stranger comes up to them and flatters them, his action 
is being driven by some ulterior motive. 
The fourth maxim - the modesty maxim can be used with 
assertives, but it seems rather strange to launch into a tirade 
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against oneself to a perfect stranger. The sixth maxim - the 
sympathy maxim is only applicable in certain circumstances, 
sympathy is not always welcome. The fifth maxim, that of agreement 
is the safest, because the best way to avoid conflict is to reach 
agreement on something. 
Consider the speech act: Assert(P). This is perfectly safe 
assuming that P is not controversial. One way of making sure that 
this will be so, is a statement of the obvious, e. g. statements 
about the weather. There even appears to be a surface form that 
facilitates agreement, i. e. Tag Question 1 (see Chapter Five and 
Quirk et. al. 1973). A form such as: 
(20) Its nice here isn't it? 
actually seems to invite agreement. This therefore appears to be 
the safest form of utterance that it is possible to make, one 
which no one is likely to disagree with. 
In a sense what is happening, particularly with a tag 
question is that the speaker is not only conveying the cognitive 
state: bel(S P) but is also inviting the response that the hearer 
agrees. The speech act expressed in this way (as a tag question) 
appears to make it possible not only to convey the cognitive 
state but also the preferred response. 
Let's now consider some other common responses: firstly where 
the hearer believes that poss(P) but is not absolutely certain. 
Without violating the maxim of quality, one could go along with 
the agreement maxim with a response such as: 
(21) Perhaps, Yes. (Rising tone). 
On the other hand if the hearer does not really believe that P, 
then without (completely) violating the quality maxim, he could 
respond: 
(22) Well, perhaps. 
Note the use of the marker to signal an unfavoured response. If 
however that hearer definitely believes that -P then the response 
appears abrupt, even rude: 
(23) A: We've been having nice weather this year, haven't we? 
(24) B: Actually, I think its been awful. 
A response that indicates that the hearer cannot accept P, and yet 
does not want to appear too rude might be one such as: 
(25a) B: Oh, I'm not so sure. 
or 
(25b) B: Do you really think so? 
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Asserting that P, particularly where one is inviting 
agreement appears to be the safest form of utterance as it is 
positively inviting agreement, thus ensuring that conflict will be 
avoided. 
Another form of speech act that seems relatively safe in that 
it is unlikely to lead to conflict is a suggestion (of something 
pertaining to some neutral topic as in the examples given above). 
When making a suggestion we are stating that although we believe 
that P may be true, we are not certain. Suggestions are more 
neutral than assertions because they don't invite agreement (they 
leave the hearer open to disagree without conflict). Suggestions 
don't seem to involve the use of tag questions in the same way as 
above, however the falling tone tag question appears to indicate 
doubts about P e. g. 
(26) He likes his food, doesn't he? 
But rising tone tag questions don't appear to be used to make 
suggestions, except in the rather clumsy form: 
(27) He might leave tomorrow, mightn't he? 
It is easy to agree with a suggestion, because in doing so, one is 
not making an absolute commitment. However, there are pitfalls, 
for example, by either agreeing or disagreeing, one gives the 
impression of proclaiming oneself as an authority on P matters. 
The next major category of speech act is the set of 
commissive acts, for example promise. When making a promise, one 
is obligating oneself, and not someone else, hence, I suggest that 
commissive speech acts are not often used indirectly, except 
perhaps where the speaker promises to do something that he 
shouldn't really do and once again, this is guided by a pragmatic 
maxim - the morality maxim. 
Questions involve a higher degree of work by the hearer than 
simple assertions and hence impose a greater "obligation" on the 
part of the hearer. It is very easy to agree with an assertion 
that is obvious without saying very much about oneself, but 
answering a question involves doing some work, arriving at a 
truthful answer for something. Hence a greater focus or obligation 
is placed upon the hearer. Some societies place emphasis on the 
avoidance of answering questions negatively (e. g. Japanese), 
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hence a question appears to be more "emotionally loaded" than an 
assertion. 
If responding to questions involves a higher degree of 
commitment from the hearer than does responding to assertives, 
then requests certainly involve a greater degree of commitment 
than questions. This gives us the hierarchy: 
request > question > assertive 
Indirection goes on a downwards gradient (from left to right), but 
it is worth asking the question why this should be so. It is 
likely that refusing to carry out a request involves a potential 
conflict, or at best a loss of face. The worst that can happen 
with a question is that it is answered negatively, which can be 
awkward, but not as bad as refusing to carry out a request. If an 
assertive is not controversial then agreement can readily be 
reached, the safest form of linguistic interaction. Consider an 
example, a hint: 
(28) A (Standing outside in the rain waiting for a bus, 
meeting an acquaintance who has a car): Its raining hard 
tonight isn't it? 
A is hinting that he would like a ride home in the car, but cannot 
use a direct request. Lets consider the direct request, it can 
either be accepted or refused. If it is refused, then it is for 
one of two reasons: 
B cannot give Aa lift home (because he is going in a 
different direction or has to stop off to do some shopping or 
is going to visit his mistress, there can be many reasons). 
B does not want to give Aa lift home (because, for example 
B finds A boring, or A has halitosis, again there can be many 
reasons). 
Clearly, can't is a better reason than won't and under normal 
circumstances an individual does not want to be put into a 
position where they have to admit that they won't do something in 
response to a request. 
The strategy of hinting allows Ba way out if he does not 
want to give Aa lift. B can agree with A's assertion and that is 
that. B drives off and A is left perhaps feeling somewhat 
annoyed with B. But he is not absolutely certain whether B did not 
want to give Aa lift or whether B was merely insensitive. 
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On the other hand turning the request into a question is less 
desirable: 
(29) A: Are you going home via Stotfold? 
or worse still: 
(30) A: Can you possibly give me a lift home? 
The strategy of using a question is worse because it potentially 
reveals the reason why B does not comply with the request. If B 
can give Aa lift home, but does not want to, then he has to 
resort to one of two responses: 
(31) B: I'm sorry I can't, I've got to pick up my son first 
(breaking the quality maxim, by lying) 
(32) B: I'm sorry, but I'm not prepared to give you a lift. 
In the first case B is forced into lying, something he probably 
feels uncomfortable about doing, in the second case, it is going 
to lead to a deterioration in relations between A and B. Of course 
B might unwillingly comply in order to avoid worsening relations, 
but in any case B feels "put upon". 
Using a hint is the safest strategy, because it allows both 
parties a means of by-passing the request altogether. This can be 
achieved by a mechanism that I will call request cancellation: 
(33) A: Its raining heavily tonight isn't it? 
(34) B: I'm sorry I can't give you a lift, I have to go to 
pick up my son. 
(35) A: Oh, sorry, I didn't mean to imply I was asking for a 
lift. 
(36) B: That's OK. 
The implied request is effectively cancelled by both parties. This 
raises the interesting question of why hints are used only in 
certain situations. For example in the standard case of : Can you 
pass the salt? Why would a hint such as: The salt is next to you. 
not be used instead. There are perhaps two reasons for this: 
firstly, this is a case where the speaker knows that the hearer is 
unlikely not to comply with the request. Perhaps this explains 
why: 
(37) Can you pass the salt? 
seems OK, whereas 
(38) Will you pass the salt? 
seems rather rude. 
This appears to suggest that in a situation where the speaker 
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knows that the hearer is unlikely to say "No, I won't service your 
request" then it is acceptable to ask a question, because the 
worst that can happen is that the hearer will say "No, I can't do 
X". Answering "no" to a question is far better than answering "no" 
to a request. So, why then does it seem strange to use a hint such 
as: 
(39) The salt is next to you. 
as a form of request? An obvious answer might be that it is 
because the form Can You X? is a standardized form. If that is so, 
then we still need to delimit the cases where it is acceptable to 
use: Can you X? as opposed to hinting. I suggest that where one 
assumes that the hearer is not likely to refuse the request, then 
the form Can you X? is acceptable, but where the request is a 
favour, then the hinting strategy is more acceptable because it 
allows a strategy that enables the hearer to get out of revealing 
the state: -want H (do (H, P)). Perhaps also, a reason why a hint 
used in the salt passing request seems rude might be because it 
implies a possible unwillingness on the part of the hearer to 
carry out a simple social act. This in turn would imply that the 
hearer is anti-social which would be regarded as offensive by the 
hearer (hints used in this way are fairly common in classrooms, 
i. e. teacher to pupil exchanges: 
(40) The window is open. 
Perhaps the reason why th: +. s is so is that it is used as a form of 
pedagogic strategy to help pupils develop a sense of social 
awareness to the needs of others). 
When we look at the form: Can you P? it is not so much a 
conventionalised/standardized act as a finely tuned form of 
politeness that is correctly formed so that it avoids appearing 
imposing or intrusive (as a request might). It also avoids 
implying possible anti-social behaviour on the part of the hearer. 
We can now summarise this strategy as follows: 
1. Speaker states that some state of affairs P obtains that 
is 
a) known to the hearer, 
b) easily recognisable as a state of affairs that is bad 
for the speaker, and 
c) a state of affairs that the hearer can possibly 
remedy. 
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2. Hearer can: 
a) fail completely to recognise the assertion as a hint. 
b) recognise it as a hint and offer to do Q which 
alleviates the consequences of state of affairs for 
speaker. 
c) recognise it as a hint, but be unable to do Q. 
d) recognise it as a hint, but not want to do Q. 
2a. Hearer agrees with speaker, end of exchange sequence. 
2b Hearer offers to do Q. Speaker (presumably) accepts, 
unless there has been a misunderstanding. 
2c. Hearer may: 
i) apologise for not being able to Q and give reason. 
After which speaker has the option to "cancel" the 
request by saying the equivalent of "I didn't mean to 
imply that I wanted you to do Q". 
ii) not want to reveal the reason for not being able to 
do Q and either lie or resort to strategy 2a. 
Alternatively the hearer may resort to a strategy that 
implies that at some other time he might have been able 
to do P, but not today. e. g. "I'm sorry, I can't give 
you a lift today, some other time perhaps. " 
2d. Hearer will either lie and adopt strategy 2ci or resort 
to strategy 2a. The direct response is normally 
unacceptable. 
In accordance with this schema, the "worst" that can happen is 
that the hearer has to choose between the potential snub (2a) and 
a lie in order to conceal the reason why he cannot do Q. 
I suggest therefore, that the reason why hints are used is 
that it avoids having to rise to the level that Leech called will 
incompatibility, which would happen if the hearer had to reveal 
that he did not want to do Q (which is requested by the speaker). 
Furthermore it gives the hearer a means of getting round having to 
lie. 
The analysis suggests that we cannot treat all requests 
in 
the same way, I suggest that a simple (though possibly incomplete) 
taxonomy of requests might be: 
i) Request Confirmation. (To a person who is an authority 
on P, I believe that P, can you confirm? ) 
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ii) Request Information. Here the speaker wants to know P. 
He is asking the hearer to tell him about P. 
iii) Request Action. The speaker wants the hearer to 
do something. 
iv) Request Transaction. Used in transactions, where 
the speaker wants to buy P. 
Case 1 was described above, it is the situation where the speaker 
wants confirmation that P is true. The speaker believes that P may 
be true and knows that the hearer is an authority on P matters and 
uses a declarative question typically, or a tagged question. 
Case 2 arises when the speaker wants to know something and 
the important question is whether the hearer knows P (there is a 
further possibility regarding whether the hearer is permitted to 
tell the speaker P). This case typically involves indirect speech 
acts such as: Can you tell me P? Addressing the necessary 
precondition once again as an indirect speech act(it also works 
when the speaker wants to know if the hearer is permitted to tell 
him about P). 
Case 3 is the "normal" request, here there are two important 
conditions: that the hearer can do P and that the hearer wants to 
(or is willing to ) do P. The argument that I have put forward is 
that for a request which it is assumed the hearer would not 
normally refuse to service, then a question regarding ability to 
do P can be asked. If however it is a favour, something that the 
hearer might not want to do, then in order to give the hearer a 
way out, a means of disguising the fact that he does not want to 
service the request (what Leech calls will incompatibility), then 
a hint is used. The hint has the virtue of also giving the speaker 
a way out, in that he has a pathway that enables him to claim that 
he was merely making a comment (see the schema above). 
With increased familiarity between speaker and hearer, the 
likelihood of using questions or even direct forms increases, 
however this is perfectly acceptable within the theory presented. 
For example, I always give my friend a lift home when he requests 
it: in this case it seems natural for him to use the direct form. 
On the other hand, I usually give my friend a lift home, but 
sometimes I can't due to other commitments, in this case it is 
more likely that a question would be used. However if this same 
-211- 
friend wanted to borrow money, then this would take our friendship 
onto new ground: he would be likely to use a hint for the simple 
reason that he would not know how I would react to a request to 
lend him money, and if I say that I won't lend him money, it 
strains the friendship, even if I can't it may put the friendship 
on more difficult ground, hence the need for a hint. Here the hint 
may also serve as a mechanism that can be used by the hearer to 
explain why he cannot service the request. At the same time the 
speaker can then claim that he was not making the request anyway, 
this enables both parties to arrive at a form of equilibrium, 
maintaining honour or face intact. 
Case 4 is used almost exclusively for transactions involving 
sales: here the indirect form is: Have you got P? The assumption 
is that the vendor will want to sell P if he has it, also that he 
is able to sell it. What may not be known is whether he has P to 
sell. Note that it is perfectly acceptable to use the direct form 
when it is obvious that the vendor has P. May I have P. please? is 
not in the least bit impolite. 
To summarise the indirect strategies for requests: we may 
view a request as a "plan" in the sense used by Allen (1983,1987) : 
a sequence of operations to achieve a goal. In order to execute 
the request plan, we need to know (depending upon the type of 
request) that the hearer can do P, and that the hearer is willing 
to do P. However, finding this out is a problem because the hearer 
may not want to tell us that he is not willing to do P. This is 
solved by using the hint schema described above. The exact surface 
form type of the request is determined by the obstacles that we 
perceive in the way of a successful execution of the request. 
Politeness considerations mean that we do not want to test for 
will incompatibility directly. 
The idea of request plans or schemas also explains pre- 
requests as something totally compatible with speech acts, hence 
the assertion made by Levinson (1983) that pre-sequences challenge 
speech act theory is incorrect. 
The other question connected with the strategies surrounding 
requests: is how is the surface form decoded as a request? 
Brown and Levinson (op. cit. p. 213) are incorrect in their 
assertion that a hint violates the maxim of relevance. It does 
-212- 
not, for if it did, it would be impossible to distinguish from 
truely irrelevant responses. We assume co-operative behaviour and 
hence that sequencing and relevance maxims will be obeyed. 
Therefore when giving a hint we assume that the hearer will 
recognise it as relevant to the current context. 
Having spent some time examining requests and why they are 
often performed indirectly, it is worth examining some other 
indirect speech acts. Searle identified certain other types that 
he thought were conventionally indirect: for example sentences 
concerning the speaker's wish or want that the hearer will do P; 
e. g., I want you to do P. This particular act appears to be a 
direct communication of the desired affect. The effect of a 
directive act is that it is an attempt to get the hearer to do 
something, and in most cases, the speaker conveys the fact that he 
wants the hearer to do P. This is similar to the case where the 
speaker directly states the purpose of an assertive: I want you to 
believe that P. Thus it appears that another way of expressing 
oneself directly is to explicitly state the cognitive state 
conveyed by the speech act. The problem with the utterance: I want 
you to do P is that it is not clear which speech act it is being 
used to perform; whether it is a suggestion or an order for 
example. Almost all directives convey in one form or another the 
fact that the speaker wants the hearer to do P and because of 
this, if the speaker states directly that he wants the hearer to 
do P, it might not be clear to the hearer with what degree of 
force (to use classical speech act theory terminology) the speaker 
wishes express this cognitive state (e. g. should it be a request 
or a command). Hence it tends to come over as rather impolite. 
There is a tendency for the hearer to interpret the direct form of 
the cognitive state in its most imposing (speech act)form, i. e. 
as an order or command. 
Another indirect form mentioned by Searle is that of a 
question about the hearer's reasons for doing something, e. g. 
(41) Is it really necessary for you to make so much noise? 
By questioning the reasons why the hearer is doing P, the speaker 
is implying that he would rather the hearer not do P. 
Further ways of asking someone not to do something include 
forms such as: 
(42) Must I ask/tell you to take out the garbage? 
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I suggest that the reason why this form is used is that there is a 
contract between the speaker and hearer that the hearer will 
normally do P and in this case has failed to do so. This is an 
extra knowledge state relating to P. This form is barely 
acceptable as it is not very polite, but it would be odd if there 
were no assumption between speaker and hearer that hearer normally 
does P. 
Two questions remain with this approach: firstly, how do the 
indirect speech acts relate to the Gricean maxims and secondly, 
how can we measure levels of politeness, with particular reference 
to indirect speech acts? 
6.6 Indirect Speech Acts and Pragmatic Maxims 
Possibly the two most important pragmatic maxims are the 
maxim of relevance and the sequencing maxim. These are paramount 
because they are inviolable if a rational conversation is going to 
take place. We have to assume relevance because without it there 
is a violation of the communicative presumption (that the speaker 
is speaking with some identifiable communicative intent). If we 
consider the example used by Searle as a response to a proposal: 
(43) I have to study for my exams, 
then although this appears to violate the relevance maxim, it does 
not in fact do so. If we take the sequencing maxim in conjunction 
with the relevance maxim then we will see why this is so. The 
sequencing maxim may be defined in terms of a pairing between 
primary speech acts and appropriate secondary speech acts. It also 
ensures the continuation of the primary-secondary sequence as well 
as controlling new topic introduction. To change topic when an 
answer to a question is expected is seen as a violation of the 
sequencing maxim, and is also seen as being evasive. It is the 
relevance and sequencing maxims that give the discourse its 
coherence. 
The sincerity maxim ensures that when people do things such 
as make promises, they intend to carry them out. Clearly it is 
desirable to obey this maxim because violation implies 
insincerity. It is also desirable to ensure that an utterance does 
not push someone into a violation of this maxim. For example, when 
making a request, the response requires some form of commitment by 
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the hearer. If the hearer does not want to service the request, 
then he either has to say so, or violate the sincerity maxim, 
which is undesirable. 
The maxim of quantity ensures that the speaker provides 
enough information, not too much, not too little. If we stand by 
the co-operative principle: that people co-operate with each other 
by inferring each others wants and beliefs, then sometimes the 
quantity maxim has to be violated. Allen (1983) described a 
computer model that produced "helpful" responses: those that arose 
as a result of inferring the speaker's goals and plans and 
providing information to enable them to achieve those goals. The 
example used was: 
(44) Traveller: Can you tell the time of the next train to 
Rochester? 
(45) Clerk: At 18.30 from platform 5. 
In a sense, the clerk's response is "indirect": it is not a strict 
answer to the indirect interpretation of the question. 
(46) T: (Direct) Canyou tell me the time of the ...? 
(47) T: (Indirect) What time does the next train to ...? 
(48) C: (Direct) At 18.30 
(49) C: (Indirect) At 18.30 from platform 5. 
Strictly speaking it is not indirect because the direct response 
is directly coded in the surface form, but it also includes 
additional information and one could argue that it makes it a form 
of indirect speech act. It also violates the quantity maxim in 
that it is providing more information than the question strictly 
asks for. Here a conflict is set up between being co-operative and 
obeying the quantity maxim. To violate the quantity maxim is not 
as serious as violating say the relevance maxim or the sincerity 
maxim. 
It is difficult to know where to draw the line with the co- 
operative principle however. For example, I travel into London 
almost daily and usually buy a one-day ticket. However City 
University is within walking distance of Kings Cross, so I only 
purchase a rail ticket. However, most people would use the 
underground and could save themselves money by buying a composite 
ticket, a travel card. So the following often takes place: 
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(50) P: A return to Kings Cross please. 
(51) Clerk: Do you want to use the underground? 
(52) P: No 
(53) Clerk: (Provides ticket) 
The co-operative principle obviously has to involve certain 
generalisations. 
The quantity maxim can be violated in other ways: by either 
asserting something that you know to be true, or asking a question 
to which you know the answer. These occur when using certain 
indirect strategies: a hint sometimes involves asserting something 
that is known to the hearer, e. g. 
(54) Its raining hard tonight isn't it (Can I have a lift? ). 
The conventional/standardized form of making a request by asking a 
question sometimes means that the answer to the question is 
already known. 
I suggest that the fact that the quantity maxim has been 
violated is coincidental; consider the following hints: 
(55) Its raining heavily tonight. (Violation of the quantity 
maxim) . 
(56) I'm really short of money at the moment. 
The first involves a violation of the quantity maxim, but the 
second probably does not. This suggests that the violation occurs 
not as a strategy, but because there is no other choice. 
The maxim of truthfulness is one that should not violated, 
for obvious reasons. It is not generally acceptable to be thought 
of as being a liar. If the speE. ker asks the hearer something that 
the hearer does not want to tell the speaker, or if the speaker 
asks the hearer to do something that they do not want to do, then 
the hearer is faced with the prospect of either refusing to tell 
or do whatever the speaker wants him to do. Alternatively, the 
hearer can lie, but neither of these alternatives is very 
desirable. 
A violation of the maxim of manner results in a greater 
possibility that the speaker will be misunderstood. It is 
acceptable, indeed necessary when shouting a warning to use a very 
direct form, e. g. Watch out! However, when using an indirect form 
the maxim of manner is violated, but this is not always a bad 
thing. It may be associated with being evasive, but it may also be 
associated with being tactful or polite. 
The maxim of politeness assumes that the speaker uses the 
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correct level of politeness. Leech (1983) has attempted to analyse 
this maxim further. Brown and Levinson (op. cit. p. 4) argue 
against this approach because it is likely to result in a 
proliferation of maxims with the result that pragmatic theory will 
become totally unconstrained. There is some virtue in this 
argument, because Gu (1990) has indicated that Chinese requires 
separate maxims to those defined by Leech. If it becomes necessary 
to define new politeness maxims for every language then we are 
possibly attempting to view politeness in the wrong way. 
The alternative is to represent politeness in terms of the 
other maxims, which is what Brown and Levinson have attempted in 
their set of strategies. However they appear misguided in their 
attempt to explain everything in terms of face and face 
threatening acts for three reasons: firstly, as Ide (1986) pointed 
out, Japanese for example, appears to involve a greater element of 
discernment. Secondly, the concept of face does not match all 
cultures (see the arguments and examples above). Thirdly, it is 
possible to realise tensions between the other maxims that often 
result in very good reasons why indirect speech acts are used, for 
example a speech act that attempts to force someone to reveal 
information that they prefer to keep to themselves. 
The final maxim (used by Bach and Harnish) is the maxim of 
morality. There are two aspects to this, firstly things that the 
speaker ought not to reveal. Secondly, the speaker should avoid 
putting the hearer into the position where he has to reveal 
something he ought not to, or to have to do something he does not 
want to do. The maxim of morality comes into play when considering 
the strategy for hinting when making a request. 
A difficult remaining question is how can we measure 
politeness, particularly in terms of indirect speech acts? Leech 
(op. cit. ) suggests a set of scales: 
i) The Cost-benefi-c Scale. 
ii) The Optionality Scale. 
iii) The Indirectness Scale. 
iv) The Authority Scale. 
v) The Social Distance Scale. 
The cost-benefit scale is a measure of the cost or benefit to the 
hearer of complying with the utterance. For example the utterance 
(Leech op. cit. p. 107) Peel these potatoes involves a cost to the 
hearer (of having to do some work). On the other hand an utterance 
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such as Have another sandwich has an obvious benefit to the 
hearer. Given in their bare form as imperatives when there is a 
cost to the hearer, an utterance such as Peel these potatoes is 
hardly polite. On the other hand Have another sandwich is polite 
as it stands. Leech points out that somewhere on the scale there 
is a change from cost to hearer to benefit to hearer and there is 
a general increase in politeness. 
The optionality scale is concerned with how much choice the 
speaker gives the hearer. Sit down! gives the hearer less choice 
than Would you like to sit down? The more choice the speaker gives 
the hearer, the more polite (in general) the utterance is. 
The indirectness scale can be measured in terms of how many 
inferences the hearer has to make in order to arrive at the 
intention behind the utterance. 
The authority scale is a measure of the authority that the 
speaker has over the hearer, or vice versa. The social distance 
scale is the overall degree of respectfulness that the speaker has 
for the hearer, based upon familiarity between the speaker and 
hearer plus other factors such as respect for age etc. 
Of the five factors, I have already considered to some extent 
the degree of authority; but I do not accept indirectness as a 
measure in its own right - it appears to come about because of 
other factors but the first two factors are of some significance. 
In order to throw some light on measures of politeness, I want to 
return first of all to the strategies of indirectness that are 
used for one particular speech act which I shall expand upon in 
the next section. 
6.7 A Schematic Model of the Speech Act "Request" 
Throughout the thesis, I have been developing a model of 
speech acts based upon the idea of states or cognitive states that 
are necessary in order to: 
i) determine the underlying intent behind an utterance. 
ii) determine what the speaker needs to know, believe or 
think in order to make a particular speech act. 
iii) determine, to some extent, the possible types of 
response that the hearer may make. 
i) says that the speaker communicates beliefs, intentions, wants 
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etc. to the hearer. For example, when requesting P, the speaker 
communicates to the hearer that he wants the hearer to do 
something. 
ii) is a mutually shared set of facts about an utterance that 
enable the speaker to make a particular type of speech act. For 
example, when making a request, the speaker believes that the 
hearer might be able to do P. 
iii) are certain things that the speaker knows about the hearer in 
order to understand the hearer's responses to the speech act. For 
example, in making an assertion, the speaker knows that it is 
possible that the hearer will not believe him. This enables the 
speaker to recognize a response which effectively questions the 
speaker's belief in P. 
I put this information together in Chapter Three in the form 
of an outline schema. I then used the communicated cognitive state 
in Chapter Four to show the range of possible response that the 
hearer could make to the the speaker's original speech act. Then 
in Chapter Five I outlined a sketchy account of how particular 
communicated cognitive states map onto surface forms. 
In order to include indirect speech acts, together with an 
account of pragmatic maxims, it is necessary to add to the schema 
a set of "schematic plans" which determine how the speech act 
should be delivered within a particular language community. A 
schematic plan is an outline plan of action that is used to ensure 
the successful expression of a particular cognitive state in terms 
of the most appropriate form in accordance with politeness norms. 
I shall now examine the schematic plan for the speech act request. 
REQUEST 
In this description of request I shall be somewhat liberal; 
strictly, some of the conditions may arguably belong to tell or 
ask. 
Firstly, I will use the schema outlined in Chapter Three: 
Action: SPEAK(S H want(S do(H P))) 
Cognitive States: 1) know(S -do(H P) -> -P) 
2) -want(S bel(H O(do(H P)))) 
3) bel (S poss (do (H P)) ) 
Presumed Effect: know(H want(S do(H P))) 
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This tells us what is being communicated (that the speaker wants 
the hearer to do P). Secondly it tells us what the speaker needs 
to know before generating the speech act: that if the hearer 
doesn't do P, it won't get done, furthermore that the speaker does 
not want the hearer to believe that he has to do P. Perhaps we 
should also add the fact that the speaker wants the hearer to do 
P. Finally, it includes the fact that the speaker knows that the 
hearer may do P, but does not have to. 
In addition to this we need to add a schematic plan that 
enables the speaker to deliver the request in the most acceptable 
surface form within the language community. The ultimate aim of 
the schematic plan is to convey to the hearer that we want 
something from him: this may be a request for information (such as 
the time), a request for the hearer to do something (such as 
passing us the salt or giving us a lift in a car), a request for 
the hearer to ensure that a certain state of affairs comes about 
(such as requesting that someone is informed of something) or 
requesting that the hearer gives, sells or allows us to use 
something. There are probably other forms, such as requesting that 
the hearer gives us permission to do something. 
Within this schema, there is information about the authority 
relationship between speaker and hearer, there is also some 
measure of social distance between speaker and hearer. The 
assumption is that if the hearer is not able to service the 
request then the hearer is subject to a loss of face, however 
small. For example if we ask for something in a shop and the 
assistant is unable to supply us with what we want, then a small 
apology is in order. Worse, if the hearer is unwilling to service 
the request then a situation of will incompatibility exists. 
Therefore the plan schema ensures that the preconditions for the 
request are established before making the request, the pre-request 
pattern is one example of this. There may even be a morality 
problem with requesting the hearer to do something that we know is 
wrong (morally or illegally). This gives us the following: 
i) want (S know(P) ) 
Precondition: know(H P) 
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ii) want (S do (H P) ) 
Preconditions: poss(do(H P)) 
will (do(H P)) 
iii) want(S do(H P)) P=a transfer of ownership of an object 
Preconditions: poss (do(H P)) 
will (do(H P)) 
has (H P) 
ii) also includes acts that could be immoral or illegal, in which 
case the same basic problem exists - of whether the hearer is 
willing to do the act in question. 
If we take the first case, that of a request for information, then 
the precondition is that the hearer knows whatever the speaker 
requests, the standard indirect form for such requests is: 
(57) Can you tell me the time, please? 
(58) Have you got the time please? 
In both cases, the speaker is attempting to check the pre- 
condition, In certain cases, the hearer may not be able to give 
the speaker the information requested, for reasons of 
confidentiality, in which case the first of these forms is 
appropriate. (It is worth noting here that the modal auxiliary can 
can be used to denote both ability and permission, and hence may 
have a double meaning; of both questioning ability and requesting 
permission. ) 
I have already given an outline strategy for the second case 
in which the speaker requests the hearer to do something. The 
precondition of the hearer's willingness to do P overrides the 
hearer's ability to do P. The speaker must judge the hearer's 
willingness to do P based presumably on factors such as social 
distance (in some societies obligation comes into play as an 
important constituent, e. g. Chinese society), the cost of the act 
to the hearer (lending money has a high cost, whereas passing the 
salt at the table is of minimal cost and is a social nicety. ) The 
speaker will also judge whether to use a hinting strategy 
referring to the fact that the hearer has serviced a request of 
this kind before. I suggest that everyone has their own 
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threshhold as to whether they use the hinting strategy or request 
by use of a question, but the rough formula 
Cost to Hearer - Social Distance > Threshhold 
seems to apply when deciding to use a hinting strategy or to make 
a request using a question. The hints themselves take the form of: 
i) Speaker states a state of affairs that is bad for him and 
that the hearer can rectify. (e. g. I'm getting very wet 
waiting for this bus. ) 
ii) Speaker states a state of affairs that he would like to 
see obtain. (e. g. I really need to be home in bed with 
this cold. ) 
An obvious question to ask at this point is why a hinting strategy 
seems rude in a situation where the hearer would not normally 
refuse to service the request? e. g. 
(59) The salt is next to you and I can't reach it. 
I suggest that this might be because by making a hint, the speaker 
implies that the hearer might not be willing to do P and this is 
the same thing as hinting that the hearer might not be willing to 
observe the accepted norms of social behaviour, something which 
might be taken as rather offensive. 
Another related question is why is the direct form not used, 
after all, given that we assume that the hearer will observe 
social norms, why is it necessary to resort to a question rather 
than a direct request? In situations where the social distance is 
great, then, however small the cost is to the hearer, it is not 
acceptable to use a request if an acceptable indirect form exists. 
Additionally, a problem with the bald imperative (i. e. pass 
the salt) is that it uses no form of address and I suggest that a 
form such as Can you pass the salt? is used because it uses a form 
of address. (There is a possibility that it may stem from the use 
of "you" as a polite form in old English, in the same way that 
"vous" is used to indicate social distance in French, however this 
is pure speculation). The modal can is used because others are 
pragmatically loaded in ways that makes their use inappropriate, 
e. g will. 
The indirect form: Can you do P? may be contextually 
dependent (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975), e. g. 
(60) Can you juggle with three objects? (Speaker holding 
three skittles) 
It may also be ambiguous, e. g., speaker to hearer in a Japanese 
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restaurant: 
(61) Can you speak Japanese? (To Hearer who shows a marked 
preference for Japanese food) 
The final form of request is where the speaker wants to have 
or use something possessed by the hearer. The form of indirection 
is heavily dependent upon the type of transaction that is to take 
place. In a situation where the hearer is willing to sell the item 
to the speaker, then the form: 
Have you got P? 
is perfectly acceptable. On the other hand, if the speaker wants 
to borrow something owned by the hearer, then the same sort of 
considerations apply as do the case where the speaker attempted to 
assess the hearer's willingness to do P. If the cost is great and 
the social distance is not sufficiently near then a hint may be 
used, e. g 
(62) The trees at the back of my garden are overhanging and 
cutting down the light to my rockery. (May I borrow your wood 
saw? ) 
Requests - Other Forms of Indirection 
Other forms of indirection exist in connection with requests. 
These seem to take the following forms: 
i) Speaker states desired effect of request. e. g. I want 
you to leave the room. 
ii) Speaker states or emphasises a precondition state of the 
requesting act. e. g. If you don't stop smoking, then 
we'll all get cancer. (Specification of the case where 
the speaker states that if the hearer doesn't do P, then 
-P will obtain) 
iii) Speaker states the communicative act directly. (For a 
request, this is the same as the desired effect, but in 
the case of an assertive, the desired effect is: bel(H 
P), whereas what is being communicated is: bel(S P) ). 
There are various reasons why these forms might be used. 
Although by the strict definition of speech acts the first of 
these cases is indirect, it come across as a very direct form of 
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speaking. The third case in particular is almost akin to the 
performative hypothesis. Perhaps the reason why there is such an 
argument is that it is possible to state the desired effect of 
many speech acts directly with greater or lesser success, however 
to suggest that a surface form such as 
(63) Leave the room 
has an underlying structure 
(64) I imper that you leave the room 
is in my opinion misguided. I suggest that the reason why many 
speech act verbs can be expressed performatively is that in many 
cases it is possible to directly express the desired effect. Hence 
an assertive, 
(65) The moon is made of green cheese, 
becomes 
(66) I believe that the moon is made of green cheese. 
or in the first case, 
(67) I want you to believe that the moon is made of green 
cheese. 
By directly expressing the desired effect of the speech act, the 
intention couldn't be clearer in the directive case: 
(68) I request that you leave the room, 
(69) I want you to leave the room. 
Both of these forms are very much to the point and are somewhat 
lacking in politeness. The analogous case with assert seems very 
intense, giving the impression that the person making the 
utterance is very sincere in their beliefs. 
The second case arises when the speaker gives some 
precondition of the act as an indirect form of the act itself. I 
suggest that the reasons for using this type of indirection varies 
according to which precondition is being used. For example with 
request it is possible to say: 
(70) If you don't do P then nobody else will. 
as an indirect form of request/ask/tell. In this case the idea 
behind the indirection appears to be to draw attention to the 
consequences of the hearer not doing P. When making a request it 
is also possible to emphasise the desire to give the hearer a 
choice (the precondition that the speaker does not want to say 
that the hearer has to do P), e. g. 
(71) I don't want you to think that you have to do it but, 
could you possibly do P. 
-224- 
here the speaker feels he has no right to ask the hearer to do P, 
and does not want to put him under any pressure. 
Other speech acts yield similar forms of indirection: 
(Assert) I know you won't believe me but I just saw a UFO. 
In this case the speaker is emphasising the fact that he accepts 
that there is little likelihood of the hearer believing him. 
Similar types of indirection can be found for almost every speech 
act verb. The reason : _or indirection appears to be that the 
speaker particularly wants to emphasise one precondition. 
There are also cases where what is requested/asserted is 
already known to the hearer. I gave an example of plead/beg 
(Maltby and Boulblil 1989) where it was known what the speaker was 
asking for, but the reason why the speaker was pleading was not 
known. 
6.8 Summary 
In this section, I have attempted to deal with the problem of 
indirect speech acts. The final description of a speech act 
consisted of a schematic plan which contained an action in the 
form of what the speaker wants to express in terms of their 
beliefs or wants. Hence when making an assertive, the speaker 
expresses his belief in P. This belief may be modified by modal or 
deontic operators. There are also a set of preconditions 
(presupposed cognitive states) that express two things: those 
things that the speaker needs to know or to have thought about in 
order to make a given speech act. Secondly, they include a set of 
states that enable the speaker to determine (to some extent) the 
sort of response that they will receive from the hearer. For 
example with an assertive, the speaker knows that the hearer may 
not believe him and is prepared for this. 
The speech act also contains a presumed effect, that is what 
the speaker hopes will happen as a result of uttering a particular 
speech act. Additionally, the speech act is associated with a set 
of plans, which enable the speaker to deliver the speech act in 
the most appropriate surface form by operating within the 
constraints imposed upon him by a set of pragmatic maxims. These 
plans include considerations of maintaining face, the authority 
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relationship between speaker and hearer and the social distance 
between the two. The same plans enable the speaker to recognise 
the type of response to the speech act. 
This schematic plan as a whole works as an explanation of the 
meaning of a speech act verb as it describes in some detail its 
use within a particular language community. This may be considered 
an extension of the base model of speech act generation produced 
in Chapter Five. 
This theory not only dissolves the distinction between 
conversational analysis theories (at the appropriate level) and 
those of discourse analysis, but it also describes how a 
particular act is to be performed within a language community. 
Finally, I believe that this work is of some importance as an 
explanation of linguistic politeness. 
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Appendix I 
The material contained in the appendix must at best be 
considered incomplete, it is an attempt to demonstrate how the 
idea of speech act pairings described in Chapter Four can be 
extended into a structure for discourse. However, it is heavily 
dependent upon a detailed analysis of discourse markers in 
conjunction with speech act pairs and this has only been achieved 
at a very rudimantary level. It starts with a recorded dialogue of 
a telephone conversation, indicating the initiation response 
pairs. The next section is a description of a proposed discourse 
grammar, along similar lines to those of Sinclair and Coulthard. 
The grammar is specified as a context free (Chomsky Type 2) 
grammar, using Backus-Naur Form, commonly used to specify computer 
programming languages. 
Sample Dialogue 
[1] A: Hello there, I rang you earlier but you were out. 
[Initiationl - Report: Possibly to explain reason for not ringing 
earlier] 
[2] B: Oh, [Unexpected propositional content] I must have been at 
D's mum's. [Responsel] But we've been in a good hour and a half to 
two. [12] 
[3] A: Oh [Unexpected propositional content] well [re-orientation] 
I went shopping then [R2] 
[4] B: How uz things, alright? [13] 
[5] A: Yes fine [R3] I'm ringing up about tomorrow actually 
[I4] 
and I'll do coffee tomorrow morning. [14+] 
[6] B: Itchee - Not V's [Meta-speech act - clarification] 
[7] A: Insteada V's [Meta-speech act - clarify] 
[8] B: Alright. [R4 - accept commissive] 
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[9] A: Coz there's no bag meeting [14++ - additional] So [Marker 
of supplementary material] I thought it'll be an opportunity for 
me to do it. [I4+++] 
[10] B: Yes [R4+] V's alright is she? [I5] 
[11] A: Yes she's fine I popped down last night [R5] 
[12] B: Oh that's good. She's alright. [IR5 summary] 
[13] A: For awhile -M came with me, so... [Repair] How's D 
anyway? [16] 
[14] B: Yes, he went for his X-Rays on Friday. [R6] 
[15] A: Yes [Acknowledge - marker for R6+] 
[16] B: And we're waiting for the results, now he has to go to the 
doctor's on Monday for his sick note. [R6+/17] 
[17] A: Mm? [R7] 
[18] B: So [Supplementary information marker] we'll see how he 
gets on [17+] 
[19] A: And is he any better? [18] 
[20] B: Yes his back has been much better the last two days. [R8] 
[21] A: Oh that's good [IR8 - expressive] The pain's gone? [19] 
[22] B: Yes [R9] 
[23] A: Yes [Self orientation] You know whether anything will show 
up on the X-rays, or not? [I10] 
[24] B: No we'll just have to wait and see But it's better with 
him. [R10] 
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[25] A: Muscles I think really. [Ill] 
[26] B: Could have been yes [R11] 
A Structure for Discourse 
The notation used in this section is based upon Backus-Naur 
Form (BNF) used to represent computer languages. BNF is a means of 
representing a Chomsky type 2 (context free) grammar. Based upon 
the initiation-response cycle it is possible to put forward a 
structure for discourse. However it is not quite as simple as it 
first appears. At the top level of the structure is the 
transaction which consists of a set of exchanges: 
Ep (E2E3... En) 
where there must be at least one exchange. A transaction 
corresponds roughly with a topic in the conversation. The exchange 
then has at its heart the initiation-response pairing. The 
preliminary exchange has at its head a marker to introduce the 
topic, hence it has the form: 
<topic-marker><exchange> 
Then <exchange> itself consists of an initiation body followed by 
a response body with an optional comment body. 
<exchange> <initiation-body><response-body>(<comment- 
body>) 
Initiation body consists of an initiation followed by an optional 
set of elaborations with an optional terminator. 
<initiation-body> <initiation> (<elaboration>)* 
(<terminator>) 
Initiation itself is simply a primary speech act (defined in 
Chapter Four) : 
<initiation> :: = primary speech act 
Elaboration normally occurs when the speaker continues on after 
the primary speech act. Each elaboration section may be connected 
by a connective marker, hence we have the structure: 
<elaboration> :: = <connective> primary speech act The 
terminator of the initiation sequence occurs when the speaker 
indicates that he has finished and is expecting a response. 
<terminator> :. = <supplementary-marker> primary speech act 
The response body is quite complex and may consist of a meta- 
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section, a response with or without a preceding response marker. 
Finally it may or may not be followed by an initiation body from 
the hearer. 
<response-body> :. _ <meta-section><response-body> 
<response-markers><response> I 
<response-markers><response><initiation- 
body> 
<response><initiation-body> 
The meta-section is what is known as an insertion sequence 
and consists of two meta-speech acts. The meta section is then 
followed by a normal response body. 
<meta-section> :. _ <meta-initiation><meta-response> 
<meta-initiation> :. _- primary speech act 
<meta-response> :: = secondary speech act 
The response itself consists of a secondary speech act ( defined 
earlier in the section). 
<response> :: = secondary speech act 
(strictly speaking the idea of using context free grammar to 
describe the discourse structure breaks down here because the 
primary and secondary speech acts must be typed and hence can only 
be represented by a type 1 or context sensistive grammar. ) 
The various markers used are as follows: 
<topic-marker> :: = By the wayl... 
The topic marker is a small set of recognized ways of introducing 
new topics of which By the way is one example. 
<comment-body> :: = expressive speech act 
The comment body allows the initiator of the exchange to finish 
with a comment which is normally an expressive speech act. 
<connective> :: = andibut ... 
A connective serves to attach one sequence to another, it may be 
competely absent. 
... <supplementary marker> :. = Sol 
The only supplementary marker that I have been able to find is the 
marker so, but there may be others. 
<response-markers> :. _ <orientation-marker> I 
<information-management-marker> I 
<orientation-marker><information-management- 
marker> 
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<orientation-marker> :: = ohi... 
<information-management-marker> :. = wellt... 
The dialogue structure is meant to be an outline, it is not meant 
to be thought of as exhaustive particularly with respect to the 
various non-speech act markers. 
The simplest form of exchange occurs when there is just an 
initiation and a response: 
A: How uz things, alright? 
B: Yes fine. 
Initiation sections may be extended, although sometimes, but not 
always the speaker marks where they want to end using the marker 
of supplementary material: 
A: Coz there's no bag meeting. [Initiation]. So [Marker] I 
thought it'll be an opportunity for me to do it. 
[Supplementary material] 
Meta sections occcur immediately after the initiation part and 
usually indicate something that needs clarifying: 
A: I'm ringing up about tomorrow actually [Initiation] and 
I'll do coffee tomorrow morning. [Elaboration] 
B: Itchee - Not V's? [Request for clarification - Meta-speech 
act] 
A: Insteada V's. [Meta-speech act - Clarify] 
B: Alright. [Response] 
markers for orientation and what Schiffrin (1987) calls 
information management often indicate an unexpected propositional 
content. They may also indicate that the response does not follow 
the expected pattern. This may serve as a means of decoding 
indirect speech acts as responses. 
A: I rang you earlier but you were out. [Initiation] 
B: Oh [Orientation] I must have been at D's mum's. [Response] 
But we've been in a good hour and a half to two. 
[Initiation]. 
A: Oh [Orientation] well [Information management] I went 
shopping then. 
